Quantification of E-Waste: A Case Study in Federal University of Espírito Santo, Brazil

The segregation of waste of electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) in the generating source, its characterization (quali-quantitative) and identification of origin, besides being integral parts of classification reports, are crucial steps to the success of its integrated management. The aim of this paper was to count WEEE generation at the Federal University of Espírito Santo (UFES), Brazil, as well as to define sources, temporary storage sites, main transportations routes and destinations, the most generated WEEE and its recycling potential. Quantification of WEEE generated at the University in the years between 2010 and 2015 was performed using data analysis provided by UFES’s sector of assets management. EEE and WEEE flow in the campuses information were obtained through questionnaires applied to the University workers. It was recorded 6028 WEEEs units of data processing equipment disposed by the university between 2010 and 2015. Among these waste, the most generated were CRT screens, desktops, keyboards and printers. Furthermore, it was observed that these WEEEs are temporarily stored in inappropriate places at the University campuses. In general, these WEEE units are donated to NGOs of the city, or sold through auctions (2010 and 2013). As for recycling potential, from the primary processing and further sale of printed circuit boards (PCB) from the computers, the amount collected could reach U$ 27,839.23. The results highlight the importance of a WEEE management policy at the University.

An Open Source Advertisement System

An online advertisement system and its implementation for the Yioop open source search engine are presented. This system supports both selling advertisements and displaying them within search results. The selling of advertisements is done using a system to auction off daily impressions for keyword searches. This is an open, ascending price auction system in which all accepted bids will receive a fraction of the auctioned day’s impressions. New bids in our system are required to be at least one half of the sum of all previous bids ensuring the number of accepted bids is logarithmic in the total ad spend on a keyword for a day. The mechanics of creating an advertisement, attaching keywords to it, and adding it to an advertisement inventory are described. The algorithm used to go from accepted bids for a keyword to which ads are displayed at search time is also presented. We discuss properties of our system and compare it to existing auction systems and systems for selling online advertisements.

Value Co-Creation in Used-Car Auctions: A Service Scientific Perspective

Electronic market place plays an important intermediary role for connecting dealers and retail customers. The main aim of this paper is to design a value co-creation model in used-car auctions. More specifically, the study has been designed in order to describe the process of value co-creation in used-car auctions, to explore the co-created values in used-car auctions, and finally conclude the paper indicating the future research directions. Our analysis shows that economic values as well as non-economic values are co-created in used-car auctions. In addition, this paper contributes to the academic society broadening the view of value co-creation in service science.

A Frugal Bidding Procedure for Replicating WWW Content

Fine-grained data replication over the Internet allows duplication of frequently accessed data objects, as opposed to entire sites, to certain locations so as to improve the performance of largescale content distribution systems. In a distributed system, agents representing their sites try to maximize their own benefit since they are driven by different goals such as to minimize their communication costs, latency, etc. In this paper, we will use game theoretical techniques and in particular auctions to identify a bidding mechanism that encapsulates the selfishness of the agents, while having a controlling hand over them. In essence, the proposed game theory based mechanism is the study of what happens when independent agents act selfishly and how to control them to maximize the overall performance. A bidding mechanism asks how one can design systems so that agents- selfish behavior results in the desired system-wide goals. Experimental results reveal that this mechanism provides excellent solution quality, while maintaining fast execution time. The comparisons are recorded against some well known techniques such as greedy, branch and bound, game theoretical auctions and genetic algorithms.

Auction Theory: Bidder's Perspective in an English Auction Environment

This paper provides an overview of auction theory literature. We present a general review on literature of various auctions and focus ourselves specifically on an English auction. We are interested in modelling bidder's behavior in an English auction environment. And hence, we present an overview of the New Zealand wool auction followed by a model that would describe a bidder's decision making behavior from the New Zealand wool auction. The mathematical assumptions in an English auction environment are demonstrated from the perspective of the New Zealand wool auction.

Designing a Multilingual Auction Website for Selling Agricultural Products

The study aimed to identify the logical structure of data and particularities of developing and testing a website designed for selling farm products through online auctions. The research is based on a short literature review in the field and exploratory trials of some successful models from other industries, in order to identify the advantages of using such tool, as well as the optimal structure and functionality of an auction portal. In the last part, the study focuses on the results of testing the website by the potential beneficiaries. Conclusions of the study underlines that the particularities of some agricultural products could raise difficulties in the process of selling them through online auctions, but the use of such system it is perceived to bring significant improvements in the supply chain. The results of scientific investigations require a more detailed study regarding the importance of using quality standards for agricultural products sold via online auction, the impact that implementation of an online payment system could have on trade with agricultural products and problems which could arise in using the website in different countries.

A Profit-Based Maintenance Scheduling of Thermal Power Units in Electricity Market

This paper presents one comprehensive modelling approach for maintenance scheduling problem of thermal power units in competitive market. This problem is formulated as a 0/1 mixedinteger linear programming model. Model incorporates long-term bilateral contracts with defined profiles of power and price, and weekly forecasted market prices for market auction. The effectiveness of the proposed model is demonstrated through case study with detailed discussion.

GenCos- Optimal Bidding Strategy Considering Market Power and Transmission Constraints: A Cournot-based Model

Restructured electricity markets may provide opportunities for producers to exercise market power maintaining prices in excess of competitive levels. In this paper an oligopolistic market is presented that all Generation Companies (GenCos) bid in a Cournot model. Genetic algorithm (GA) is applied to obtain generation scheduling of each GenCo as well as hourly market clearing prices (MCP). In order to consider network constraints a multiperiod framework is presented to simulate market clearing mechanism in which the behaviors of market participants are modelled through piecewise block curves. A mixed integer linear programming (MILP) is employed to solve the problem. Impacts of market clearing process on participants- characteristic and final market prices are presented. Consequently, a novel multi-objective model is addressed for security constrained optimal bidding strategy of GenCos. The capability of price-maker GenCos to alter MCP is evaluated through introducing an effective-supply curve. In addition, the impact of exercising market power on the variation of market characteristics as well as GenCos scheduling is studied.

A Preference-Based Multi-Agent Data Mining Framework for Social Network Service Users' Decision Making

Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) emerged in the pursuit to improve our standard of living, and hence can manifest complex human behaviors such as communication, decision making, negotiation and self-organization. The Social Network Services (SNSs) have attracted millions of users, many of whom have integrated these sites into their daily practices. The domains of MAS and SNS have lots of similarities such as architecture, features and functions. Exploring social network users- behavior through multiagent model is therefore our research focus, in order to generate more accurate and meaningful information to SNS users. An application of MAS is the e-Auction and e-Rental services of the Universiti Cyber AgenT(UniCAT), a Social Network for students in Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman (UTAR), Kampar, Malaysia, built around the Belief- Desire-Intention (BDI) model. However, in spite of the various advantages of the BDI model, it has also been discovered to have some shortcomings. This paper therefore proposes a multi-agent framework utilizing a modified BDI model- Belief-Desire-Intention in Dynamic and Uncertain Situations (BDIDUS), using UniCAT system as a case study.

A Competitive Replica Placement Methodology for Ad Hoc Networks

In this paper, a mathematical model for data object replication in ad hoc networks is formulated. The derived model is general, flexible and adaptable to cater for various applications in ad hoc networks. We propose a game theoretical technique in which players (mobile hosts) continuously compete in a non-cooperative environment to improve data accessibility by replicating data objects. The technique incorporates the access frequency from mobile hosts to each data object, the status of the network connectivity, and communication costs. The proposed technique is extensively evaluated against four well-known ad hoc network replica allocation methods. The experimental results reveal that the proposed approach outperforms the four techniques in both the execution time and solution quality

Design and Implementation of Optimal Winner Determination Algorithm in Combinatorial e- Auctions

The one of best robust search technique on large scale search area is heuristic and meta heuristic approaches. Especially in issue that the exploitation of combinatorial status in the large scale search area prevents the solution of the problem via classical calculating methods, so such problems is NP-complete. in this research, the problem of winner determination in combinatorial auctions have been formulated and by assessing older heuristic functions, we solve the problem by using of genetic algorithm and would show that this new method would result in better performance in comparison to other heuristic function such as simulated annealing greedy approach.

A Fast Replica Placement Methodology for Large-scale Distributed Computing Systems

Fine-grained data replication over the Internet allows duplication of frequently accessed data objects, as opposed to entire sites, to certain locations so as to improve the performance of largescale content distribution systems. In a distributed system, agents representing their sites try to maximize their own benefit since they are driven by different goals such as to minimize their communication costs, latency, etc. In this paper, we will use game theoretical techniques and in particular auctions to identify a bidding mechanism that encapsulates the selfishness of the agents, while having a controlling hand over them. In essence, the proposed game theory based mechanism is the study of what happens when independent agents act selfishly and how to control them to maximize the overall performance. A bidding mechanism asks how one can design systems so that agents- selfish behavior results in the desired system-wide goals. Experimental results reveal that this mechanism provides excellent solution quality, while maintaining fast execution time. The comparisons are recorded against some well known techniques such as greedy, branch and bound, game theoretical auctions and genetic algorithms.

The Exclusion of Consumer Rights in e-Auctions – Is an e-Auction Really an Auction at all?

This paper considers the exclusion of consumer rights by the New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 in eauctions. The paper asserts that the absence of an individual auctioneer conducting each e-auction means that e-auctions may not be auctions at all. The paper also questions the justification for excluding consumer rights in e-auctions because the rationale for excluding consumer rights in traditional auctions does not fit with e-auctions due to the significant differences in the sale processes. The paper recommends reform by way of statutory amendment.

Replicating Data Objects in Large-scale Distributed Computing Systems using Extended Vickrey Auction

This paper proposes a novel game theoretical technique to address the problem of data object replication in largescale distributed computing systems. The proposed technique draws inspiration from computational economic theory and employs the extended Vickrey auction. Specifically, players in a non-cooperative environment compete for server-side scarce memory space to replicate data objects so as to minimize the total network object transfer cost, while maintaining object concurrency. Optimization of such a cost in turn leads to load balancing, fault-tolerance and reduced user access time. The method is experimentally evaluated against four well-known techniques from the literature: branch and bound, greedy, bin-packing and genetic algorithms. The experimental results reveal that the proposed approach outperforms the four techniques in both the execution time and solution quality.

Evaluating Service Quality of Online Auction by Fuzzy MCDM

This paper applies fuzzy set theory to evaluate the service quality of online auction. Service quality is a composition of various criteria. Among them many intangible attributes are difficult to measure. This characteristic introduces the obstacles for respondent in replying to the survey. So as to overcome this problem, we invite fuzzy set theory into the measurement of performance. By using AHP in obtaining criteria and TOPSIS in ranking, we found the most concerned dimension of service quality is Transaction Safety Mechanism and the least is Charge Item. Regarding to the most concerned attributes are information security, accuracy and information.

Auction Theory: Bidder-s Perspective in a Public Out-Cry English Auction

This paper provides an overview of auction theory literature. We present a general review on literature of various auctions and focus ourselves specifically on an English auction. We are interested in modelling bidder-s behavior in an English auction environment. And hence, we present an overview of the New Zealand wool auction followed by a model that would describe a bidder-s decision making behavior from the New Zealand wool auction. The mathematical assumptions in an English auction environment are demonstrated from the perspective of the New Zealand wool auction.

Enhancing Competition in Public Procurement for Sustained Growth: Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions

Limited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the process at the beginning of the tendering or may be technically disqualified at any point in the selection process. The paper applies the double selection model to procurement data from road development projects in developing countries and shows that competition ends up restricted, because bidders are self-selective and auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on the size of contracts.Limited competition would likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs, threatening fiscal sustainability and economic growth.

An Efficient Approach for Optimal Placement of TCSC in Double Auction Power Market

This paper proposes an investment cost recovery based efficient and fast sequential optimization approach to optimal allocation of thyristor controlled series compensator (TCSC) in competitive power market. The optimization technique has been used with an objective to maximizing the social welfare and minimizing the device installation cost by suitable location and rating of TCSC in the system. The effectiveness of proposed approach for location of TCSC has been compared with some existing methods of TCSC placement, in terms of its impact on social welfare, TCSC investment recovery and optimal generation as well as load patterns. The results have been obtained on modified IEEE 14-bus system.

Optimal Route Policy in Air Traffic Control with Competing Airlines

This work proposes a novel market-based air traffic flow control model considering competitive airlines in air traffic network. In the flow model, an agent based framework for resources (link/time pair) pricing is described. Resource agent and auctioneer for groups of resources are also introduced to simulate the flow management in Air Traffic Control (ATC). Secondly, the distributed group pricing algorithm is introduced, which efficiently reflect the competitive nature of the airline industry. Resources in the system are grouped according to the degree of interaction, and each auctioneer adjust s the price of one group of resources respectively until the excess demand of resources becomes zero when the demand and supply of resources of the system changes. Numerical simulation results show the feasibility of solving the air traffic flow control problem using market mechanism and pricing algorithms on the air traffic network.

Applying Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process for Evaluating Service Quality of Online Auction

This paper applies fuzzy AHP to evaluate the service quality of online auction. Service quality is a composition of various criteria. Among them many intangible attributes are difficult to measure. This characteristic introduces the obstacles for respondents on reply in the survey. So as to overcome this problem, we invite fuzzy set theory into the measurement of performance and use AHP in obtaining criteria. We found the most concerned dimension of service quality is Transaction Safety Mechanism and the least is Charge Item. Other criteria such as information security, accuracy and information are too vital.