Auction Theory: Bidder's Perspective in an English Auction Environment

This paper provides an overview of auction theory literature. We present a general review on literature of various auctions and focus ourselves specifically on an English auction. We are interested in modelling bidder's behavior in an English auction environment. And hence, we present an overview of the New Zealand wool auction followed by a model that would describe a bidder's decision making behavior from the New Zealand wool auction. The mathematical assumptions in an English auction environment are demonstrated from the perspective of the New Zealand wool auction.





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