Abstract: An online advertisement system and its implementation
for the Yioop open source search engine are presented. This system
supports both selling advertisements and displaying them within
search results. The selling of advertisements is done using a system
to auction off daily impressions for keyword searches. This is an
open, ascending price auction system in which all accepted bids will
receive a fraction of the auctioned day’s impressions. New bids in
our system are required to be at least one half of the sum of all
previous bids ensuring the number of accepted bids is logarithmic
in the total ad spend on a keyword for a day. The mechanics of
creating an advertisement, attaching keywords to it, and adding it
to an advertisement inventory are described. The algorithm used to
go from accepted bids for a keyword to which ads are displayed at
search time is also presented. We discuss properties of our system
and compare it to existing auction systems and systems for selling
online advertisements.
Abstract: Mauritius, a developing small-island-state, is facing a recession which is having a considerable economic impact particularly on its construction sector. Further, the presence of foreign entities, both as companies and workers, within this sector is creating a very competitive environment for local firms. This study investigates the key drivers that allow foreign firms to participate in this sector, in particular looking at the international and local tender processes, and the capacity of local industry to participate. This study also looks at how the current set up may hinder the latter’s involvement. The methodology used included qualitative semi-structured interviews conducted with established foreign companies, local companies, and public bodies. Study findings indicate: there is an adequate availability of professional skills and expertise within the Mauritian construction industry but a lack of skilled labour especially at the operative level; projects awarded to foreign firms are either due to their uniqueness and hence lack of local knowledge, or due to foreign firms having lower tender bids; tendering systems and processes are weak, including monitoring and enforcement, which encourages corruption and favouritism; a high lev el of ignorance of this sector’s characteristics and opportunities exists amongst the local population; local entities are very profit oriented and have short term strategies that discourage long term investment in workforce training and development; but most importantly, stakeholders do not grasp the importance of encouraging youngsters to join this sector, they have no long term vision, and there is a lack of mutual involvement and collaboration between them. Although local industry is highly competent, qualified and experienced, the tendering and procurement systems in Mauritius are not conducive enough to allow for effective strategic planning and an equitable allocation of projects during an economic downturn so that the broadest spread of stakeholders’ benefit. It is of utmost importance that all sector and government entities collaborate to formulate strategies and reforms on tender processes and capacity building to ensure fairness and continuous growth of this sector in Mauritius.
Abstract: Public procurement is one of the most
important areas in the public sector that introduces a possibility for a
corruption. Due to the volume of the funds that are
allocated through this institution (in the EU countries it is between 10
– 15% of GDP), it has very serious implications for the efficiency of
public expenditures and the overall economic efficiency as
well. Indicators that are usually used for the measurement of the
corruption (such as Corruption Perceptions Index - CPI) show that
the worst situation is in the post-communist countries
and Mediterranean countries.
The presented paper uses the Czech Republic as an example of a
post-communist country and analyses the factors which influence
the scope of corruption in public procurement. Moreover, the
paper discusses indicators that could point at the public procurement
market inefficiency. The presented results show that post-communist
states use the institute of public contracts significantly more than the
old member countries of the continental Europe. It has a very
important implication because it gives more space for corruption.
Furthermore, it appears that the inefficient functioning of public
procurement market is clearly manifested in the low number of bids,
low level of market transparency and an ineffective control
system. Some of the observed indicators are statistically significantly
correlated with the CPI.
Abstract: Intrusion detection systems (IDS)are crucial components
of the security mechanisms of today-s computer systems.
Existing research on intrusion detection has focused on sequential
intrusions. However, intrusions can also be formed by concurrent
interactions of multiple processes. Some of the intrusions caused
by these interactions cannot be detected using sequential intrusion
detection methods. Therefore, there is a need for a mechanism that
views the distributed system as a whole. L-BIDS (Lattice-Based
Intrusion Detection System) is proposed to address this problem. In
the L-BIDS framework, a library of intrusions and distributed traces
are represented as lattices. Then these lattices are compared in order
to detect intrusions in the distributed traces.
Abstract: The one of best robust search technique on large scale
search area is heuristic and meta heuristic approaches. Especially in
issue that the exploitation of combinatorial status in the large scale
search area prevents the solution of the problem via classical
calculating methods, so such problems is NP-complete. in this
research, the problem of winner determination in combinatorial
auctions have been formulated and by assessing older heuristic
functions, we solve the problem by using of genetic algorithm and
would show that this new method would result in better performance
in comparison to other heuristic function such as simulated annealing
greedy approach.
Abstract: National Biodiversity Database System (NBIDS) has
been developed for collecting Thai biodiversity data. The goal of this
project is to provide advanced tools for querying, analyzing,
modeling, and visualizing patterns of species distribution for
researchers and scientists. NBIDS data record two types of datasets:
biodiversity data and environmental data. Biodiversity data are
specie presence data and species status. The attributes of biodiversity
data can be further classified into two groups: universal and projectspecific
attributes. Universal attributes are attributes that are common
to all of the records, e.g. X/Y coordinates, year, and collector name.
Project-specific attributes are attributes that are unique to one or a
few projects, e.g., flowering stage. Environmental data include
atmospheric data, hydrology data, soil data, and land cover data
collecting by using GLOBE protocols. We have developed webbased
tools for data entry. Google Earth KML and ArcGIS were used
as tools for map visualization. webMathematica was used for simple
data visualization and also for advanced data analysis and
visualization, e.g., spatial interpolation, and statistical analysis.
NBIDS will be used by park rangers at Khao Nan National Park, and
researchers.
Abstract: Limited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the process at the beginning of the tendering or may be technically disqualified at any point in the selection process. The paper applies the double selection model to procurement data from road development projects in developing countries and shows that competition ends up restricted, because bidders are self-selective and auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on the size of contracts.Limited competition would likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs, threatening fiscal sustainability and economic growth.