The Situation in the Public Procurement Market in Post-Communist Countries: The Case of the Czech Republic

Public procurement is one of the most important areas in the public sector that introduces a possibility for a corruption. Due to the volume of the funds that are allocated through this institution (in the EU countries it is between 10 – 15% of GDP), it has very serious implications for the efficiency of public expenditures and the overall economic efficiency as well. Indicators that are usually used for the measurement of the corruption (such as Corruption Perceptions Index - CPI) show that the worst situation is in the post-communist countries and Mediterranean countries. The presented paper uses the Czech Republic as an example of a post-communist country and analyses the factors which influence the scope of corruption in public procurement. Moreover, the paper discusses indicators that could point at the public procurement market inefficiency. The presented results show that post-communist states use the institute of public contracts significantly more than the old member countries of the continental Europe. It has a very important implication because it gives more space for corruption. Furthermore, it appears that the inefficient functioning of public procurement market is clearly manifested in the low number of bids, low level of market transparency and an ineffective control system. Some of the observed indicators are statistically significantly correlated with the CPI.

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