Elections, Checks and Balances, and Government Expenditures: Empirical Evidence for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan

Previous studies on political budget cycles (PBCs) implicitly assume the executive has full discretion power over fiscal policy, neglecting the role of checks and balances of the legislature. This paper goes beyond traditional PBCs models and sheds light on the case study of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan over the 1988-2007 periods. Based on the results, we find no evidence of electoral impacts on the public expenditures in South Korean and Taiwan's congressional elections. We also noted that PBCs are found on Taiwan-s government expenditures during our sample periods. Furthermore, the results also show that Japan-s legislature has a significant checks and balances on government-s expenditures. However, empirical results show that the legislature veto player in Taiwan neither has effect on the reduction of public expenditures, nor has the moderating effect over Taiwan-s political budget cycles, albeit that they are statistically insignificant.We suggest that the existence of PBCs in Taiwan is due to a weaker systemof checks and balances. Our conjecture is that Taiwan either has no legislative veto player or has observed low compliance to the law during the time period examined in our study.

Analyzing the Fiscal Health of Local Governments in Taiwan: Evidence from Quantile Analysis

This paper develops the fiscal health index of 21 local governments in Taiwan over the 1984 to 2010 period. A quantile regression analysis was used to explore the extent that economic variables, political budget cycles, and legislative checks and balances, impact different quantiles of fiscal health index for a country over a sample period of time. Our findings suggest that local governments at the lower quantile are significantly benefited from political budget cycles and the increase in central government revenues, while legislative effective checks and balances and the increase in central government expenditures have a significantly negative effect on local fiscal health. When local governments are in the upper tail of the distribution, legislative checks and balances and growth in macroeconomics have significant and adverse effects on the fiscal health of local governments. However, increases in central government revenues have significant and positive effects on the health status of local government in Taiwan.