Abstract: Previous studies on political budget cycles (PBCs)
implicitly assume the executive has full discretion power over fiscal
policy, neglecting the role of checks and balances of the legislature.
This paper goes beyond traditional PBCs models and sheds light on
the case study of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan over the 1988-2007
periods. Based on the results, we find no evidence of electoral impacts
on the public expenditures in South Korean and Taiwan's
congressional elections. We also noted that PBCs are found on
Taiwan-s government expenditures during our sample periods.
Furthermore, the results also show that Japan-s legislature has a
significant checks and balances on government-s expenditures.
However, empirical results show that the legislature veto player in
Taiwan neither has effect on the reduction of public expenditures, nor
has the moderating effect over Taiwan-s political budget cycles, albeit
that they are statistically insignificant.We suggest that the existence of
PBCs in Taiwan is due to a weaker systemof checks and balances. Our
conjecture is that Taiwan either has no legislative veto player or has
observed low compliance to the law during the time period examined
in our study.