Abstract: In this paper, a non-cooperative game method is
formulated where all players compete to transmit at higher
power. Every base station represents a player in the game.
The game is solved by obtaining the Nash equilibrium (NE)
where the game converges to optimality. The proposed method,
named Power Efficient Handover Game Theoretic (PEHO-GT)
approach, aims to control the handover in dense small cell
networks. Players optimize their payoff by adjusting the
transmission power to improve the performance in terms of
throughput, handover, power consumption and load balancing.
To select the desired transmission power for a player, the payoff
function considers the gain of increasing the transmission power.
Then, the cell selection takes place by deploying Technique for
Order Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution (TOPSIS).
A game theoretical method is implemented for heterogeneous
networks to validate the improvement obtained. Results reveal
that the proposed method gives a throughput improvement while
reducing the power consumption and minimizing the frequent
handover.
Abstract: The capacity of conventional cellular networks has
reached its upper bound and it can be well handled by introducing
femtocells with low-cost and easy-to-deploy. Spectrum interference
issue becomes more critical in peace with the value-added multimedia
services growing up increasingly in two-tier cellular networks.
Spectrum allocation is one of effective methods in interference
mitigation technology. This paper proposes a game-theory-based on
OFDMA downlink spectrum allocation aiming at reducing co-channel
interference in two-tier femtocell networks. The framework is
formulated as a non-cooperative game, wherein the femto base
stations are players and frequency channels available are strategies.
The scheme takes full account of competitive behavior and
fairness among stations. In addition, the utility function reflects
the interference from the standpoint of channels essentially. This
work focuses on co-channel interference and puts forward a negative
logarithm interference function on distance weight ratio aiming
at suppressing co-channel interference in the same layer network.
This scenario is more suitable for actual network deployment and
the system possesses high robustness. According to the proposed
mechanism, interference exists only when players employ the same
channel for data communication. This paper focuses on implementing
spectrum allocation in a distributed fashion. Numerical results show
that signal to interference and noise ratio can be obviously improved
through the spectrum allocation scheme and the users quality of
service in downlink can be satisfied. Besides, the average spectrum
efficiency in cellular network can be significantly promoted as
simulations results shown.
Abstract: The customers use the best compromise criterion
between price and quality of service (QoS) to select or change
their Service Provider (SP). The SPs share the same market and
are competing to attract more customers to gain more profit. Due
to the divergence of SPs interests, we believe that this situation is a
non-cooperative game of price and QoS. The game converges to an
equilibrium position known Nash Equilibrium (NE). In this work, we
formulate a game theoretic framework for the dynamical behaviors
of SPs. We use Genetic Algorithms (GAs) to find the price and
QoS strategies that maximize the profit for each SP and illustrate
the corresponding strategy in NE. In order to quantify how this NE
point is performant, we perform a detailed analysis of the price of
anarchy induced by the NE solution. Finally, we provide an extensive
numerical study to point out the importance of considering price and
QoS as a joint decision parameter.
Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of resource allocation
in the emerging cognitive technology. Focusing the Quality of
Service (QoS) of Primary Users (PU), a novel method is proposed for
the resource allocation of Secondary Users (SU). In this paper, we
propose the unique Utility Function in the game theoretic model of
Cognitive Radio which can be maximized to increase the capacity of
the Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) and to minimize the
interference scenario. Utility function is formulated to cater the need
of PUs by observing Signal to Noise ratio. Existence of Nash
Equilibrium for the postulated game is established.
Abstract: In this paper a new methodology for vendor selection
and supply quotas determination (VSSQD) is proposed. The problem
of VSSQD is solved by the model that combines revised weighting
method for determining the objective function coefficients, and a
multiple objective linear programming (MOLP) method based on the
cooperative game theory for VSSQD. The criteria used for VSSQD
are: (1) purchase costs and (2) product quality supplied by individual
vendors. The proposed methodology has been tested on the example
of flour purchase for a bakery with two decision makers.
Abstract: The performance of any cooperative communication system depends largely on the selection of a proper partner. Another important factor to consider is an efficient allocation of resource like power by the source node to help it in forwarding information to the destination. In this paper, we look at the concepts of partner selection and resource (power) allocation for a distributed communication network. A type of non-cooperative game referred to as Trade-Off game is employed so as to jointly consider the utilities of the source and relay nodes, where in this case, the source is the node that requires help with forwarding of its information while the partner is the node that is willing to help in forwarding the source node’s information, but at a price. The approach enables the source node to maximize its utility by selecting a partner node based on (i) the proximity of the partner node to the source and destination nodes, and (ii) the price the partner node will charge for the help being rendered. Our proposed scheme helps the source locate and select the relay nodes at ‘better’ locations and purchase power optimally from them. It also aids the contending relay nodes maximize their own utilities as well by asking proper prices. Our game scheme is seen to converge to unique equilibrium.
Abstract: Restructuring of Electricity supply industry introduced many issues such as transmission pricing, transmission loss allocation and congestion management. Many methodologies and algorithms were proposed for addressing these issues. In this paper a power flow tracing based method is proposed which involves Matrices methodology for the transmission usage and loss allocation for generators and demands. This method provides loss allocation in a direct way because all the computation is previously done for usage allocation. The proposed method is simple and easy to implement in a large power system. Further it is less computational because it requires matrix inversion only a single time. After usage and loss allocation cooperative game theory is applied to results for finding efficient economic signals. Nucleolus and Shapely value approach is used for optimal allocation of results. Results are shown for the IEEE 6 bus system and IEEE 14 bus system.
Abstract: The performance of state of the art worldwide telecommunication networks strongly depends on the efficiency of the applied routing mechanism. Game theoretical approaches to this problem offer new solutions. In this paper a new continuous network routing model is defined to describe data transfer in fixed telecommunication networks of multiple hosts. The nodes of the network correspond to routers whose latency is assumed to be traffic dependent. We propose that the whole traffic of the network can be decomposed to a finite number of tasks, which belong to various hosts. To describe the different latency-sensitivity, utility functions are defined for each task. The model is used to compare router and host intelligent types of routing methods, corresponding to various data transfer protocols. We analyze host intelligent routing as a transferable utility cooperative game with externalities. The main aim of the paper is to provide a framework in which the efficiency of various routing algorithms can be compared and the transferable utility game arising in the cooperative case can be analyzed.
Abstract: We consider a cooperative game played by n players against a referee. The players names are randomly distributed among n lockers, with one name per locker. Each player can open up to half the lockers and each player must find his name. Once the game starts the players may not communicate. It has been previously shown that, quite surprisingly, an optimal strategy exists for which the success probability is never worse than 1 − ln 2 ≈ 0.306. In this paper we consider an extension where the number of lockers is greater than the number of players, so that some lockers are empty. We show that the players may still win with positive probability even if there are a constant k number of empty lockers. We show that for each fixed probability p, there is a constant c so that the players can win with probability at least p if they are allowed to open cn lockers.
Abstract: This paper presents a conceptual model of agreement
options for negotiation support in multi-person decision on
optimizing high-rise building columns. The decision is complicated
since many parties involved in choosing a single alternative from a
set of solutions. There are different concern caused by differing
preferences, experiences, and background. Such building columns as
alternatives are referred to as agreement options which are
determined by identifying the possible decision maker group,
followed by determining the optimal solution for each group. The
group in this paper is based on three-decision makers preferences that
are designer, programmer, and construction manager. Decision
techniques applied to determine the relative value of the alternative
solutions for performing the function. Analytical Hierarchy Process
(AHP) was applied for decision process and game theory based agent
system for coalition formation. An n-person cooperative game is
represented by the set of all players. The proposed coalition
formation model enables each agent to select individually its allies or
coalition. It further emphasizes the importance of performance
evaluation in the design process and value-based decision.
Abstract: The problem of mapping tasks onto a computational grid with the aim to minimize the power consumption and the makespan subject to the constraints of deadlines and architectural requirements is considered in this paper. To solve this problem, we propose a solution from cooperative game theory based on the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution. The proposed game theoretical technique is compared against several traditional techniques. The experimental results show that when the deadline constraints are tight, the proposed technique achieves superior performance and reports competitive performance relative to the optimal solution.
Abstract: In this paper, we discuss the egalitarianism solution (ES) and center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value (CIV) for bicooperative games, which can be seen as the extensions of the solutions for traditional games given by Dutta and Ray [1] and Driessen and Funaki [2]. Furthermore, axiomatic systems for the given values are proposed. Finally, a numerical example is offered to illustrate the player ES and CTV.
Abstract: In this paper, we first introduce the model of games on augmenting systems with a coalition structure, which can be seen as an extension of games on augmenting systems. The core of games on augmenting systems with a coalition structure is defined, and an equivalent form is discussed. Meantime, the Shapley function for this type of games is given, and two axiomatic systems of the given Shapley function are researched. When the given games are quasi convex, the relationship between the core and the Shapley function is discussed, which does coincide as in classical case. Finally, a numerical example is given.