Abstract: The customers use the best compromise criterion
between price and quality of service (QoS) to select or change
their Service Provider (SP). The SPs share the same market and
are competing to attract more customers to gain more profit. Due
to the divergence of SPs interests, we believe that this situation is a
non-cooperative game of price and QoS. The game converges to an
equilibrium position known Nash Equilibrium (NE). In this work, we
formulate a game theoretic framework for the dynamical behaviors
of SPs. We use Genetic Algorithms (GAs) to find the price and
QoS strategies that maximize the profit for each SP and illustrate
the corresponding strategy in NE. In order to quantify how this NE
point is performant, we perform a detailed analysis of the price of
anarchy induced by the NE solution. Finally, we provide an extensive
numerical study to point out the importance of considering price and
QoS as a joint decision parameter.