Abstract: This paper offered the primary methodical proof on how director remuneration related to enterprise earnings in listed firms in China in light of most evidence focusing on cross-sectional data or data in a short span of time. Using full economic and business panel data on China’s publicly listed enterprise from 1999 to 2020 over two decades in the China Stock Market & Accounting Research database, we found statistically significant positive associations between director pay and firm performance in privately owned firms over this period, supporting the agency theory. In contrast, among the state-owned enterprises, there was a reverse relation between director compensation and firm financial performance, contributing to the existing literature. But the results also revealed that state-owned enterprises financially performed as well as private enterprises. Such findings suggested that state ownership might line up officials’ career incentives with party prime concern rather than pecuniary incentives. Also, CEO duality enhanced firm performance. As such, allegiance to the party and possible advancement to an upper-level political position would motivate company directors in state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, directors in privately owned enterprises might be motivated by monetary incentives. In addition, a statistical regression model was proposed and tested to get the results of the performance of state-owned enterprises. Finally, some suggestions were made about how to improve the institutional management of government-owned corporations in China.
Abstract: Well organized digitalization and information systems have been selected as relevant measures to mitigate operational risks within organizations. Unfortunately, information system comes with new threats that can cause severe damage and quick organization lockout. This study aims to measure perceived information system risks and their effects on operational risks within the microfinance institution in D.R. Congo. Also, the factors influencing the operational risk are to be identified, and the link between operational risk with other risks and performance is to be assessed. The study proposes a research model drawn on the combination of Resources-Based-View, dynamic capabilities, the agency theory, the Information System Security Model, and social theories of risk. Therefore, we suggest adopting a mixed methods research with the sole aim of increasing the literature that already exists on perceived operational risk assessment and its link with other risk and performance, with a focus on information system risks.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to develop an empirical
research on the nature and consequences of corporate governance on
Eurozone Insurance Industry risk taking attitude. More particularly,
we analyzed the effect of public ownership on risk taking with
respect to privately held Insurance Companies. We also analyzed the
effects on risk taking attitude of different degrees of ownership
concentration, directors compensation, and the dimension/diversity of
the Board of Directors. Our results provide quite strong evidence that,
coherently with the Agency Theory, publicly traded insurance
companies with more concentrated ownership are less risky than the
corresponding privately held.
Abstract: Managing a capital group is a complex and specific process. It creates special conditions for the introduction of team work organization of managers. The selection of a manager employment form is a problem which gets complicated in case of management teams. The considered possibilities are an employment-based and non-employment managerial contract, which can be based on a thorough action or on formulating definite expectations regarding the results of a manager’s work. The problem of selection between individual and collegiate settlement of managers’ work has been pointed out. The deliberations were based on the assumptions of chosen company management theories, including transactional cost, agency theory, nexus of contracts theory, stewardship theory and theories referring directly to management teams, i.e. Upper echelons theory.
Abstract: The recommendation of the committee on corporate
governance for public companies in Nigeria, that the position of the
CEO be separated from board chair has generated serious debate
among scholars and practitioners. They have questioned the
appropriateness of implementing corporate governance model that is
based on Anglo-Saxon agency problem characterized by dispersed
ownership structure; where markets for corporate control, legal
regulation, and contractual incentives are the key governance
mechanisms. This paper strives to resolve the argument by adopting
an institutional perspective in testing the agency theory on board
duality. The study developed a theoretical and empirical model to
better understand how ownership structure influences agency conflict
and how such affects firm performance. Hence, the study examines
the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance using
two institutional ownership structures – dispersed ownership and
concentrated ownership structures. The empirical results show that
CEO duality is negatively correlated with firm performance in
Nigeria irrespective of the firm-s ownership structure. The findings
give credence to the recommendation of the Peterside Commission
on the need to separate the position of CEO from board chair.
Abstract: Not many studies have been undertaken on shareholder activism in emerging economies, including Malaysia. Shareholder activism in emerging economies is on the rise. This paper seeks to comprehend the elements of this activism that are unique to Malaysia, specifically with respect to how the agency problem is controlled through shareholder activism in improving corporate governance practices within target companies. Through shareholder activism, shareholders make contact with a target company to voice their dissatisfaction, suggestions, or recommendations. This paper utilises agency theory to explain institutional shareholder activism. This theory has been extensively used within literature on corporate governance with regards to shareholder activism. The effectiveness of shareholder activism in improving corporate governance will be examined as well. This research provides a further understanding of shareholder activism in emerging economies, such as Malaysia; this research also has the potential to enhance shareholder activism and corporate governance practices in general.