Abstract: This paper offered the primary methodical proof on how director remuneration related to enterprise earnings in listed firms in China in light of most evidence focusing on cross-sectional data or data in a short span of time. Using full economic and business panel data on China’s publicly listed enterprise from 1999 to 2020 over two decades in the China Stock Market & Accounting Research database, we found statistically significant positive associations between director pay and firm performance in privately owned firms over this period, supporting the agency theory. In contrast, among the state-owned enterprises, there was a reverse relation between director compensation and firm financial performance, contributing to the existing literature. But the results also revealed that state-owned enterprises financially performed as well as private enterprises. Such findings suggested that state ownership might line up officials’ career incentives with party prime concern rather than pecuniary incentives. Also, CEO duality enhanced firm performance. As such, allegiance to the party and possible advancement to an upper-level political position would motivate company directors in state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, directors in privately owned enterprises might be motivated by monetary incentives. In addition, a statistical regression model was proposed and tested to get the results of the performance of state-owned enterprises. Finally, some suggestions were made about how to improve the institutional management of government-owned corporations in China.
Abstract: Recent financial international scandals around the world have led to a number of investigations into the effectiveness of corporate governance practices and audit quality. Although evidence of corporate governance practices and audit quality exists from developed economies, very scanty studies have been conducted in Egypt where corporate governance is just evolving. Therefore, this study provides evidence on the effectiveness of corporate governance practices and audit quality from a developing country. The data for analysis are gathered from the top 50 most active companies in the Egyptian Stock Exchange, covering the three year period 2007-2009. Logistic regression was used in investigating the questions that were raised in the study. Findings from the study show that board independence; CEO duality and audit committees significantly have relationship with audit quality. The results also, indicate that institutional investor and managerial ownership have no significantly relationship with audit quality. Evidence also exist that size of the company; complexity and business leverage are important factors in audit quality for companies quoted on the Egypt Stock Exchange.
Abstract: The recommendation of the committee on corporate
governance for public companies in Nigeria, that the position of the
CEO be separated from board chair has generated serious debate
among scholars and practitioners. They have questioned the
appropriateness of implementing corporate governance model that is
based on Anglo-Saxon agency problem characterized by dispersed
ownership structure; where markets for corporate control, legal
regulation, and contractual incentives are the key governance
mechanisms. This paper strives to resolve the argument by adopting
an institutional perspective in testing the agency theory on board
duality. The study developed a theoretical and empirical model to
better understand how ownership structure influences agency conflict
and how such affects firm performance. Hence, the study examines
the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance using
two institutional ownership structures – dispersed ownership and
concentrated ownership structures. The empirical results show that
CEO duality is negatively correlated with firm performance in
Nigeria irrespective of the firm-s ownership structure. The findings
give credence to the recommendation of the Peterside Commission
on the need to separate the position of CEO from board chair.