Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting, State Ownership, and Corporate Performance in China: Proof from Longitudinal Data of Publicly Traded Enterprises from 2006 to 2020

This paper offered the primary methodical proof on how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting related to enterprise earnings in listed firms in China in light of most evidence focusing on cross-sectional data or data in a short span of time. Using full economic and business panel data on China’s publicly listed enterprises from 2006 to 2020 over two decades in the China Stock Market & Accounting Research database, we found initial evidence of significant direct relations between CSR reporting and firm corporate performance in both state-owned and privately-owned firms over this period, supporting the stakeholder theory. Results also revealed that state-owned enterprises performed as well as private enterprises in the current period. But private enterprises performed better than state-owned enterprises in the subsequent years. Moreover, the release of social responsibility reports had the more significant impact on the financial performance of state-owned and private enterprises in the current period than in the subsequent periods. Specifically, CSR release was not significantly associated to the financial performance of state-owned enterprises on the lag of the first, second, and third periods. But it had an impact on the lag of the first, second, and third periods among private enterprises. Such findings suggested that CSR reporting helped improve the corporate financial performance of state-owned and private enterprises in the current period, but this kind of effect was more significant among private enterprises in the lag periods.

Director Compensation, CEO Duality, State Ownership, and Firm Performance in China: Proof from Panel Data of Publicly Listed Enterprises from 1999 to 2020

This paper offered the primary methodical proof on how director remuneration related to enterprise earnings in listed firms in China in light of most evidence focusing on cross-sectional data or data in a short span of time. Using full economic and business panel data on China’s publicly listed enterprise from 1999 to 2020 over two decades in the China Stock Market & Accounting Research database, we found statistically significant positive associations between director pay and firm performance in privately owned firms over this period, supporting the agency theory. In contrast, among the state-owned enterprises, there was a reverse relation between director compensation and firm financial performance, contributing to the existing literature. But the results also revealed that state-owned enterprises financially performed as well as private enterprises. Such findings suggested that state ownership might line up officials’ career incentives with party prime concern rather than pecuniary incentives. Also, CEO duality enhanced firm performance. As such, allegiance to the party and possible advancement to an upper-level political position would motivate company directors in state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, directors in privately owned enterprises might be motivated by monetary incentives. In addition, a statistical regression model was proposed and tested to get the results of the performance of state-owned enterprises. Finally, some suggestions were made about how to improve the institutional management of government-owned corporations in China.