The Influence of Institutional Shareholder Activism as a Corporate Governance Monitoring Mechanism in Malaysia

Not many studies have been undertaken on shareholder activism in emerging economies, including Malaysia. Shareholder activism in emerging economies is on the rise. This paper seeks to comprehend the elements of this activism that are unique to Malaysia, specifically with respect to how the agency problem is controlled through shareholder activism in improving corporate governance practices within target companies. Through shareholder activism, shareholders make contact with a target company to voice their dissatisfaction, suggestions, or recommendations. This paper utilises agency theory to explain institutional shareholder activism. This theory has been extensively used within literature on corporate governance with regards to shareholder activism. The effectiveness of shareholder activism in improving corporate governance will be examined as well. This research provides a further understanding of shareholder activism in emerging economies, such as Malaysia; this research also has the potential to enhance shareholder activism and corporate governance practices in general.


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