Abstract: In many countries, governments have been promoting the involvement of private sector entities to enter into long-term agreements for the development and delivery of large infrastructure projects, with a focus on overcoming the limitations upon public fund of the traditional approach. The involvement of private sector through public private partnerships (PPP) brings in new capital investments, value for money and additional risks to handle. Worldwide research studies have shown that an objective, systematic, reliable and useroriented risk assessment process and an optimal allocation mechanism among different stakeholders is crucial to the successful completion. In this framework, this paper, which is the first stage of a research study, aims to identify the main risks for the delivery of PPP projects. A review of cross-countries research projects and case studies was performed to map the key risks affecting PPP infrastructure delivery. The matrix of mapping offers a summary of the frequency of factors, clustered in eleven categories: construction, design, economic, legal, market, natural, operation, political, project finance, project selection and relationship. Results will highlight the most critical risk factors, and will hopefully assist the project managers in directing the managerial attention in the further stages of risk allocation.
Abstract: This paper examines the utilization of public-private
partnerships for the building and operation of wastewater treatment
plants. Our research focuses on risk allocation in this kind of projects.
Our analysis builds on more than hundred wastewater treatment
plants built and operated through PPP projects in Aragon (Spain).
The paper illustrates the consequences of an inadequate management
of construction risk and an unsuitable transfer of demand risk in
wastewater treatment plants. It also shows that the involvement of
many public bodies at local, regional and national level further
increases the complexity of this kind of projects and make time
delays more likely.
Abstract: There are three main ways of categorizing capital in banking operations: accounting, regulatory and economic capital. However, the 2008-2009 global crisis has shown that none of these categories adequately reflects the real risks of bank operations, especially in light of the failures Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers or Northern Rock. This paper deals with the economic capital allocation of global banks. In theory, economic capital should reflect the real risks of a bank and should be publicly available. Yet, as discovered during the global financial crisis, even when economic capital information was publicly disclosed, the underlying assumptions rendered the information useless. Specifically, some global banks that reported relatively high levels of economic capital before the crisis went bankrupt or had to be bailed-out by their government. And, only 15 out of 50 global banks reported their economic capital during the 2007-2010 period. In this paper, we analyze the changes in reported bank economic capital disclosure during this period. We conclude that relative shares of credit and business risks increased in 2010 compared to 2007, while both operational and market risks decreased their shares on the total economic capital of top-rated global banks. Generally speaking, higher levels of disclosure and transparency of bank operations are required to obtain more confidence from stakeholders. Moreover, additional risks such as liquidity risks should be included in these disclosures.
Abstract: This conference paper discusses a risk allocation problem for subprime investing banks involving investment in subprime structured mortgage products (SMPs) and Treasuries. In order to solve this problem, we develop a L'evy process-based model of jump diffusion-type for investment choice in subprime SMPs and Treasuries. This model incorporates subprime SMP losses for which credit default insurance in the form of credit default swaps (CDSs) can be purchased. In essence, we solve a mean swap-at-risk (SaR) optimization problem for investment which determines optimal allocation between SMPs and Treasuries subject to credit risk protection via CDSs. In this regard, SaR is indicative of how much protection investors must purchase from swap protection sellers in order to cover possible losses from SMP default. Here, SaR is defined in terms of value-at-risk (VaR). Finally, we provide an analysis of the aforementioned optimization problem and its connections with the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC).