Abstract: It is known that the mean investment evolves from a very low initial value to some high level in the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma. We examine how the cooperation level evolves from a low initial level to a high level in our Demographic Multi-level Donor-Recipient situation. In the Multi-level Donor-Recipient game, one player is selected as a Donor and the other as a Recipient randomly. The Donor has multiple cooperative moves and one defective move. A cooperative move means the Donor pays some cost for the Recipient to receive some benefit. The more cooperative move the Donor takes, the higher cost the Donor pays and the higher benefit the Recipient receives. The defective move has no effect on them. Two consecutive Multi-level Donor-Recipient games, one as a Donor and the other as a Recipient, can be viewed as a discrete version of the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma. In the Demographic Multi-level Donor-Recipient game, players are initially distributed spatially. In each period, players play multiple Multi-level Donor-Recipient games against other players. He leaves offspring if possible and dies because of negative accumulated payoff of him or his lifespan. Cooperative moves are necessary for the survival of the whole population. There is only a low level of cooperative move besides the defective move initially available in strategies of players. A player may modify and expand his strategy by his recent experiences or practices. We distinguish several types of a player about modification and expansion. We show, by Agent-Based Simulation, that introducing only the modification increases the emergence rate of cooperation and introducing both the modification and the expansion further increases it and a high level of cooperation does emerge in our Demographic Multi-level Donor-Recipient Game.
Abstract: Since the advent of the information era, the Internet has
brought various positive effects in everyday life. Nevertheless,
recently, problems and side-effects have been noted. Internet
witch-trials and spread of pornography are only a few of these
problems.In this study, problems and causes of malicious replies on
internet boards were analyzed, using the key ideas of game theory. The
study provides a mathematical model for the internet reply game to
devise three possible plans that could efficiently counteract malicious
replies. Furthermore, seven specific measures that comply with one of
the three plans were proposed and evaluated according to the
importance and utility of each measure using the orthogonal array
survey and SPSS conjoint analysis.The conclusion was that the most
effective measure would be forbidding unsigned user access to
malicious replies. Also notable was that some analytically proposed
measures, when implemented, could backfire and encourage malicious
replies.