Abstract: Game theory could be used to analyze the conflicted
issues in the field of information hiding. In this paper, 2-phase game
can be used to build the embedder-attacker system to analyze the
limits of hiding capacity of embedding algorithms: the embedder
minimizes the expected damage and the attacker maximizes it. In the
system, the embedder first consumes its resource to build embedded
units (EU) and insert the secret information into EU. Then the attacker
distributes its resource evenly to the attacked EU. The expected
equilibrium damage, which is maximum damage in value from the
point of view of the attacker and minimum from the embedder against
the attacker, is evaluated by the case when the attacker attacks a
subset from all the EU. Furthermore, the optimal equilibrium capacity
of hiding information is calculated through the optimal number of EU
with the embedded secret information. Finally, illustrative examples
of the optimal equilibrium capacity are presented.