The Optimal Equilibrium Capacity of Information Hiding Based on Game Theory
Game theory could be used to analyze the conflicted
issues in the field of information hiding. In this paper, 2-phase game
can be used to build the embedder-attacker system to analyze the
limits of hiding capacity of embedding algorithms: the embedder
minimizes the expected damage and the attacker maximizes it. In the
system, the embedder first consumes its resource to build embedded
units (EU) and insert the secret information into EU. Then the attacker
distributes its resource evenly to the attacked EU. The expected
equilibrium damage, which is maximum damage in value from the
point of view of the attacker and minimum from the embedder against
the attacker, is evaluated by the case when the attacker attacks a
subset from all the EU. Furthermore, the optimal equilibrium capacity
of hiding information is calculated through the optimal number of EU
with the embedded secret information. Finally, illustrative examples
of the optimal equilibrium capacity are presented.
[1] Elias K., Saraju P. M., et al, Hardware assisted watermarking for
multimedia, Computers and electrical engineering, vol.35, no.2, 2009,
pp. 339-358.
[2] M. Fan, H. Wang, Chaos-based discrete fractional sine transform domain
audio watermarking scheme, Computers and electrical engineering, vol.
35, no. 3, pp. 2009, 506-516.
[3] Hazem A. A., Allam O. A., Adaptive color image watermarking based
on a modified improved pixel-wise masking technique, Computers and
electrical engineering, vol. 35, no. 5, 2009, pp. 673-695.
[4] A. Kaneda, Y. Fujii et al, An Improvement of Robustness Against
Physical Attacks and Equipment Independence in Information Hiding
Based on the Artificial Fiber Pattern, 2010 International Conference on
Availability, Reliability and Security, 2010, pp. 608-612.
[5] M. E. Andr'es, C. Palamidessi et al, Computing the Leakage
of Information-Hiding Systems, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 373-389.
[6] Cooperman M, Moskowitz S, Steganographic method and device, USA:
patent, 1997.
[7] Q. Li, I. J. Cox, Using perceptual models to improve fidelity and
provide resistance to valumetric scaling for quantization index modulation
watermarking, IEEE transaction on information forensics and security,
vol. 2 no. 2, 2007, pp. 127-139.
[8] L. M. Marvel, C. G. Boncelet Jr., C. T. Retter, Spread spectrum image
steganography, IEEE Transaction on image processing, vol. 8, no. 8, 1999,
pp. 1075-1083.
[9] W. Bender, D. Gruhl, N. Morimoto, Techniques for data hiding, Tech.
Rep., MIT media Lab, 1994.
[10] S. Pereira, T. Pun, Fast robust template matching for affine resistant
image watermarks, http://cuiwww.unige.ch/vision, 1999.
[11] T. Aura, Practical invisibility in digital communication. Springer
Berlin/Heidelberg, 1996, pp. 265-278.
[12] G. Levitin, K. Hausken, Influence of attacker-s target recognition ability
on defense strategy in homogeneous systems, Reliability Engineering and
System Safety, vol. 95, 2010, pp. 565-572.
[13] G. Levitin, K. Hausken, Protection vs. redundancy in homogeneous
parallel systems, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol. 93,
2008, pp. 1444-1451.
[14] G. Levitin, K. Hausken, Redundancy vs. protection in defending parallel
systems against unintentional and intentional impacts, IEEE transactions
on reliability, vol. 58, no. 4, 2009, pp. 679-690.
[15] F. Kahl, S. Agarwal et al, Practical global optimization for multiview
geometry, Int J Comput Vis, vol. 79, no. 3, 2008, pp. 271-284.
[16] Hyv¨arinen, Fast and robust fixed-point algorithms for independent
component analysis, IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, vol. 10,
no. 3, 1999, pp. 626-634.
[17] Skeperdas S, Contest success functions, Economic theory, 1996 90-283.
[18] Tullock G, Efficient rent-seeking, In: Buchnana JM, Tollison RD,
Tullock G, editors, Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, College
station:Texas A&M university press, 1980, 97-112.
[19] Hausken K, Production and conflict models versus rent seeking models,
Public choice 2005, 123:59-93.
[1] Elias K., Saraju P. M., et al, Hardware assisted watermarking for
multimedia, Computers and electrical engineering, vol.35, no.2, 2009,
pp. 339-358.
[2] M. Fan, H. Wang, Chaos-based discrete fractional sine transform domain
audio watermarking scheme, Computers and electrical engineering, vol.
35, no. 3, pp. 2009, 506-516.
[3] Hazem A. A., Allam O. A., Adaptive color image watermarking based
on a modified improved pixel-wise masking technique, Computers and
electrical engineering, vol. 35, no. 5, 2009, pp. 673-695.
[4] A. Kaneda, Y. Fujii et al, An Improvement of Robustness Against
Physical Attacks and Equipment Independence in Information Hiding
Based on the Artificial Fiber Pattern, 2010 International Conference on
Availability, Reliability and Security, 2010, pp. 608-612.
[5] M. E. Andr'es, C. Palamidessi et al, Computing the Leakage
of Information-Hiding Systems, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 373-389.
[6] Cooperman M, Moskowitz S, Steganographic method and device, USA:
patent, 1997.
[7] Q. Li, I. J. Cox, Using perceptual models to improve fidelity and
provide resistance to valumetric scaling for quantization index modulation
watermarking, IEEE transaction on information forensics and security,
vol. 2 no. 2, 2007, pp. 127-139.
[8] L. M. Marvel, C. G. Boncelet Jr., C. T. Retter, Spread spectrum image
steganography, IEEE Transaction on image processing, vol. 8, no. 8, 1999,
pp. 1075-1083.
[9] W. Bender, D. Gruhl, N. Morimoto, Techniques for data hiding, Tech.
Rep., MIT media Lab, 1994.
[10] S. Pereira, T. Pun, Fast robust template matching for affine resistant
image watermarks, http://cuiwww.unige.ch/vision, 1999.
[11] T. Aura, Practical invisibility in digital communication. Springer
Berlin/Heidelberg, 1996, pp. 265-278.
[12] G. Levitin, K. Hausken, Influence of attacker-s target recognition ability
on defense strategy in homogeneous systems, Reliability Engineering and
System Safety, vol. 95, 2010, pp. 565-572.
[13] G. Levitin, K. Hausken, Protection vs. redundancy in homogeneous
parallel systems, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol. 93,
2008, pp. 1444-1451.
[14] G. Levitin, K. Hausken, Redundancy vs. protection in defending parallel
systems against unintentional and intentional impacts, IEEE transactions
on reliability, vol. 58, no. 4, 2009, pp. 679-690.
[15] F. Kahl, S. Agarwal et al, Practical global optimization for multiview
geometry, Int J Comput Vis, vol. 79, no. 3, 2008, pp. 271-284.
[16] Hyv¨arinen, Fast and robust fixed-point algorithms for independent
component analysis, IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, vol. 10,
no. 3, 1999, pp. 626-634.
[17] Skeperdas S, Contest success functions, Economic theory, 1996 90-283.
[18] Tullock G, Efficient rent-seeking, In: Buchnana JM, Tollison RD,
Tullock G, editors, Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, College
station:Texas A&M university press, 1980, 97-112.
[19] Hausken K, Production and conflict models versus rent seeking models,
Public choice 2005, 123:59-93.
@article{"International Journal of Information, Control and Computer Sciences:60091", author = "Ziquan Hu and Kun She and Shahzad Ali and Kai Yan", title = "The Optimal Equilibrium Capacity of Information Hiding Based on Game Theory", abstract = "Game theory could be used to analyze the conflicted
issues in the field of information hiding. In this paper, 2-phase game
can be used to build the embedder-attacker system to analyze the
limits of hiding capacity of embedding algorithms: the embedder
minimizes the expected damage and the attacker maximizes it. In the
system, the embedder first consumes its resource to build embedded
units (EU) and insert the secret information into EU. Then the attacker
distributes its resource evenly to the attacked EU. The expected
equilibrium damage, which is maximum damage in value from the
point of view of the attacker and minimum from the embedder against
the attacker, is evaluated by the case when the attacker attacks a
subset from all the EU. Furthermore, the optimal equilibrium capacity
of hiding information is calculated through the optimal number of EU
with the embedded secret information. Finally, illustrative examples
of the optimal equilibrium capacity are presented.", keywords = "2-Phase Game, Expected Equilibrium damage, InformationHiding, Optimal Equilibrium Capacity.", volume = "5", number = "9", pages = "1035-6", }
