Combining Mobile Intelligence with Formation Mechanism for Group Commerce

The rise of smartphones brings new concept So-Lo-Mo (social-local-mobile) in mobile commerce area in recent years. However, current So-Lo-Mo services only focus on individual users but not a group of users, and the development of group commerce is not enough to satisfy the demand of real-time group buying and less to think about the social relationship between customers. In this research, we integrate mobile intelligence with group commerce and consider customers' preference, real-time context, and social influence as components in the mechanism. With the support of this mechanism, customers are able to gather near customers with the same potential purchase willingness through mobile devices when he/she wants to purchase products or services to have a real-time group-buying. By matching the demand and supply of mobile group-buying market, this research improves the business value of mobile commerce and group commerce further.

A Community Compromised Approach to Combinatorial Coalition Problem

Buyer coalition with a combination of items is a group of buyers joining together to purchase a combination of items with a larger discount. The primary aim of existing buyer coalition with a combination of items research is to generate a large total discount. However, the aim is hard to achieve because this research is based on the assumption that each buyer completely knows other buyers- information or at least one buyer knows other buyers- information in a coalition by exchange of information. These assumption contrast with the real world environment where buyers join a coalition with incomplete information, i.e., they concerned only with their expected discounts. Therefore, this paper proposes a new buyer community coalition formation with a combination of items scheme, called the Community Compromised Combinatorial Coalition scheme, under such an environment of incomplete information. In order to generate a larger total discount, after buyers who want to join a coalition propose their minimum required saving, a coalition structure that gives a maximum total retail prices is formed. Then, the total discount division of the coalition is divided among buyers in the coalition depending on their minimum required saving and is a Pareto optimal. In mathematical analysis, we compare concepts of this scheme with concepts of the existing buyer coalition scheme. Our mathematical analysis results show that the total discount of the coalition in this scheme is larger than that in the existing buyer coalition scheme.