Abstract: This study examines whether corporate governance (CG) mechanisms in firms that have a whistle-blowing policy (WHBLP) are more effective in constraining earnings management (EM), than those without. A sample of 288 Malaysian firms for the years 2013 to 2015, amounting to 864 firm-years were grouped into firms with and without WHBLP. Results show that for firms without WHBLP, the board chairman tenure would minimize EM activities. Meanwhile, for firms with WHBLP, board chairman independence, board chairman tenure, audit committee size, audit committee meeting and women in the audit committees are found to be associated with less EM activities. Further, it is found that ownership concentration and Big 4 auditing firms help to reduce EM activities in firms with WHBLP, while not in firms without WHBLP. Hence, functional and effective governance can be achieved by having a WHBLP, which is in line with agency and resource dependent theories. Therefore, this study suggests that firms should have a WHBLP in place, and policymakers should come up with enhanced criteria to strengthen the mechanisms of WHBLP.
Abstract: The supervisory board is assumed to use power in the governance of a firm, but the actual use of power has been scantly investigated. The research question of the paper is “How does the supervisory board use power in the selection of the board of directors”. The data stem from 11 large Finnish agricultural cooperatives. The research approach was qualitative including semi-structured interviews of the board of directors and supervisory board chairpersons. The results were analyzed and interpreted against theories of social power. As a result, the use of power is approached from two perspectives: (1) formal position-based authority and (2) informal power. Central elements of power were the mandate of the supervisory board, the role of the supervisory board, the supervisory board chair, the nomination committee, collaboration between the supervisory board and the board of directors, the role of regions and the role of the board of directors. The study contributes to the academic discussion on corporate governance in cooperatives and on the supervisory board in the context of the two-tier model. Additional research of the model in other countries and of other types of cooperatives would further academic understanding of supervisory boards.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to develop an empirical
research on the nature and consequences of corporate governance on
Eurozone Insurance Industry risk taking attitude. More particularly,
we analyzed the effect of public ownership on risk taking with
respect to privately held Insurance Companies. We also analyzed the
effects on risk taking attitude of different degrees of ownership
concentration, directors compensation, and the dimension/diversity of
the Board of Directors. Our results provide quite strong evidence that,
coherently with the Agency Theory, publicly traded insurance
companies with more concentrated ownership are less risky than the
corresponding privately held.