Abstract: The security of power systems against malicious cyberphysical
data attacks becomes an important issue. The adversary
always attempts to manipulate the information structure of the power
system and inject malicious data to deviate state variables while
evading the existing detection techniques based on residual test. The
solutions proposed in the literature are capable of immunizing the
power system against false data injection but they might be too costly
and physically not practical in the expansive distribution network.
To this end, we define an algebraic condition for trustworthy power
system to evade malicious data injection. The proposed protection
scheme secures the power system by deterministically reconfiguring
the information structure and corresponding residual test. More
importantly, it does not require any physical effort in either microgrid
or network level. The identification scheme of finding meters being
attacked is proposed as well. Eventually, a well-known IEEE 30-bus
system is adopted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
schemes.