Abstract: Organizations are increasingly relying upon teamwork; however, little is known about the best fit among incentive system, team composition, and group performance. To further explore this issue this study examines whether the congruence between incentive system and locus of control (LoC) affects team performance. To reconcile opposite lines of argument in literature regarding the best incentive system for a team, this paper uses the social identity perspective and person-environment (P-E) fit theory to understand behavior in a group process. A laboratory experiment with postgraduate students is conducted to test the hypotheses. One hundred and five accounting students were assigned to three-person work groups, where they completed an independent task under one of two types of incentive—individual and group incentive systems—after their LoC was measured. The findings confirm the hypothesis. Group incentive results in an enhanced team performance. Team performance is better when there is congruence between incentive system and LoC. Group incentive system combined with external LoC results in the best performance, while individual incentive system results in a better team performance when combined with internal LoC. The result suggests that a cooperative process enables ‘ordinary people’ to obtain extraordinary results.
Abstract: Today-s manufacturing companies are facing multiple and dynamic customer-supplier-relationships embedded in nonhierarchical production networks. This complex environment leads to problems with delivery reliability and wasteful turbulences throughout the entire network. This paper describes an operational model based on a theoretical framework which improves delivery reliability of each individual customer-supplier-relationship within non-hierarchical production networks of the European machinery and equipment industry. By developing a non-centralized coordination mechanism based on determining the value of delivery reliability and derivation of an incentive system for suppliers the number of in time deliveries can be increased and thus the turbulences in the production network smoothened. Comparable to an electronic stock exchange the coordination mechanism will transform the manual and nontransparent process of determining penalties for delivery delays into an automated and transparent market mechanism creating delivery reliability.
Abstract: This paper introduced the status quo of laws and
regulations of sustainable construction in China and investigated the
existing problems of current laws and regulations through
person-interviews in Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing and Shenzhen in
China. The problems include incomplete legal system, lack of
guidance of higher-level laws, backward in some laws and regulations,
unclear legal liability and poor law enforcement. Aimed at these
problems, this paper also put forward some improvement approaches,
such as filling the legal gap, revising laws and regulations, establishing
incentive system and keeping pace with level of development.