Abstract: This paper presents an economic game for sybil
detection in a distributed computing environment. Cost parameters
reflecting impacts of different sybil attacks are introduced in the sybil
detection game. The optimal strategies for this game in which both
sybil and non-sybil identities are expected to participate are devised.
A cost sharing economic mechanism called Discriminatory
Rewarding Mechanism for Sybil Detection is proposed based on this
game. A detective accepts a security deposit from each active agent,
negotiates with the agents and offers rewards to the sybils if the latter
disclose their identity. The basic objective of the detective is to
determine the optimum reward amount for each sybil which will
encourage the maximum possible number of sybils to reveal
themselves. Maintaining privacy is an important issue for the
mechanism since the participants involved in the negotiation are
generally reluctant to share their private information. The mechanism
has been applied to Tor by introducing a reputation scoring function.