Abstract: This paper used an asymmetric informative concept to apply in the macroeconomic model estimation of the tourism sector in Thailand. The variables used to statistically analyze are Thailand international and domestic tourism revenues, the expenditures of foreign and domestic tourists, service investments by private sectors, service investments by the government of Thailand, Thailand service imports and exports, and net service income transfers. All of data is a time-series index which was observed between 2002 and 2015. Empirically, the tourism multiplier and accelerator were estimated by two statistical approaches. The first was the result of the Generalized Method of Moments model (GMM) based on the assumption which the tourism market in Thailand had perfect information (Symmetrical data). The second was the result of the Maximum Entropy Bootstrapping approach (MEboot) based on the process that attempted to deal with imperfect information and reduced uncertainty in data observations (Asymmetrical data). In addition, the tourism leakages were investigated by a simple model based on the injections and leakages concept. The empirical findings represented the parameters computed from the MEboot approach which is different from the GMM method. However, both of the MEboot estimation and GMM model suggests that Thailand’s tourism sectors are in a period capable of stimulating the economy.
Abstract: The article analyzes problems of improving the management systems of the ownership risks in the conditions of the transformation of the Russian economy. Among the main sources of threats business owners should highlight is the inefficiency of the implementation of business models and interaction with hired managers. In this context, it is particularly important to analyze the relationship of business models and ownership risks. The analysis of this problem appears to be relevant for a number of reasons: Firstly, the increased risk appetite of the owner directly affects the business model and the composition of his holdings; secondly, owners with significant stakes in the company are factors in the formation of particular types of risks for owners, for which relations have a significant influence on a firm's competitiveness and ultimately determines its survival; and thirdly, inefficient system of management ownership of risk is one of the main causes of mass bankruptcies, which significantly affects the stable operation of the economy as a whole. The separation of the processes of possession, disposal and use in modern organizations is the cause of not only problems in the process of interaction between the owner and managers in managing the organization as a whole, but also the asymmetric information about the kinds and forms of the main risks. Managers tend to avoid risky projects, inhibit the diversification of the organization's assets, while owners can insist on the development of such projects, with the aim not only of creating new values for themselves and consumers, but also increasing the value of the company as a result of increasing capital. In terms of separating ownership and management, evaluation of projects by the ratio of risk-yield requires preservation of the influence of the owner on the process of development and making management decisions. It is obvious that without a clearly structured system of participation of the owner in managing the risks of their business, further development is hopeless. In modern conditions of forming a risk management system, owners are compelled to compromise between the desire to increase the organization's ability to produce new value, and, consequently, increase its cost due to the implementation of risky projects and the need to tolerate the cost of lost opportunities of risk diversification. Improving the effectiveness of the management of ownership risks may also contribute to the revitalization of creditors on implementation claims to inefficient owners, which ultimately will contribute to the efficiency models of ownership control to exclude variants of insolvency. It is obvious that in modern conditions, the success of the model of the ownership of risk management and audit is largely determined by the ability and willingness of the owner to find a compromise between potential opportunities for expanding the firm's ability to create new value through risk and maintaining the current level of new value creation and an acceptable level of risk through the use of models of diversification.
Abstract: We consider a Principal-Agent model with the
Principal being a seller who does not know perfectly how much the
buyer (the Agent) is willing to pay for the good. The buyer-s
preferences are hence his private information. The model corresponds
to the nonlinear pricing problem of Maskin and Riley. We assume
there are three types of Agents. The model is solved using
“informational rents" as variables. In the last section we present the
main characteristics of the optimal contracts in asymmetric
information and some possible extensions of the model.
Abstract: A property-s selling price is described as the result of
sequential bargaining between a buyer and a seller in an environment
of asymmetric information. Hedonic housing prices are estimated
based upon 17,333 records of New Zealand residential properties
sold during the years 2006 and 2007.
Abstract: The article deals with dividends and their distribution from investors from a theoretical point of view. Some studies try to analyzed the reaction of the market on the dividend announcement and found out the change of dividend policy is associated with abnormal returns around the dividend announcement date. Another researches directly questioned the investors about their dividend preference and beliefs. Investors want the dividend from many reasons (e.g. some of them explain the dividend preference by the existence of transaction cost; investors prefer the dividend today, because there is less risky; the managers have private information about the firm). The most controversial theory of dividend policy was developed by Modigliani and Miller (1961) who demonstrated that in the perfect and complete capital markets the dividend policy is irrelevant and the value of the company is independent of its payout policy. Nevertheless, in the real world the capital markets are imperfect, because of asymmetric information, transaction costs, incomplete contracting possibilities and taxes.
Abstract: Compliance requires an effective communication
within an enterprise as well as towards a company-s external
environment. This requirement commences with the
implementation of compliance within large scale compliance
projects and still persists in the compliance reporting within
standard operations. On the one hand the understanding of
compliance necessities within the organization is promoted.
On the other hand reduction of asymmetric information with
compliance stakeholders is achieved. To reach this goal, a
central reporting must provide a consolidated view of different
compliance efforts- statuses. A concept which could be
adapted for this purpose is the balanced scorecard by Kaplan /
Norton. This concept has not been analyzed in detail
concerning its adequacy for a holistic compliance reporting
starting in compliance projects until later usage in regularly
compliance operations.
At first, this paper evaluates if a holistic compliance
reporting can be designed by using the balanced scorecard
concept. The current status of compliance reporting clearly
shows that scorecards are generally accepted as a compliance
reporting tool and are already used for corporate governance
reporting. Additional specialized compliance IT - solutions
exist in the market. After the scorecard-s adequacy is
thoroughly examined and proofed, an example strategy map as
the basis to derive a compliance balanced scorecard is defined.
This definition answers the question on proceeding in
designing a compliance reporting tool.