U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Partisanship: Support for the President and Solicitor General
This paper analyzes the extent to which the justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court cast votes that support the positions of the
president, or more generally the Executive Branch. Can presidents
count on such deference from those justices they nominate or those
whom are nominated by other presidents of the same party? Or, do
the justices demonstrate judicial independence and impartiality such
that they are not so predisposed to vote in favor of arguments of their
nominating president-s party? The results suggest that while in
general the justices do not exhibit any marked tendency to partisan
support of presidents, more recent and conservative Supreme Court
justices are significantly more likely to support Republican
presidents.
[1] O. T. Frieden, "Gonzales Aides Politicized Hirings, Investigators find".
July 28, 2008 (cnn.com accessed May 8, 2009).
[2] E. Schwartz, "Looking Back on the Justice Department Scandal: A
Conversation with Former U.S. Attorney David Iglesias". June 4, 2008
(usnews.com accessed May 8, 2009).
[3] R. Van Dongen and E. Pierce, "GOP Senators Join in Criticism over
Firings". RollCall (March 14, 2007).
[4] J. Vicini, "Gonzales seen as politicizing Justice Department". August
19, 2007, Reuters (Reuters. com accessed May 8, 2009).
[5] K. O-Connor, "The Amicus Curiae Role of the U.S. Solicitor General in
Supreme Court Litigation". Judicature vol. 66, pp. 256-264, 1983.
[6] L. Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of
Law. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987.
[7] R. Deen, J. Ignagni and J. Meernik, "Trends in the Solicitor General as
Amicus, 1953-1990: Is He a Friend? Is He Influential." Judicature vol.
87, no. 2, pp. 1-16, 2003.
[8] R. Deen, J. Ignagni and J. Meernik, "Individual Justices and the
Solicitor General: The Amicus Curiae Cases, 1953-2000" Judicature,
vol. 89, no. 2, pp. 68-77, 2005.
[9] J.A. Segal and C. D. Reedy, "The Supreme Court and Sex
Discrimination: The Role of the Solicitor General." The Western Pol. Q.
vol. 41, pp. 553-568, 1988.
[10] S. Meinhold and S. Shull, "Policy Congruence between the President
and the Solicitor General." Pol. R. Q. vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 527-537, 1998.
[11] R. Salokar, The Solicitor General: The Politics of Law Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University Press, 1992.
[12] S. Puro, "The role of Amicus Curiae in the United States Supreme
Court: 1920-1966," Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at
Buffalo, 1971.
[13] R. Pacelle, Between Law and Politics: the Solicitor General and the
Structuring of Race, Gender and Reproductive Rights Litigation.
College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2003.
[14] J. Yates, Jeffrey, Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive
Success in the Supreme Court. New York: State University of New
York Press, 2002.
[15] H. J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents and Senators: A History of the U.S.
Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to Clinton, rev. ed.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
[16] L. Baum, The Supreme Court. Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1998.
[17] L. Epstein, J. A. Segal, H.J. Spaeth and T.G. Walker. The Supreme
Court Compendium: Data, Decisions and Developments. Washington,
DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1994, 1999.
[18] R. Scigliano, The Supreme Court and the Presidency. New York: Free
Press, 1971.
[19] J.A. Segal, "Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the
Warren and Burger Courts". W. Pol. Q. vol. 41, pp 135-144, 1988.
[20] Werdegar, K. M., "The Solicitor General and Administrative Due
Process." In George Washington L. Rev. vol. 36, pp. 481-514, 1967.
[21] G. Caldeira and J.Wright, "Organized Interests and Agenda-Setting in
the Supreme Court" Am. Pol. Sc. Rev.vol. 82, pp. 1109-1127, 1988.
[22] M. Galanter , "Why the ÔÇÿHaves- Come Out ahead: Speculation on the
Limits of Legal Change" Law and Soc. Rev. vol 9, page 95, 1974.
[23] S. Puro, "The United States as Amicus Curiae." In Courts, Law and
Judicial Processes. Sidney Ulmer, ed.. New York: Free Press, 1981.
[24] S. Wasby, The Supreme Court in the Federal Judicial System. New
York: Nelson Hall, 1988.
[25] K. T. McGuire, "Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme
Court". Pol. Res. Q. vol. 51, pp.505-526, 1998
[26] R. Deen, J. Ignagni and J. Meernik, "Executive Influence on the U.S.
Supreme Court: Solicitor General Amicus Cases, 1953-1997" A. Rev.of
Pol. vol. 22, pp. 3-26, 2002.
[27] C. R. Ducat and R. L. Dudley, "Federal District Judges and Presidential
Power During the Postwar Years" J. of Pol. vol. 51, pp. :98-118,
February 1989.
[28] R. M. Howard and J. A. Segal, "A Preference for Deference: The
Supreme Court and Judicial Review". Pol. Res.Q. vol. 57, no. 1, pp.
131-143, 2004.
[29] K. McGuire, "Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of
Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success." Journal of Politics vol. 57,
pp. 187-196, 1995.
[30] J. A. Segal,. "Supreme Court Support for the Solicitor General: The
Effect of Presidential Appointments," W. Pol. Q. vol. 43, pp. 137-152,
March 1990.
[31] J. A. Segal, R. J. Timpone and R. M. Howard "Buyer Beware:
Presidential Success Through Supreme Court Appointments". Pol. Res.
Q. vol. 53, pp. 557-573, September 2004.
[32] J. Yates, "Presidential Bureaucratic Power and Supreme Court Justice
Voting". Pol. Behavior vol.. 21, pp. 349-366, December 1999.
[33] J. Yates and A. Whitford, "Presidential Power and the United States
Supreme Court". Pol.Res.Q. vol. 51, pp. 539-550, 1998.
[34] L. Epstein, A. Martin, K. Quinn and J. Segal, "Ideological Drift Among
Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?"
Northwestern Univ. Law Rev. vol. 101, pp. 1483-1542, Fall 2007.
[35] J. A. Segal and H. J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model Revisited. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2002.
[36] M. A. Bailey, B. Kamoie and F. Maltzman, "Signals from the Tenth
Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court
Decision Making" A. J. of Pol. S. vol. 49, pp. 72-85, 2005.
[37] Szmer, John and Donald R. Songer. 2005. "The Effects of Information
on the Accuracy of Presidential Assessments of Supreme Court
Nominee Preferences". Political Research Quarterly 58(Mar.):151-160.
[38] J. Ignagni and J. Meernik, "Explaining Congressional Attempts to
Reverse Supreme Court Decisions" Pol. Res. Q. vol. 47, pp. 353-371,
1994.
[1] O. T. Frieden, "Gonzales Aides Politicized Hirings, Investigators find".
July 28, 2008 (cnn.com accessed May 8, 2009).
[2] E. Schwartz, "Looking Back on the Justice Department Scandal: A
Conversation with Former U.S. Attorney David Iglesias". June 4, 2008
(usnews.com accessed May 8, 2009).
[3] R. Van Dongen and E. Pierce, "GOP Senators Join in Criticism over
Firings". RollCall (March 14, 2007).
[4] J. Vicini, "Gonzales seen as politicizing Justice Department". August
19, 2007, Reuters (Reuters. com accessed May 8, 2009).
[5] K. O-Connor, "The Amicus Curiae Role of the U.S. Solicitor General in
Supreme Court Litigation". Judicature vol. 66, pp. 256-264, 1983.
[6] L. Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of
Law. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987.
[7] R. Deen, J. Ignagni and J. Meernik, "Trends in the Solicitor General as
Amicus, 1953-1990: Is He a Friend? Is He Influential." Judicature vol.
87, no. 2, pp. 1-16, 2003.
[8] R. Deen, J. Ignagni and J. Meernik, "Individual Justices and the
Solicitor General: The Amicus Curiae Cases, 1953-2000" Judicature,
vol. 89, no. 2, pp. 68-77, 2005.
[9] J.A. Segal and C. D. Reedy, "The Supreme Court and Sex
Discrimination: The Role of the Solicitor General." The Western Pol. Q.
vol. 41, pp. 553-568, 1988.
[10] S. Meinhold and S. Shull, "Policy Congruence between the President
and the Solicitor General." Pol. R. Q. vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 527-537, 1998.
[11] R. Salokar, The Solicitor General: The Politics of Law Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University Press, 1992.
[12] S. Puro, "The role of Amicus Curiae in the United States Supreme
Court: 1920-1966," Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at
Buffalo, 1971.
[13] R. Pacelle, Between Law and Politics: the Solicitor General and the
Structuring of Race, Gender and Reproductive Rights Litigation.
College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2003.
[14] J. Yates, Jeffrey, Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive
Success in the Supreme Court. New York: State University of New
York Press, 2002.
[15] H. J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents and Senators: A History of the U.S.
Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to Clinton, rev. ed.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
[16] L. Baum, The Supreme Court. Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1998.
[17] L. Epstein, J. A. Segal, H.J. Spaeth and T.G. Walker. The Supreme
Court Compendium: Data, Decisions and Developments. Washington,
DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1994, 1999.
[18] R. Scigliano, The Supreme Court and the Presidency. New York: Free
Press, 1971.
[19] J.A. Segal, "Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the
Warren and Burger Courts". W. Pol. Q. vol. 41, pp 135-144, 1988.
[20] Werdegar, K. M., "The Solicitor General and Administrative Due
Process." In George Washington L. Rev. vol. 36, pp. 481-514, 1967.
[21] G. Caldeira and J.Wright, "Organized Interests and Agenda-Setting in
the Supreme Court" Am. Pol. Sc. Rev.vol. 82, pp. 1109-1127, 1988.
[22] M. Galanter , "Why the ÔÇÿHaves- Come Out ahead: Speculation on the
Limits of Legal Change" Law and Soc. Rev. vol 9, page 95, 1974.
[23] S. Puro, "The United States as Amicus Curiae." In Courts, Law and
Judicial Processes. Sidney Ulmer, ed.. New York: Free Press, 1981.
[24] S. Wasby, The Supreme Court in the Federal Judicial System. New
York: Nelson Hall, 1988.
[25] K. T. McGuire, "Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme
Court". Pol. Res. Q. vol. 51, pp.505-526, 1998
[26] R. Deen, J. Ignagni and J. Meernik, "Executive Influence on the U.S.
Supreme Court: Solicitor General Amicus Cases, 1953-1997" A. Rev.of
Pol. vol. 22, pp. 3-26, 2002.
[27] C. R. Ducat and R. L. Dudley, "Federal District Judges and Presidential
Power During the Postwar Years" J. of Pol. vol. 51, pp. :98-118,
February 1989.
[28] R. M. Howard and J. A. Segal, "A Preference for Deference: The
Supreme Court and Judicial Review". Pol. Res.Q. vol. 57, no. 1, pp.
131-143, 2004.
[29] K. McGuire, "Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of
Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success." Journal of Politics vol. 57,
pp. 187-196, 1995.
[30] J. A. Segal,. "Supreme Court Support for the Solicitor General: The
Effect of Presidential Appointments," W. Pol. Q. vol. 43, pp. 137-152,
March 1990.
[31] J. A. Segal, R. J. Timpone and R. M. Howard "Buyer Beware:
Presidential Success Through Supreme Court Appointments". Pol. Res.
Q. vol. 53, pp. 557-573, September 2004.
[32] J. Yates, "Presidential Bureaucratic Power and Supreme Court Justice
Voting". Pol. Behavior vol.. 21, pp. 349-366, December 1999.
[33] J. Yates and A. Whitford, "Presidential Power and the United States
Supreme Court". Pol.Res.Q. vol. 51, pp. 539-550, 1998.
[34] L. Epstein, A. Martin, K. Quinn and J. Segal, "Ideological Drift Among
Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?"
Northwestern Univ. Law Rev. vol. 101, pp. 1483-1542, Fall 2007.
[35] J. A. Segal and H. J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model Revisited. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2002.
[36] M. A. Bailey, B. Kamoie and F. Maltzman, "Signals from the Tenth
Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court
Decision Making" A. J. of Pol. S. vol. 49, pp. 72-85, 2005.
[37] Szmer, John and Donald R. Songer. 2005. "The Effects of Information
on the Accuracy of Presidential Assessments of Supreme Court
Nominee Preferences". Political Research Quarterly 58(Mar.):151-160.
[38] J. Ignagni and J. Meernik, "Explaining Congressional Attempts to
Reverse Supreme Court Decisions" Pol. Res. Q. vol. 47, pp. 353-371,
1994.
@article{"International Journal of Business, Human and Social Sciences:57485", author = "James Meernik and Joseph Ignagni and Rebecca Deen", title = "U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Partisanship: Support for the President and Solicitor General", abstract = "This paper analyzes the extent to which the justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court cast votes that support the positions of the
president, or more generally the Executive Branch. Can presidents
count on such deference from those justices they nominate or those
whom are nominated by other presidents of the same party? Or, do
the justices demonstrate judicial independence and impartiality such
that they are not so predisposed to vote in favor of arguments of their
nominating president-s party? The results suggest that while in
general the justices do not exhibit any marked tendency to partisan
support of presidents, more recent and conservative Supreme Court
justices are significantly more likely to support Republican
presidents.", keywords = "Separation of Powers, Solicitor General, U.S.
President", volume = "6", number = "8", pages = "2176-7", }
