Relationships between Information Transparency, Corporate Governance and D&O Insurance

This study examines the influence of information
transparency and corporate governance on purchase directors and
officers liability (D&O) insurance decisions. The results show that
companies with greater information transparency have significant
demand for D&O insurance. Greater transparency in voluntary
disclosures is significantly and positively associated with demand for
insurance, indicating that increasing the degree of information
disclosure reduces information asymmetry for insurers, which
stimulates their willingness to provide greater protection.
Analysis of insured and uninsured subsamples indicates that
uninsured companies have superior corporate governance compared to
insured companies. Although insured companies tend to have weaker
corporate governance structures, they appoint Big 4 firms or industry
experts to compensate for the weakness of their corporate governance.
Empirical results indicate that purchasing D&O insurance can
strengthen external corporate governance and increase companies’
willingness to voluntarily provide more transparent information.

• Shu-Lin Lin
• Ching-Chien Yang

• Directors and officers liability (D&O) insurance
• information transparency
• corporate governance
• Big 4.

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