Dynamic Anonymity

Encryption protects communication partners from disclosure of their secret messages but cannot prevent traffic analysis and the leakage of information about “who communicates with whom". In the presence of collaborating adversaries, this linkability of actions can danger anonymity. However, reliably providing anonymity is crucial in many applications. Especially in contextaware mobile business, where mobile users equipped with PDAs request and receive services from service providers, providing anonymous communication is mission-critical and challenging at the same time. Firstly, the limited performance of mobile devices does not allow for heavy use of expensive public-key operations which are commonly used in anonymity protocols. Moreover, the demands for security depend on the application (e.g., mobile dating vs. pizza delivery service), but different users (e.g., a celebrity vs. a normal person) may even require different security levels for the same application. Considering both hardware limitations of mobile devices and different sensitivity of users, we propose an anonymity framework that is dynamically configurable according to user and application preferences. Our framework is based on Chaum-s mixnet. We explain the proposed framework, its configuration parameters for the dynamic behavior and the algorithm to enforce dynamic anonymity.




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