Detecting and Locating Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks Using Beacon Nodes
This paper focuses on wormhole attacks detection in wireless sensor networks. The wormhole attack is particularly challenging to deal with since the adversary does not need to compromise any nodes and can use laptops or other wireless devices to send the packets on a low latency channel. This paper introduces an easy and effective method to detect and locate the wormholes: Since beacon nodes are assumed to know their coordinates, the straight line distance between each pair of them can be calculated and then compared with the corresponding hop distance, which in this paper equals hop counts × node-s transmission range R. Dramatic difference may emerge because of an existing wormhole. Our detection mechanism is based on this. The approximate location of the wormhole can also be derived in further steps based on this information. To the best of our knowledge, our method is much easier than other wormhole detecting schemes which also use beacon nodes, and to those have special requirements on each nodes (e.g., GPS receivers or tightly synchronized clocks or directional antennas), ours is more economical. Simulation results show that the algorithm is successful in detecting and locating wormholes when the density of beacon nodes reaches 0.008 per m2.
[1] S. Shankar Sastry, Tanya Gazelle Roosta, "attacks and defenses of
ubiquitous sensor networks," pp.10-22, Available:
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2008/EECS-2008-58.html
[2] Y.C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D.B. Johnson. Packet leashes, "A defense against
wormhole attacks in wireless ad hoc networks," in Proceedings of
INFOCOM 2003, April 2003.
[3] C. Karlof and D. Wagner, "Secure routing in wireless sensor networks:
Attacks and countermeasures," in Proceedings of 1st IEEE International
Workshop on Sensor Network Protocols and Applications, May
2003.pp.293-301
[4] J. Eriksson, S. Krishnamurthy, and M. Faloutsos, "Truelink: A practical
countermeasure to the wormhole attack," in ICNP, 2006.
[5] R. Poovendran and L. Lazos, "A graph theoretic framework for
preventing the wormhole attack in wireless ad hoc networks," ACM
Journal of Wireless Networks (WINET), 2005.
[6] D. Nicolescu and B. Nath, "Ad-Hoc Positioning Systems (APS)," in
Proc. of IEEE GLOBECOM 2001, San Antonio, TX, USA, November
2001.
[7] P. Papadimitratos and Z. Haas, "Secure routing for mobile ad hoc
networks," Proc. SCS Communication Networks and Distributed Systems
Modeling and Simulation, 2002.
[8] K. Sanzgiri, B. Dahill, B. Levine, C Shields, and E. Belding-Royer, "A
secure routing protocol for ad hoc networks," in ICNP, 2002, pp. 78- 89.
[9] L. Hu and D. Evans, "Using directional antennas to prevent wormhole
attacks," Proceedings of the Eleventh Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, 2004, pp. 131~141.
[10] L. Lazos, and R. Poovendran, "SeRLoc: Secure Range-Independent
Localization for Wireless Sensor Networks," Proceedings ACM WiSe
(October 2004).
[11] W. Du, L. Fang and P. Ning, "LAD: Localization anomaly detection for
wireless sensor networks," Journal of Parallel and Distributed
Computing, vol. 66(7), 2006, pp. 874~886.
[12] I. Khalil, S. Bagchi, and N. B. Shroff, "LITEWORP: A Lightweight
Countermeasure for the Wormhole attack in multihop wireless network,"
in International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
(DSN), 2005.
[13] S. ╦ÿ Capkun, L. Buttyan, J. Hubaux, "SECTOR: Secure Tracking of
Node Encounters in Multi-hop Wireless Networks," Proceedings of
Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (Oct. 2003) pp. 21~32.
[14] Khin Sandar Win, Pathein Gyi, "Analysis of Detecting Wormhole Attack
in Wireless Networks," Proceedings Of World Academy Of Science
Engineering And Technology Volume 36 December 2008.
[15] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, "Random key predistribution schemes
for sensor networks," in IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and
Privacy, 2003, pp. 197-213.
[16] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, and P. Varshney, "A pairwise key
predistribution scheme for wireless sensor networks," in Proceedings of
10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(CCS-03), October 2003, pp. 42~51.
[17] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, and D. Tygar, "SPINS:
Security protocols for sensor networks," in Proceedings of Seventh
Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networks,
July 2001.
[18] Niculescu D, Nath B, "DV based positioning in ad hoc networks[J],"
Journal of Telecommunication System 22(1/4), 2003, pp.267~280.
[1] S. Shankar Sastry, Tanya Gazelle Roosta, "attacks and defenses of
ubiquitous sensor networks," pp.10-22, Available:
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2008/EECS-2008-58.html
[2] Y.C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D.B. Johnson. Packet leashes, "A defense against
wormhole attacks in wireless ad hoc networks," in Proceedings of
INFOCOM 2003, April 2003.
[3] C. Karlof and D. Wagner, "Secure routing in wireless sensor networks:
Attacks and countermeasures," in Proceedings of 1st IEEE International
Workshop on Sensor Network Protocols and Applications, May
2003.pp.293-301
[4] J. Eriksson, S. Krishnamurthy, and M. Faloutsos, "Truelink: A practical
countermeasure to the wormhole attack," in ICNP, 2006.
[5] R. Poovendran and L. Lazos, "A graph theoretic framework for
preventing the wormhole attack in wireless ad hoc networks," ACM
Journal of Wireless Networks (WINET), 2005.
[6] D. Nicolescu and B. Nath, "Ad-Hoc Positioning Systems (APS)," in
Proc. of IEEE GLOBECOM 2001, San Antonio, TX, USA, November
2001.
[7] P. Papadimitratos and Z. Haas, "Secure routing for mobile ad hoc
networks," Proc. SCS Communication Networks and Distributed Systems
Modeling and Simulation, 2002.
[8] K. Sanzgiri, B. Dahill, B. Levine, C Shields, and E. Belding-Royer, "A
secure routing protocol for ad hoc networks," in ICNP, 2002, pp. 78- 89.
[9] L. Hu and D. Evans, "Using directional antennas to prevent wormhole
attacks," Proceedings of the Eleventh Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, 2004, pp. 131~141.
[10] L. Lazos, and R. Poovendran, "SeRLoc: Secure Range-Independent
Localization for Wireless Sensor Networks," Proceedings ACM WiSe
(October 2004).
[11] W. Du, L. Fang and P. Ning, "LAD: Localization anomaly detection for
wireless sensor networks," Journal of Parallel and Distributed
Computing, vol. 66(7), 2006, pp. 874~886.
[12] I. Khalil, S. Bagchi, and N. B. Shroff, "LITEWORP: A Lightweight
Countermeasure for the Wormhole attack in multihop wireless network,"
in International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
(DSN), 2005.
[13] S. ╦ÿ Capkun, L. Buttyan, J. Hubaux, "SECTOR: Secure Tracking of
Node Encounters in Multi-hop Wireless Networks," Proceedings of
Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (Oct. 2003) pp. 21~32.
[14] Khin Sandar Win, Pathein Gyi, "Analysis of Detecting Wormhole Attack
in Wireless Networks," Proceedings Of World Academy Of Science
Engineering And Technology Volume 36 December 2008.
[15] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, "Random key predistribution schemes
for sensor networks," in IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and
Privacy, 2003, pp. 197-213.
[16] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, and P. Varshney, "A pairwise key
predistribution scheme for wireless sensor networks," in Proceedings of
10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(CCS-03), October 2003, pp. 42~51.
[17] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, and D. Tygar, "SPINS:
Security protocols for sensor networks," in Proceedings of Seventh
Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networks,
July 2001.
[18] Niculescu D, Nath B, "DV based positioning in ad hoc networks[J],"
Journal of Telecommunication System 22(1/4), 2003, pp.267~280.
@article{"International Journal of Information, Control and Computer Sciences:52626", author = "He Ronghui and Ma Guoqing and Wang Chunlei and Fang Lan", title = "Detecting and Locating Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks Using Beacon Nodes", abstract = "This paper focuses on wormhole attacks detection in wireless sensor networks. The wormhole attack is particularly challenging to deal with since the adversary does not need to compromise any nodes and can use laptops or other wireless devices to send the packets on a low latency channel. This paper introduces an easy and effective method to detect and locate the wormholes: Since beacon nodes are assumed to know their coordinates, the straight line distance between each pair of them can be calculated and then compared with the corresponding hop distance, which in this paper equals hop counts × node-s transmission range R. Dramatic difference may emerge because of an existing wormhole. Our detection mechanism is based on this. The approximate location of the wormhole can also be derived in further steps based on this information. To the best of our knowledge, our method is much easier than other wormhole detecting schemes which also use beacon nodes, and to those have special requirements on each nodes (e.g., GPS receivers or tightly synchronized clocks or directional antennas), ours is more economical. Simulation results show that the algorithm is successful in detecting and locating wormholes when the density of beacon nodes reaches 0.008 per m2.
", keywords = "Beacon node, wireless sensor network, worm hole attack.", volume = "3", number = "7", pages = "1710-5", }
