Corporate Fraud: An Analysis of Malaysian Securities Commission Enforcement Releases

Economic crime (i.e. corporate fraud) has a significant impact on business. This study analyzes the fraud cases reported by the Malaysian Securities Commission. Frauds involving market manipulation and/or illegal share trading are the most common types of fraud reported over the 6 years analyzed. The highest number of frauds reported involved investment and fund holding companies. Alarmingly the results indicate quite a high number of frauds cases are committed by management. The higher number of Chinese perpetrators may be due to fact that they are the dominant group in Malaysian business. The result also shows that more than half of companies involved with fraud are privately held companies in the investment/fund/finance sector. The results of this study highlight general characteristic of perpetrators (person and company) that commit fraud which could help the regulators in their monitoring and enforcement activities. To investors, this would help in analyzing their business investment or portfolio risk.

Authors:

• Raziah Bi Mohamed Sadique
• Jamal Roudaki
• Murray B. Clark
• Norhayati Alias

Keywords:

• Corporate fraud
• economic crime
• fraudcharacteristic
• perpetrators

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