A New Method for Complex Goods Selection in Electronic Markets

After the development of the Internet a suitable discipline for trading goods electronically has been emerged. However, this type of markets is not still mature enough in order to become independent and get closer to seller/buyer-s needs. Furthermore, the buyable and sellable goods in these markets still don-t have essential standards for being well-defined. In this paper, we will present a model for development of a market which can contain goods with variable definitions and we will also investigate its characteristics. Besides, by noticing the fact that people have different discriminations, it-s figured out that the significance of each attribute of a specific product may vary from different people-s view points. Consequently we-ll present a model for weighting and accordingly different people-s view points could be satisfied. These two aspects will be discussed completely throughout this paper.

Authors:

• Mohammad Ali Tabarzad
• Caro Lucas
• Nassim Jafarzadeh Eslami

Keywords:

• Electronic markets
• selection of multi attributegoods
• data infusion.

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