Abstract: Un-keyed SIM cards do not contain the required security infrastructure to provide end-to-end encryption with Service Providers. Hence, new, emerging, or smart services those require end-to-end encryption between SIM card and a Service Provider is impossible. SIMSec key exchange protocol creates symmetric keys between SIM card and Service Provider. After a successful protocol execution, SIM card and Service Provider creates the symmetric keys and can perform end-to-end data encryption when required. In this paper, our aim is to analyze the SIMSec protocol’s security. According to the results, SIM card and Service Provider can generate keys securely using SIMSec protocol.
Abstract: The study investigated the practices of organisations in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries with regards to G2C egovernment maturity. It reveals that e-government G2C initiatives in the surveyed countries in particular, and arguably around the world in general, are progressing slowly because of the lack of a trusted and secure medium to authenticate the identities of online users. The authors conclude that national ID schemes will play a major role in helping governments reap the benefits of e-government if the three advanced technologies of smart card, biometrics and public key infrastructure (PKI) are utilised to provide a reliable and trusted authentication medium for e-government services.
Abstract: Recently, with the appearance of smart cards, many
user authentication protocols using smart card have been proposed to
mitigate the vulnerabilities in user authentication process. In 2004,
Das et al. proposed a ID-based user authentication protocol that is
secure against ID-theft and replay attack using smart card. In 2009,
Wang et al. showed that Das et al.-s protocol is not secure to randomly
chosen password attack and impersonation attack, and proposed an
improved protocol. Their protocol provided mutual authentication and
efficient password management. In this paper, we analyze the security
weaknesses and point out the vulnerabilities of Wang et al.-s protocol.