Abstract: One possible approach for maintaining the security of communication systems relies on Physical Layer Security mechanisms. However, in wireless time division duplex systems, where uplink and downlink channels are reciprocal, the channel estimate procedure is exposed to attacks known as pilot contamination, with the aim of having an enhanced data signal sent to the malicious user. The Shifted 2-N-PSK method involves two random legitimate pilots in the training phase, each of which belongs to a constellation, shifted from the original N-PSK symbols by certain degrees. In this paper, legitimate pilots’ offset values and their influence on the detection capabilities of the Shifted 2-N-PSK method are investigated. As the implementation of the technique depends on the relation between the shift angles rather than their specific values, the optimal interconnection between the two legitimate constellations is investigated. The results show that no regularity exists in the relation between the pilot contamination attacks (PCA) detection probability and the choice of offset values. Therefore, an adversary who aims to obtain the exact offset values can only employ a brute-force attack but the large number of possible combinations for the shifted constellations makes such a type of attack difficult to successfully mount. For this reason, the number of optimal shift value pairs is also studied for both 100% and 98% probabilities of detecting pilot contamination attacks. Although the Shifted 2-N-PSK method has been broadly studied in different signal-to-noise ratio scenarios, in multi-cell systems the interference from the signals in other cells should be also taken into account. Therefore, the inter-cell interference impact on the performance of the method is investigated by means of a large number of simulations. The results show that the detection probability of the Shifted 2-N-PSK decreases inversely to the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio.
Abstract: At present, dictionary attack has been the basic tool for
recovering key passwords. In order to avoid dictionary attack, users
purposely choose another character strings as passwords. According to
statistics, about 14% of users choose keys on a keyboard (Kkey, for
short) as passwords. This paper develops a framework system to attack
the password chosen from Kkeys and analyzes its efficiency. Within
this system, we build up keyboard rules using the adjacent and parallel
relationship among Kkeys and then use these Kkey rules to generate
password databases by depth-first search method. According to the
experiment results, we find the key space of databases derived from
these Kkey rules that could be far smaller than the password databases
generated within brute-force attack, thus effectively narrowing down
the scope of attack research. Taking one general Kkey rule, the
combinations in all printable characters (94 types) with Kkey adjacent
and parallel relationship, as an example, the derived key space is about
240 smaller than those in brute-force attack. In addition, we
demonstrate the method's practicality and value by successfully
cracking the access password to UNIX and PC using the password
databases created