Abstract: The main aim of this study was to examine whether
people understand indicative conditionals on the basis of syntactic
factors or on the basis of subjective conditional probability. The
second aim was to investigate whether the conditional probability of
q given p depends on the antecedent and consequent sizes or derives
from inductive processes leading to establish a link of plausible cooccurrence
between events semantically or experientially associated.
These competing hypotheses have been tested through a 3 x 2 x 2 x 2
mixed design involving the manipulation of four variables: type of
instructions (“Consider the following statement to be true", “Read the
following statement" and condition with no conditional statement);
antecedent size (high/low); consequent size (high/low); statement
probability (high/low). The first variable was between-subjects, the
others were within-subjects. The inferences investigated were Modus
Ponens and Modus Tollens. Ninety undergraduates of the Second
University of Naples, without any prior knowledge of logic or
conditional reasoning, participated in this study.
Results suggest that people understand conditionals in a syntactic
way rather than in a probabilistic way, even though the perception of
the conditional probability of q given p is at least partially involved in
the conditionals- comprehension. They also showed that, in presence
of a conditional syllogism, inferences are not affected by the
antecedent or consequent sizes. From a theoretical point of view these
findings suggest that it would be inappropriate to abandon the idea
that conditionals are naturally understood in a syntactic way for the
idea that they are understood in a probabilistic way.
Abstract: In two studies we challenged the well consolidated
position in regret literature according to which the necessary
condition for the emergence of regret is a bad outcome ensuing from
free decisions. Without free choice, and, consequently, personal
responsibility, other emotions, such as disappointment, but not regret,
are supposed to be elicited. In our opinion, a main source of regret is
being obliged by circumstance out of our control to chose an
undesired option. We tested the hypothesis that regret resulting from
a forced choice is more intense than regret derived from a free choice
and that the outcome affects the latter, not the former. Besides, we
investigated whether two other variables – the perception of the level
of freedom of the choice and the choice justifiability – mediated the
relationships between choice and regret, as well as the other four
emotions we examined: satisfaction, anger toward oneself,
disappointment, anger towards circumstances. The two studies were
based on the scenario methodology and implied a 2 x 2 (choice x
outcome) between design. In the first study the foreseen short-term
effects of the choice were assessed; in the second study the
experienced long-term effects of the choice were assessed. In each
study 160 students of the Second University of Naples participated.
Results largely corroborated our hypotheses. They were discussed in
the light of the main theories on regret and decision making.
Abstract: In recent years linguistic research has turned
increasing attention to covert/overt strategies to modulate authorial
stance and positioning in scientific texts, and to the recipients'
response. This study discussed some theoretical implications of the
use of rhetoric in scientific communication and analysed qualitative
data from the authoritative The Cognitive Neurosciences III (2004)
volume. Its genre-identity, status and readability were considered, in
the social interactive context of contemporary disciplinary discourses
– in their polyphony of traditional and new, emerging genres.
Evidence was given of the ways its famous authors negotiate and
shape knowledge and research results – explicitly appraising team
work and promoting faith in the fast-paced progress of Cognitive
Neuroscience, also through experiential metaphors – by presenting a
set of examples, ordered according to their dominant rhetorical
quality.
Abstract: In two studies we tested the hypothesis that the
appropriate linguistic formulation of a deontic rule – i.e. the
formulation which clarifies the monadic nature of deontic operators
- should produce more correct responses than the conditional
formulation in Wason selection task. We tested this assumption by
presenting a prescription rule and a prohibition rule in conditional
vs. proper deontic formulation. We contrasted this hypothesis with
two other hypotheses derived from social contract theory and
relevance theory. According to the first theory, a deontic rule
expressed in terms of cost-benefit should elicit a cheater detection
module, sensible to mental states attributions and thus able to
discriminate intentional rule violations from accidental rule
violations. We tested this prevision by distinguishing the two types
of violations. According to relevance theory, performance in
selection task should improve by increasing cognitive effect and
decreasing cognitive effort. We tested this prevision by focusing
experimental instructions on the rule vs. the action covered by the
rule. In study 1, in which 480 undergraduates participated, we
tested these predictions through a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (type of the rule x
rule formulation x type of violation x experimental instructions)
between-subjects design. In study 2 – carried out by means of a 2 x
2 (rule formulation x type of violation) between-subjects design -
we retested the hypothesis of rule formulation vs. the cheaterdetection
hypothesis through a new version of selection task in
which intentional vs. accidental rule violations were better
discriminated. 240 undergraduates participated in this study.
Results corroborate our hypothesis and challenge the contrasting
assumptions. However, they show that the conditional formulation
of deontic rules produces a lower performance than what is
reported in literature.