The Investors- Reaction to Investment Rating Change Announcements

This study investigates the investors- behavioral reaction to the investment rating change announcements from the views of behavioral finance. The empirical results indicate that self-interest does affect the intention of securities firms to release investment ratings for individual stocks. In addition, behavioral pitfalls are also found in the response of retail investors to investment rating change announcements.




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