System Survivability in Networks in the Context of Defense/Attack Strategies: The Large Scale
We investigate the large scale of networks in the
context of network survivability under attack. We use appropriate
techniques to evaluate and the attacker-based- and the defenderbased-
network survivability. The attacker is unaware of the operated
links by the defender. Each attacked link has some pre-specified
probability to be disconnected. The defender choice is so that to
maximize the chance of successfully sending the flow to the
destination node. The attacker however will select the cut-set with
the highest chance to be disabled in order to partition the network.
Moreover, we extend the problem to the case of selecting the best p
paths to operate by the defender and the best k cut-sets to target by
the attacker, for arbitrary integers p,k>1. We investigate some
variations of the problem and suggest polynomial-time solutions.
[1] Bier, Vicki M., M. N. Azaiez. 2009. Game theoretic risk analysis of
security threats (ed.). International Series in Operations Research and
Management Science 128 Springer.
[2] Azaiez, M. N., Vicki. M. Bier. 2007. Optimal resource allocation for
security in reliability systems. European Journal of Operational
Research, 181, 773–786.
[3] Cox, L. A. Jr., (2009). Making telecommunications network resilient
against terrorist attacks, In Bier, V.M. and Azaiez, M. N. (ed.), Game
theoretic risk analysis of security threats (pp. 175-197). New York:
Springer: The International Series of Operations Research and
Management Science, 128.
[4] Kanturska, U., Schmöcker, J.D., Fonzone, A., Bell, M., G., H., (2009).
Improving reliability through multi-path routing and link defence, an
application of game theory to transport. In Bier, V.M. and Azaiez, M. N.
(ed.), Game theoretic risk analysis of security threats (pp. 199-227).
New York: Springer: The International Series of Operations Research
and Management Science, 128.
[5] Gharbi, A., Azaiez, M. N., Kharbech, M. (2010), "Minimizing Expected
Attacking Cost in Networks", Electronic Notes in Discrete
Mathematics,36, 947–954.
[6] Ben Yaghlane A., Azaiez M.N., Mrad M., 2015. System survivability in
networks: submitted for publication
[1] Bier, Vicki M., M. N. Azaiez. 2009. Game theoretic risk analysis of
security threats (ed.). International Series in Operations Research and
Management Science 128 Springer.
[2] Azaiez, M. N., Vicki. M. Bier. 2007. Optimal resource allocation for
security in reliability systems. European Journal of Operational
Research, 181, 773–786.
[3] Cox, L. A. Jr., (2009). Making telecommunications network resilient
against terrorist attacks, In Bier, V.M. and Azaiez, M. N. (ed.), Game
theoretic risk analysis of security threats (pp. 175-197). New York:
Springer: The International Series of Operations Research and
Management Science, 128.
[4] Kanturska, U., Schmöcker, J.D., Fonzone, A., Bell, M., G., H., (2009).
Improving reliability through multi-path routing and link defence, an
application of game theory to transport. In Bier, V.M. and Azaiez, M. N.
(ed.), Game theoretic risk analysis of security threats (pp. 199-227).
New York: Springer: The International Series of Operations Research
and Management Science, 128.
[5] Gharbi, A., Azaiez, M. N., Kharbech, M. (2010), "Minimizing Expected
Attacking Cost in Networks", Electronic Notes in Discrete
Mathematics,36, 947–954.
[6] Ben Yaghlane A., Azaiez M.N., Mrad M., 2015. System survivability in
networks: submitted for publication
@article{"International Journal of Information, Control and Computer Sciences:71761", author = "A. Ben Yaghlane and M. N. Azaiez and M. Mrad", title = "System Survivability in Networks in the Context of Defense/Attack Strategies: The Large Scale", abstract = "We investigate the large scale of networks in the
context of network survivability under attack. We use appropriate
techniques to evaluate and the attacker-based- and the defenderbased-
network survivability. The attacker is unaware of the operated
links by the defender. Each attacked link has some pre-specified
probability to be disconnected. The defender choice is so that to
maximize the chance of successfully sending the flow to the
destination node. The attacker however will select the cut-set with
the highest chance to be disabled in order to partition the network.
Moreover, we extend the problem to the case of selecting the best p
paths to operate by the defender and the best k cut-sets to target by
the attacker, for arbitrary integers p,k>1. We investigate some
variations of the problem and suggest polynomial-time solutions.", keywords = "Defense/attack strategies, large scale, networks,
partitioning a network.", volume = "9", number = "12", pages = "2521-4", }