Forecasting Stock Price Manipulation in Capital Market

The aim of the article is extending and developing econometrics and network structure based methods which are able to distinguish price manipulation in Tehran stock exchange. The principal goal of the present study is to offer model for approximating price manipulation in Tehran stock exchange. In order to do so by applying separation method a sample consisting of 397 companies accepted at Tehran stock exchange were selected and information related to their price and volume of trades during years 2001 until 2009 were collected and then through performing runs test, skewness test and duration correlative test the selected companies were divided into 2 sets of manipulated and non manipulated companies. In the next stage by investigating cumulative return process and volume of trades in manipulated companies, the date of starting price manipulation was specified and in this way the logit model, artificial neural network, multiple discriminant analysis and by using information related to size of company, clarity of information, ratio of P/E and liquidity of stock one year prior price manipulation; a model for forecasting price manipulation of stocks of companies present in Tehran stock exchange were designed. At the end the power of forecasting models were studied by using data of test set. Whereas the power of forecasting logit model for test set was 92.1%, for artificial neural network was 94.1% and multi audit analysis model was 90.2%; therefore all of the 3 aforesaid models has high power to forecast price manipulation and there is no considerable difference among forecasting power of these 3 models.




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