Authentication Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless sensor networks can be used to measure and monitor many challenging problems and typically involve in monitoring, tracking and controlling areas such as battlefield monitoring, object tracking, habitat monitoring and home sentry systems. However, wireless sensor networks pose unique security challenges including forgery of sensor data, eavesdropping, denial of service attacks, and the physical compromise of sensor nodes. Node in a sensor networks may be vanished due to power exhaustion or malicious attacks. To expand the life span of the sensor network, a new node deployment is needed. In military scenarios, intruder may directly organize malicious nodes or manipulate existing nodes to set up malicious new nodes through many kinds of attacks. To avoid malicious nodes from joining the sensor network, a security is required in the design of sensor network protocols. In this paper, we proposed a security framework to provide a complete security solution against the known attacks in wireless sensor networks. Our framework accomplishes node authentication for new nodes with recognition of a malicious node. When deployed as a framework, a high degree of security is reachable compared with the conventional sensor network security solutions. A proposed framework can protect against most of the notorious attacks in sensor networks, and attain better computation and communication performance. This is different from conventional authentication methods based on the node identity. It includes identity of nodes and the node security time stamp into the authentication procedure. Hence security protocols not only see the identity of each node but also distinguish between new nodes and old nodes.
[1] Perrig, R. Szewczyk, J.D. Tygar, V. Wen, D.E. Culler, SPINS: Security
protocols for sensor networks, Wireless Networks 8 (September) (2002)
521-534.
[2] Karlof, N. Sastry, D. Wagner, TinySec: a link layer se-curity
architecture for wireless sensor networks, in: The Second ACM
Conference on Embedded Networked Sen-sor Systems (SensSys-04),
Baltimore, Maryland, Novem-ber 2004.
[3] L. Eschenauer, V. Gligor, A key management scheme for distributed
sensor networks, in: The Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Se-curity (CCS-02), Washington DC,
2002.
[4] Haowen Chan, Adrian Perrig, Dawn Song, Random key predistribution
schemes for sensor networks, in: Proceed-ings of the 2003 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Priva-cy (S&P-03), 11-14 May 2003, p.
197.
[5] W. Du, J. Deng, Y.S. Han, P.K.Varshney, A pairwise key predistribution
scheme for wireless sensor networks, in: The Proceedings of
the 10th ACM Conference on Com-puter and Communications Security
(CCS-03), Washing-ton, DC, 27- 30 October 2003.
[6] Liu, P. Ning, Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks,
in: The Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS-03), Washington, DC, 2003.
[7] R. Watro, D. Kong, S. Cuti, C. Gardiner, C. Lynn, P. Kruus, TinyPK:
securing sensor networks with public key technology, in: Proceedings of
the 2nd ACM Workshop on Security of Ad hoc and Sensor Networks
(SASN-04), Washington, DC, USA, 25 October 2004.
[8] J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song, A. Perrig, The sybil attack in sensor
networks: analysis & defenses, in: The 3rd In-ternational Symposium on
Information Processing in Sen-sor Networks (IPSN-04), Berkeley,
California, USA, 26- April 2004.
[9] B. Parno, A. Perrig, V. Gligor, Distributed detection of node replication
attacks in sensor networks, in: IEEE S&P-05, 2005.
[10] Y. Hu, A. Perrig, D.B. Johnson, Pachet leashes: a defense against
wormhole attacks in wireless networks, in: IEEE INFOCOM-03, 2003.
[11] L. Hu, D. Evans, Using directional antennas to prevent wormhole
attacks, in: The 11th Annual Network and Dis-tributed System Security
Symposium (NDSS-04), San Di-ego, California, 5-6 February 2004.
[12] W. Wang, B. Bhargava, Visualization of wormholes in sensor networks,
in: Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Work-shop on Wireless Security
(Wise-04), Philadelphia, PA, USA, 1 October 2004.
[13] S.J. Choi, H.Y. Youn, An efficient key pre-distribution scheme for
secure distributed sensor network, The 2005 IFIP International
Conference on Embedded and Ubiquit-ous Computing (EUC-2005),
LNCS 3823, 2005, pp. 1088-1097.
[14] L. Eschenauer, V.D. Gligor, A key-management scheme for distributed
sensor networks, Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communication Se-curity, 2002, pp. 41-47.
[15] C.W. Park, S.J. Choi, H.Y. Youn, A novel key pre-distribution scheme
with LU matrix for secure wireless sensor networks, International
Conference on Computa-tional Intelligence and Security (CIS 2005),
Springer-Verlag, Germany, 2005, pp. 494-499, LNAI. 3801, Part I, Dec.
[16] S. Vanstone, Responses to NIST's proposal, Communica-tions of the
ACM 35 (July1992) 50-52.
[17] Tanveer Zia and Albert Zomaya,"A security Framework for Wireless
Sensor Networks", IEEE Applications Sym-posium, Houston, Texas
USA, February 2006.
[18] J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song, A. Perrig, The sybil attack in sensor
networks: analysis & defenses, in: The 3rd International Symposium on
Information Processing in Sen-sor Networks (IPSN-04), Berkeley,
California, USA, 26-April 2004.
[19] J.R. Douceur, ÔÇÿÔÇÿThe Sybil attack,-- First International Workshop on
Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS-02), March 2002.
[20] Y. Hu, A. Perrig, D.B. Johnson, Pachet leashes: a defense against
wormhole attacks in wireless networks, in: IEEE,. 417-
426.INFOCOM-03, 2003
[21] N. Koblitz, Elliptic curve cryptosystems, Mathematics of Computation
48 (1987) 203-209.
[22] Miller, Uses of elliptic curves in cryptography, Ad-vances in
Cryptology- CPYPTO'85, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 218,
Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp. 417-426.
[23] David J. Malan, Matt Welsh, Michael, and D. Smith, "A publickey
infrastructure for key distribution in TinyOS based on elliptic curve
cryptography," in Proceedings of First IEEE International Conference
on Sensor and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks (SECON-04),
October 2004, pp.145-161.
[24] Crossbow Technology. Available from: http://www.xbow. com
[25] N. Gura, A. Patel, A. Wander, H. Eberle, and S.C. Shantz, "Comparing
elliptic curve cryptography and RSA on 8-bit CPUs," in: CHES-04,
2004, pp.67-75.
[26] Atmel Corporation. Available from: http://www.atmel.- com
[1] Perrig, R. Szewczyk, J.D. Tygar, V. Wen, D.E. Culler, SPINS: Security
protocols for sensor networks, Wireless Networks 8 (September) (2002)
521-534.
[2] Karlof, N. Sastry, D. Wagner, TinySec: a link layer se-curity
architecture for wireless sensor networks, in: The Second ACM
Conference on Embedded Networked Sen-sor Systems (SensSys-04),
Baltimore, Maryland, Novem-ber 2004.
[3] L. Eschenauer, V. Gligor, A key management scheme for distributed
sensor networks, in: The Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Se-curity (CCS-02), Washington DC,
2002.
[4] Haowen Chan, Adrian Perrig, Dawn Song, Random key predistribution
schemes for sensor networks, in: Proceed-ings of the 2003 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Priva-cy (S&P-03), 11-14 May 2003, p.
197.
[5] W. Du, J. Deng, Y.S. Han, P.K.Varshney, A pairwise key predistribution
scheme for wireless sensor networks, in: The Proceedings of
the 10th ACM Conference on Com-puter and Communications Security
(CCS-03), Washing-ton, DC, 27- 30 October 2003.
[6] Liu, P. Ning, Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks,
in: The Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS-03), Washington, DC, 2003.
[7] R. Watro, D. Kong, S. Cuti, C. Gardiner, C. Lynn, P. Kruus, TinyPK:
securing sensor networks with public key technology, in: Proceedings of
the 2nd ACM Workshop on Security of Ad hoc and Sensor Networks
(SASN-04), Washington, DC, USA, 25 October 2004.
[8] J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song, A. Perrig, The sybil attack in sensor
networks: analysis & defenses, in: The 3rd In-ternational Symposium on
Information Processing in Sen-sor Networks (IPSN-04), Berkeley,
California, USA, 26- April 2004.
[9] B. Parno, A. Perrig, V. Gligor, Distributed detection of node replication
attacks in sensor networks, in: IEEE S&P-05, 2005.
[10] Y. Hu, A. Perrig, D.B. Johnson, Pachet leashes: a defense against
wormhole attacks in wireless networks, in: IEEE INFOCOM-03, 2003.
[11] L. Hu, D. Evans, Using directional antennas to prevent wormhole
attacks, in: The 11th Annual Network and Dis-tributed System Security
Symposium (NDSS-04), San Di-ego, California, 5-6 February 2004.
[12] W. Wang, B. Bhargava, Visualization of wormholes in sensor networks,
in: Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Work-shop on Wireless Security
(Wise-04), Philadelphia, PA, USA, 1 October 2004.
[13] S.J. Choi, H.Y. Youn, An efficient key pre-distribution scheme for
secure distributed sensor network, The 2005 IFIP International
Conference on Embedded and Ubiquit-ous Computing (EUC-2005),
LNCS 3823, 2005, pp. 1088-1097.
[14] L. Eschenauer, V.D. Gligor, A key-management scheme for distributed
sensor networks, Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communication Se-curity, 2002, pp. 41-47.
[15] C.W. Park, S.J. Choi, H.Y. Youn, A novel key pre-distribution scheme
with LU matrix for secure wireless sensor networks, International
Conference on Computa-tional Intelligence and Security (CIS 2005),
Springer-Verlag, Germany, 2005, pp. 494-499, LNAI. 3801, Part I, Dec.
[16] S. Vanstone, Responses to NIST's proposal, Communica-tions of the
ACM 35 (July1992) 50-52.
[17] Tanveer Zia and Albert Zomaya,"A security Framework for Wireless
Sensor Networks", IEEE Applications Sym-posium, Houston, Texas
USA, February 2006.
[18] J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song, A. Perrig, The sybil attack in sensor
networks: analysis & defenses, in: The 3rd International Symposium on
Information Processing in Sen-sor Networks (IPSN-04), Berkeley,
California, USA, 26-April 2004.
[19] J.R. Douceur, ÔÇÿÔÇÿThe Sybil attack,-- First International Workshop on
Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS-02), March 2002.
[20] Y. Hu, A. Perrig, D.B. Johnson, Pachet leashes: a defense against
wormhole attacks in wireless networks, in: IEEE,. 417-
426.INFOCOM-03, 2003
[21] N. Koblitz, Elliptic curve cryptosystems, Mathematics of Computation
48 (1987) 203-209.
[22] Miller, Uses of elliptic curves in cryptography, Ad-vances in
Cryptology- CPYPTO'85, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 218,
Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp. 417-426.
[23] David J. Malan, Matt Welsh, Michael, and D. Smith, "A publickey
infrastructure for key distribution in TinyOS based on elliptic curve
cryptography," in Proceedings of First IEEE International Conference
on Sensor and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks (SECON-04),
October 2004, pp.145-161.
[24] Crossbow Technology. Available from: http://www.xbow. com
[25] N. Gura, A. Patel, A. Wander, H. Eberle, and S.C. Shantz, "Comparing
elliptic curve cryptography and RSA on 8-bit CPUs," in: CHES-04,
2004, pp.67-75.
[26] Atmel Corporation. Available from: http://www.atmel.- com
@article{"International Journal of Electrical, Electronic and Communication Sciences:53291", author = "Sunil Gupta and Harsh Kumar Verma and AL Sangal", title = "Authentication Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks", abstract = "Wireless sensor networks can be used to measure and monitor many challenging problems and typically involve in monitoring, tracking and controlling areas such as battlefield monitoring, object tracking, habitat monitoring and home sentry systems. However, wireless sensor networks pose unique security challenges including forgery of sensor data, eavesdropping, denial of service attacks, and the physical compromise of sensor nodes. Node in a sensor networks may be vanished due to power exhaustion or malicious attacks. To expand the life span of the sensor network, a new node deployment is needed. In military scenarios, intruder may directly organize malicious nodes or manipulate existing nodes to set up malicious new nodes through many kinds of attacks. To avoid malicious nodes from joining the sensor network, a security is required in the design of sensor network protocols. In this paper, we proposed a security framework to provide a complete security solution against the known attacks in wireless sensor networks. Our framework accomplishes node authentication for new nodes with recognition of a malicious node. When deployed as a framework, a high degree of security is reachable compared with the conventional sensor network security solutions. A proposed framework can protect against most of the notorious attacks in sensor networks, and attain better computation and communication performance. This is different from conventional authentication methods based on the node identity. It includes identity of nodes and the node security time stamp into the authentication procedure. Hence security protocols not only see the identity of each node but also distinguish between new nodes and old nodes.
", keywords = "Authentication, Key management, Wireless Sensornetwork, Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).", volume = "4", number = "6", pages = "916-7", }
