Auction Theory: Bidder-s Perspective in a Public Out-Cry English Auction

This paper provides an overview of auction theory literature. We present a general review on literature of various auctions and focus ourselves specifically on an English auction. We are interested in modelling bidder-s behavior in an English auction environment. And hence, we present an overview of the New Zealand wool auction followed by a model that would describe a bidder-s decision making behavior from the New Zealand wool auction. The mathematical assumptions in an English auction environment are demonstrated from the perspective of the New Zealand wool auction.




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