Application of PSK Modulation in ADS-B 1090 Extended Squitter Authentication
Since the presence of Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) has raised specific concerns related to the privacy and security, due to its vulnerable, low-level of security and limited payload. In this paper, the authors introduce and analyze the combination of Pulse Amplitude Modulation (PAM) and Phase Shift Keying (PSK) Modulation in conventional ADS-B, forming Secure ADS-B (SADS-B) avionics. In order to demonstrate the potential of this combination, Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation was used. The tests' results show that, on the one hand, SADS-B can offer five times the payload as its predecessor. This additional payload of SADS-B can be used in various applications, therefore enhancing the ability and efficiency of the current ADS-B. On the other hand, by using the extra phase modulated bits as a digital signature to authenticate ADS-B messages, SADS-B can increase the security of ADS-B, thus ensure a more secure aviation as well. More importantly, SADS-B is compatible with the current ADS-B In and Out. Hence, no significant modifications will be needed to implement this idea. As a result, SADS-B can be considered the most promising approach to enhance the capability and security of ADS-B.
[1] F. A. A. Federal Aviation Administration. NextGen (Online). Available: https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/
[2] Brad "RenderMan" Haines. Hackers+Airplanes: No Good Can Come Of This (Online). Available: https://www.defcon.org/html/links/dc-archives/dc-20-archive.html#Renderman
[3] D. L. McCallie, "Exploring Potential ADS-B Vulnerabilities in the FAA's Nextgen Air Transportation System," Air Force Institute of Technology2011.
[4] E. Valovage, "Enhanced ads-b research," in 25th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, 2006 IEEE/AIAA, 2006, pp. 1-7: IEEE.
[5] J. Baek, E. Hableel, Y.-J. Byon, D. S. Wong, K. Jang, and H. Yeo, "How to Protect ADS-B: Confidentiality Framework and Efficient Realization Based on Staged Identity-Based Encryption," IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 690-700, 2017.
[6] K. Lynch, "FAA Exploring Possible Privacy Protections for ADS-B," in AINonline, ed. Regulations and Government, 2015.
[7] O. Yeste-Ojeda and R. Landry, "ADS-B Authentication Compliant with Mode-S Extended Squitter Using PSK Modulation," in 2015 IEEE 18th International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2015, pp. 1773-1778.
[8] RTCA Special Committee 186, "DO-260B Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Services - Broadcast (TIS-B)," ed. Washington, DC: RTCA, Inc, December 2009.
[9] F. A. A. Federal Aviation Administration, "Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Performance Requirements To Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service; Final Rule," vol. 14 CFR Part 91, ed. Department of Transportation, 2009.
[10] A. Costin and A. Francillon, "Ghost in the Air (Traffic): On insecurity of ADS-B protocol and practical attacks on ADS-B devices," Black Hat USA, pp. 1-12, 2012.
[11] RTCA Special Committee 186, "DO-282B Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B)," ed. Washington, DC: RTCA, Inc, December 2009.
[12] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, "A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems," Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 120-126, 1978.
[13] A. Amrhar, A. A. Kisomi, E. Zhang, J. Zambrano, C. Thibeault, and R. Landry, "Multi-Mode reconfigurable Software Defined Radio architecture for avionic radios," in Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference (ICNS), 2017, 2017, pp. 2D1-1-2D1-10: IEEE.
[14] S. Müller. gr-openssl Out-Of-Tree Package (Online). Available: https://github.com/sbmueller/gr-openssl
[15] M. Strohmeier, M. Schäfer, V. Lenders, and I. Martinovic, "Realities and challenges of nextgen air traffic management: the case of ADS-B," IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 111-118, 2014.
[16] R. Carnie, R. Walker, and P. Corke, "Image processing algorithms for UAV" sense and avoid"," in Robotics and Automation, 2006. ICRA 2006. Proceedings 2006 IEEE International Conference on, 2006, pp. 2848-2853: IEEE.
[1] F. A. A. Federal Aviation Administration. NextGen (Online). Available: https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/
[2] Brad "RenderMan" Haines. Hackers+Airplanes: No Good Can Come Of This (Online). Available: https://www.defcon.org/html/links/dc-archives/dc-20-archive.html#Renderman
[3] D. L. McCallie, "Exploring Potential ADS-B Vulnerabilities in the FAA's Nextgen Air Transportation System," Air Force Institute of Technology2011.
[4] E. Valovage, "Enhanced ads-b research," in 25th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, 2006 IEEE/AIAA, 2006, pp. 1-7: IEEE.
[5] J. Baek, E. Hableel, Y.-J. Byon, D. S. Wong, K. Jang, and H. Yeo, "How to Protect ADS-B: Confidentiality Framework and Efficient Realization Based on Staged Identity-Based Encryption," IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 690-700, 2017.
[6] K. Lynch, "FAA Exploring Possible Privacy Protections for ADS-B," in AINonline, ed. Regulations and Government, 2015.
[7] O. Yeste-Ojeda and R. Landry, "ADS-B Authentication Compliant with Mode-S Extended Squitter Using PSK Modulation," in 2015 IEEE 18th International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2015, pp. 1773-1778.
[8] RTCA Special Committee 186, "DO-260B Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Services - Broadcast (TIS-B)," ed. Washington, DC: RTCA, Inc, December 2009.
[9] F. A. A. Federal Aviation Administration, "Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Performance Requirements To Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service; Final Rule," vol. 14 CFR Part 91, ed. Department of Transportation, 2009.
[10] A. Costin and A. Francillon, "Ghost in the Air (Traffic): On insecurity of ADS-B protocol and practical attacks on ADS-B devices," Black Hat USA, pp. 1-12, 2012.
[11] RTCA Special Committee 186, "DO-282B Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B)," ed. Washington, DC: RTCA, Inc, December 2009.
[12] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, "A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems," Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 120-126, 1978.
[13] A. Amrhar, A. A. Kisomi, E. Zhang, J. Zambrano, C. Thibeault, and R. Landry, "Multi-Mode reconfigurable Software Defined Radio architecture for avionic radios," in Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference (ICNS), 2017, 2017, pp. 2D1-1-2D1-10: IEEE.
[14] S. Müller. gr-openssl Out-Of-Tree Package (Online). Available: https://github.com/sbmueller/gr-openssl
[15] M. Strohmeier, M. Schäfer, V. Lenders, and I. Martinovic, "Realities and challenges of nextgen air traffic management: the case of ADS-B," IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 111-118, 2014.
[16] R. Carnie, R. Walker, and P. Corke, "Image processing algorithms for UAV" sense and avoid"," in Robotics and Automation, 2006. ICRA 2006. Proceedings 2006 IEEE International Conference on, 2006, pp. 2848-2853: IEEE.
@article{"International Journal of Mechanical, Industrial and Aerospace Sciences:77071", author = "A-Q. Nguyen. A. Amrhar and J. Zambrano and G. Brown and O.A. Yeste-Ojeda and R. Jr. Landry", title = "Application of PSK Modulation in ADS-B 1090 Extended Squitter Authentication", abstract = "Since the presence of Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) has raised specific concerns related to the privacy and security, due to its vulnerable, low-level of security and limited payload. In this paper, the authors introduce and analyze the combination of Pulse Amplitude Modulation (PAM) and Phase Shift Keying (PSK) Modulation in conventional ADS-B, forming Secure ADS-B (SADS-B) avionics. In order to demonstrate the potential of this combination, Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation was used. The tests' results show that, on the one hand, SADS-B can offer five times the payload as its predecessor. This additional payload of SADS-B can be used in various applications, therefore enhancing the ability and efficiency of the current ADS-B. On the other hand, by using the extra phase modulated bits as a digital signature to authenticate ADS-B messages, SADS-B can increase the security of ADS-B, thus ensure a more secure aviation as well. More importantly, SADS-B is compatible with the current ADS-B In and Out. Hence, no significant modifications will be needed to implement this idea. As a result, SADS-B can be considered the most promising approach to enhance the capability and security of ADS-B.
", keywords = "ADS-B authentication, ADS-B security, NextGen ADS-B, PSK signature, secure ADS-B.", volume = "12", number = "3", pages = "229-12", }
