Effects of Audit Quality and Corporate Governance on Earnings Management of Quoted Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria

The stakeholders’ pressure on corporate managers to maintain firm’s profitability has created economic incentives for management to engage in earnings management practices. Therefore, this study examines the effects of audit quality and corporate governance on earnings management of quoted deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria. This study specifically investigates the influence of audit tenure, audit fee, board independence, and board size on earnings management of DMBs. Explanatory research design was employed in carrying out the study while secondary data were sourced from the annual reports and accounts of all the 15 quoted DMBs in Nigerian Stock Exchange as at December 31, 2015 for a period of 10 years covering from 2006 to 2015. The data obtained for the study were analyzed using panel regression analysis approach. The findings reveal that board independence has a negative significant effect on earnings management at a 5% level of significance (p=0.002), while audit fee has a positive significant effect on earnings management at a 5% level of significance (p=0.013) and audit tenure has a negative significant effect on earnings management of DMBs at a 5% level of significance (p=0.003). Surprisingly, board size was statistically not significant at a 5% level of significance (p=0.086). The study concludes that high audit quality and sound corporate governance could improve the earnings quality of DMBs. Hence, the study recommends that the authorities saddled with the responsibility of banking supervision in Nigeria such the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and CBN to advise the National Assembly in Nigeria to pass into law the three years professional requirement for audit tenure.

Pre and Post IFRS Loss Avoidance in France and the United Kingdom

This paper analyzes the effect of a single uniform accounting rule on reporting quality by investigating the influence of IFRS on earnings management. This paper examines whether earnings management is reduced after IFRS adoption through the use of “loss avoidance thresholds”, a method that has been verified in earlier studies. This paper concentrates on two European countries: one that represents the continental code law tradition with weak protection of investors (France) and one that represents the Anglo-American common law tradition, which typically implies a strong enforcement system (the United Kingdom). The research investigates a sample of 526 companies (6822 firm-year observations) during the years 2000 – 2013. The results are different for the two jurisdictions. This study demonstrates that a single set of accounting standards contributes to better reporting quality and reduces the pervasiveness of earnings management in France. In contrast, there is no evidence that a reduction in earnings management followed the implementation of IFRS in the United Kingdom. Due to the fact that IFRS benefit France but not the United Kingdom, other political and economic factors, such legal system or capital market strength, must play a significant role in influencing the comparability and transparency cross-border companies’ financial statements. Overall, the result suggests that IFRS moderately contribute to the accounting quality of reported financial statements and bring benefit for stakeholders, though the role played by other economic factors cannot be discounted.

The Effect of Board Composition and Ownership Concentration on Earnings Management: Evidence from IRAN

The role of corporate governance is to reduce the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers. The role of corporate governance is more useful when managers have an incentive to deviate from shareholders- interests. One example of management-s deviation from shareholders- interests is the management of earnings through the use of accounting accruals. This paper examines the association between corporate governance internal mechanisms ownership concentration, board independence, the existence of CEO-Chairman duality and earnings management. Firm size and leverage are control variables. The population used in this study comprises firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) between 2004 and 2008, the sample comprises 196 firms. Panel Data method is employed as technique to estimate the model. We find that there is negative significant association between ownership concentration and board independence manage earnings with earnings management, there is negative significant association between the existence of CEO-Chairman duality and earnings management. This study also found a positive significant association between control variable (firm size and leverage) and earnings management.

An Empirical Analysis of Earnings Management in Australia

This is a comprehensive large-sample study of Australian earnings management. Using a sample of 4,844 firm-year observations across nine Australia industries from 2000 to 2006, we find substantial corporate earnings management activity across several Australian industries. We document strong evidence of size and return on assets being primary determinants of earnings management in Australia. The effects of size and return on assets are also found to be dominant in both income-increasing and incomedecreasing earnings manipulation. We also document that that periphery sector firms are more likely to involve larger magnitude of earnings management than firms in the core sector.