

# Utilizing Dutch Auction in an Agent-based Model E-commerce System

Costin Bădică, Maria Ganzha, Maciej Gawinecki, Paweł Kobzdej, and Marcin Paprzycki

**Abstract**—Recently, we have presented an initial implementation of a model agent-based e-commerce system, which utilized a simple price negotiation mechanism—English Auction. In this note we discuss how a Dutch Auction involving multiple units of a product can be included in our system. We present UML diagrams of agents involved in price negotiations and briefly discuss rule-based mechanism exemplifying Dutch Auction.

**Keywords**—e-commerce, rule-based price negotiation mechanism, Dutch Auction, agent system.

## I. INTRODUCTION

RECENTLY, we have proposed a model agent-based e-commerce system [2], [3], [4], [9]. While our approach differs from what is typically discussed in the literature (for more details see [1]), here the most important differences are: (1) we consider a sequence of price negotiations (each one of them involves a single unit or a collection of items sold/treated as a single unit), (2) negotiations are “atomic events,” as agents cannot join negotiation in progress, (3) each price negotiation can involve a different price negotiation mechanism (e.g. first 243 units may be sold using Vickrey auction, while the next 37 units using fixed price with a deep discount).

It is the latter feature of our system that is our point of departure. In our very early work we have actually implemented a version of the system that involved multiple modularized price negotiation mechanisms dynamically loaded by *Buyer Agents* (see [11]). Since then we have concentrated our attention on extending functionality of our system ([1]), its formalization ([3]), and on rule-based representation of price negotiation mechanism and its implementation ([4], [6]), which was focused solely on an English Auction—one of the simplest and best understood price negotiation mechanisms.

The aim of this note is to show how our system can accommodate a more complex price negotiation mechanism—Dutch Auction. Here, we consider a robust version of a Dutch Auction, where multiple users can purchase sub-quantities of the inventory put for sale (not only a single unit—as in the case of an English Auction). Though, we still restrict our attention to a single product being sold in a single negotiation

(e.g. we are not interested in multi-item auctions involving, for instance, vodka and appetizers).

We proceed as follows. In the next section we define the specific version of Dutch Auction that we are concerned with. We follow with an overview of the system—focused on these features that are pertinent to the proposed form of price negotiations. In the next section we discuss our rule-based approach to representing Dutch Auction. We conclude by specifying subsequent steps in developing our system.

## II. DUTCH AUCTION – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

While, for all practical purposes, there exists an all agreed on definition of an English Auction, the situation with the Dutch Auction is more complicated. Historically, Dutch Auction has been used in Holland as ways for selling produce and flowers. Today, sometimes the name “Dutch Auction” is used to describe a “short” version of a “true” Dutch Auction. For example, in the Finance Glossary ([16]) one can read: “Named after the Dutch tulip auctions, this form of auction is one where the auctioneer starts with a high asking price, which is then lowered until a bidder accepts the auctioneer’s price. This is a quick way of auctioning goods, since a sale only requires one bid.” Obviously, it is possible to use Dutch Auction to sell a single unit of a product; however, a “full version” of a Dutch Auction is—most typically—used to sell multiple units (note that in the case of Dutch Auction it is the *Seller* who is the “driving force” of negotiation, which is a reverse of an English Auction, where *Buyers* are active and the *Seller* is “passive”). What makes the situation particularly confusing is the fact that nowadays the name “Dutch Auction” is used also for another type of an auction — *uniform second price auction* [13], [14] (this happens, for instance, in some eBay auctions).

In our work we have chosen the following conceptualization of a Dutch Auction ([12]): “In a Dutch auction, bidding starts at an extremely high price and is progressively lowered until a buyer claims an item by calling “mine,” or by pressing a button that stops an automatic clock. When multiple units are auctioned, normally more takers press the button as price declines. In other words, the first winner takes his prize and pays his price and later winners pay less. When goods are exhausted, the bidding is over.”

Observe that this conceptualization is in accordance with the following FIPA Dutch Auction Interaction Protocol [15]: “First, the good may be split: for example the auctioneer may be selling five boxes of tulips at price X, and a buyer may purchase only three of the boxes. The auction then continues, with a price at the next increment below X, until the rest

Manuscript received July 15, 2006; revised July 30, 2006

C. Bădică is with the University of Craiova, Craiova 200440, Romania, badica\_costin@software.ucv.ro

M. Ganzha is with the Elblag University of Humanities and Economy Elblag, Poland, and with Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw, Poland ganzha@euh-e.edu.pl

M. Gawinecki and P. Kobzdej are with Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw, Poland

M. Paprzycki is with the SWPS, Warszawa, Poland, and with Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw, Poland, marcin.paprzycki@swps.edu.pl

of the good is sold or the reserve price met. Such partial sales of goods are only present in some markets; in others the purchaser must bid to buy the entire good. Secondly, the flower market mechanism is set up to ensure that there is no contention amongst buyers by preventing any other bids once a single bid has been made for a good. Offers and bids are binding, so there is no protocol for accepting or rejecting a bid. In the agent case, it is not possible to assume, and too restrictive to require, that such conditions apply. Thus it is quite possible that two or more bids are received by the auctioneer for the same good. The protocol (...) thus allows for a bid to be rejected. This is intended only to be used in the case of multiple, competing and simultaneous bids. It is outside the scope of this specification to pre-specify any particular mechanism for resolving this conflict. In the general case, the agents should make no assumptions beyond "first come, first served." In any given domain, other rules may apply."

Since we consider Dutch Auction within an agent system, the above considerations can be translated into the following scenario. Let us assume that within a *Negotiation Host* (a place where the negotiations take place), we have a single *Seller Agent (SeA)* and multiple *Buyer Agents (BA)s*. The *SeA* attempts at selling  $N$  units of product  $P$ . It starts bidding (by posting an initial bid on a *blackboard*) and subsequently reduces the price. At a certain moment one of *BA*s (e.g.  $BA_{25}$ ) responds with an *ACL message* informing that it is ready to purchase  $M$  units of  $P$  (where  $M \leq N$ ) at a price equal to the current bid. At this stage, the number of available units is reduced by  $M$  and  $BA_{25}$  is removed from negotiations to process its reservation (see below). If  $N - M > 0$ , process continues until either all  $N$  units are sold, or the minimal reservation price of the *SeA* is reached without further takers. While, in general, it is possible for a given *BA* to bid for multiple quantities of a product; e.g. it could buy 23 items at \$25 and 17 items at \$23, we have decided to simplify the system and assume that each *BA* is allowed to submit at most one successful bid, which results in it being removed from further negotiations.

Let us also note that (1) when implementing our negotiation sub-system, rather than straightforwardly encoding the FIPA Dutch Auction Interaction Protocol into agents behaviors (as in [11]), we have decided to follow the more general approach proposed in [8]. Thus, to gain flexibility and modularity, we combine a generic negotiation protocol with a rule-based declarative representation of the negotiation mechanism (this solution was already applied to implement English Auctions [4]). (2) Furthermore, since we implement our system in an actual agent environment (JADE) we avoid the above described theoretical situation where two messages arrive at exactly the same time. It will be the JADE runtime that will prevent such an occurrence—one of messages will actually arrive earlier.

### III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE—AN OVERVIEW

Let us now put the above defined Dutch Auction in the context of our system. We focus our attention on these of its features that are pertinent to the subject of this note. A complete description of all of its functionalities can be found in [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [9].

Our system acts as a distributed marketplace where products available in e-shops are sold by *Shop* and *Seller* agents, while users utilize *Client* and *Buyer* agents to localize products that satisfy their needs. In Figure 1 we present Use Case diagram of the complete system. Let us note first that outside of bounds of the system we have depicted *User-Client* who attempts at buying products and *User-Seller* who tries to sell products through her e-store.

Let us now briefly summarize functionalities of agents appearing in the system. *User-Client* is represented by the *Client Agent (CA)*. The *CA* is assumed to be completely autonomous. As soon as the decision to purchase  $M$  units of product  $P$  is communicated by the *User-Client*, it will work until either purchase is completed or has to be abandoned (e.g. due to the current market-prices being higher than the user-specified maximum). The *CA* communicates with the *Client Information Center (CIC)* agent which possess a complete information which e-stores sell which products (for more information about information management in the system see [10]). For each store that sells the desired product, the *CA* delegates a single *Buyer Agent (BA)* to participate in price negotiations and, if successful, possibly attempt at making purchase. In our system, successful price negotiations result in a product reservation (for a specific time period). When the reservation expires without an actual purchase, item is returned to the pool of products available for sale. Since multiple *BA*s representing the same *CA* can win price negotiations and report to the *CA*, the *CA* has to decide if either of available offers is good enough to make a purchase. *Buyer Agents* either migrate to the negotiation host or are created locally [5]. They can participate in negotiations only if the *Gatekeeper Agent (GA)* allows this. The *GA* utilizes *trust information* to evaluate if a given *BA* should be admitted (e.g. *BA*s that win price negotiations but do not purchase products may be barred from subsequent negotiations—see [7] for more details). The *GA* is one of agents that represent an e-store and is created by the *Shop Agent (SA)*. Its role is to admit (or not) incoming *BA*s and to organize the negotiation process. In this latter capacity it creates and manages a pool of generic *Seller Agents (SeA)* that negotiate price with incoming *BA*s. The *SA* is the central manager of the e-shop. In its role of facilitator of product sales, the *SA* utilizes the *GA*, as well as a *Warehouse Agent (WA)* that is responsible for inventory and reservation management.

Considering our earlier work, there are two agents that are directly affected by incorporation of a Dutch Auction into the system. The first one of them is the *Gatekeeper agent*<sup>1</sup>. In Figure 2 we can see, affected by the changes in the system, fragment of the statechart diagram of the *Gatekeeper Agent*. It depicts its operations in management of, and interaction with, *Seller Agents* that take place in the context of a Dutch Auction.

<sup>1</sup>Here, we have to note that in the past it was the *SA* that was responsible for creation of *Seller Agents* and we used one *SeA* for each product in the store. Since we have changed the way that products are represented—different features of a given product result in its being represented as a separate product (see [10])—creation of a single *SeA* for each product defined in such a way made no sense. We have thus decided to utilize a pool of generic *SeA*s that can represent the store in any negotiation (of any product and using any mechanism). Here, we will use the same approach based on dynamically loadable modules as described in ([6], [11]).




Fig. 1 Use Case diagram of the proposed agent-based e-commerce system

In Figure 2 we present a situation when, as the first step, an “initial pool” of *Seller Agents* is created. Then the *GA* is awaiting for an *event* to service. Here, we recognize three possible events: (1) a new price negotiation, that is to be serviced by one of *SeAs* is being recognized by another “part” of the *GA* and materializes as an event in the “*SeA* management subsystem”—in this case, if there is an available *SeA*, it will be appropriately equipped with a negotiation template (and possibly a specific negotiation strategy) and assigned that task; in the case when a *SeA* is not available then either one will be created or the task will be buffered (depending on the total number of existing *SeAs*); (2) an ACL message from the *SeA* informing that a given *BA* is a winner of a negotiation arrives—in this case, appropriate information is passed to the *SA* (following basic rules of development of agent systems it is assumed that the *SA* does not know *SeAs* that are created and managed by the *GA*); (3) *SeA* informs that negotiation that it was responsible for has ended and it is available to take up the next one—in this case, if there is a task waiting in the buffer, it will be assigned to that *SeA*; if there are no tasks in the buffer,

given *SeA* may be left idle or may be eliminated (if the *GA* decides that it has too many active *SeAs*). Observe that the distinction between situation (2) and (3) would have not occur in the case of an English Auction. Successful end of negotiations in an English Auction means that the *SeA* has completed its job (it ends an English Auction). However, in the case of a Dutch Auction, the fact that one of *BAs* placed an accepted bid does not mean that the auction is over as that bid could have been placed for only a part of an inventory that is being auctioned. Note, however, that the solution depicted in Figure 2 is capable of handling *both* English and Dutch auctions. In the case of an English Auction, the *SeA* simply informs about the result of the negotiation *and* that it is free. Therefore, a single design of the *GA* can handle multiple forms of price negotiations, which was one of overarching goals of our system [1].

In Figure 3 we present a simple statechart diagram of the Seller Agent that is involved in a Dutch Auction. Here, the colored box denoted as “NEGOTIATIONS” encapsulates Dutch Auction. Since the *BA* is relatively passive (it only waits and places a single bid) it has been omitted from discussions.




Fig. 2 Gatekeeper agent, functions related to interactions with and management of Seller Agent(s)




Fig. 3 State Chart diagram of the Seller Agent

Obviously, Dutch Auction is an example of an price negotiations which continues when one *BA* completes its negotiations, and ends when the inventory is sold or the reservation price of the *SeA* is reached. However, this situation can be viewed as a generalization of an English Auction. In an English Auction when a *Buyer Agent* wins negotiations, *SeA* informs *GA* about winner (send(*GA*,*NegRes*,*busy*)) and then checks whether the negotiation can be continued—condition ( $q\_Neg == 0$ ). Of course it cannot and thus the *SeA* informs the *GA* that it is available (send(*GA*,*info*,*available*)). In this way also the *SeA* depicted here can handle both English and Dutch auctions.

#### IV. RULE-BASED REPRESENTATION OF A DUTCH AUCTION

Focus of this section is to briefly describe our solution to rule-based representation of a Dutch Auction. However, before starting this discussion, it has to be stressed that in our work we assume the negotiation model and the infrastructure proposed by [8]; that was previously used to implement English Auctions, see [4], [6]. To make the presentation self-contained, we start from an overview of that model and then discuss how it was adapted to fit our needs.

Authors of [8] sketched a general framework for implementing agent and non-agent negotiations. Their framework is based on an abstract negotiation process that comprises: a *negotiation infrastructure*, a *generic negotiation protocol* and a *taxonomy of negotiation rules*. The *negotiation infrastructure* defines roles involved in the negotiation process: *Participants* and a *Negotiation Host*. *Participants* are usually *Buyers* and *Sellers* that negotiate by exchanging proposals. The exchange is mediated by the *Negotiation Host* (i.e., conceptually, there is no direct exchange of messages between the participants, but only via the host) and governed by a *generic negotiation protocol* that defines how and when messages should be exchanged between the *Negotiation Host* and *Participants*.

This approach has the advantage that all knowledge required to facilitate negotiations is stored in a central place—the *Negotiation Host*. Therefore, the *Negotiation Host* has the power to control and coordinate negotiations. In particular, it is proposed that this knowledge should be captured as a set of *negotiation rules* organized taxonomically into rule categories for: (1) *checking the validity of negotiation proposals*, (2) *protocol enforcement*, (3) *updating negotiation status and informing participants*, (4) *agreement formation* and (5) *controlling the negotiation termination* [8]. Note also that, in the proposed framework, details of the particular negotiation (specific values for parameters specified in generic negotiation

rules) are provided to its participants in a form of a *negotiation template*.

While, according to this general framework, roles of the *Seller* and the *Negotiation Host* are *conceptually different*, in the present work, for efficiency reasons, we have decided to merge them together within the same agent—the *Seller Agent*. This basically means that the *SeA* will have two responsibilities: (i) to regulate the negotiation by checking bids and bid exchange compliance against the negotiation rules that govern Dutch Auction (see below), and (ii) to post bids (shout prices), as required by the Dutch Auction.

As specified in Section II, we consider multi-unit single-product Dutch Auction, as conceptualized in the FIPA Dutch Auction Interaction Protocol. It can be easily seen that the FIPA Dutch Auction Interaction Protocol is under-specified (a similar observation concerning the FIPA English Auction Interaction Protocol can be found in [8]), as it does not specify important issues like: (a) how often is the *SeA* allowed to shout the price? for example, shouting prices “very fast” may not leave enough time for the *BAs* to “think” if to bid or not; (b) how much the *SeA* must decrement the price in the next bid? for example, an auction might require a minimum value for this decrement (note that, similarly, an English Auction typically imposes a minimum value by which *BAs* should increment the price of their next bid, [2]); (c) how much time without any activity is allowed before terminating the auction? note that it might happen that neither *BAs* bid nor *SeA* wants to decrement the price, and in such a case the auction must be terminated (even if *SeA* didn’t sell all the inventory).

Taking this into account, we have decided to add the following parameters to the negotiation mechanism (to be later specified in the negotiation template, [8]):

- Minimum value by which the *Seller* must decrement the price at each announcement:  $H > 0$ ; i.e. if the last shouted price was  $X$  then the next shouted price must be at most  $X - H$ ;
- Minimum time limit that the *Seller* must wait before issuing the next announcement:  $T_m > 0$ ; i.e. if the last price was shouted at time  $T$  and *Buyers* didn’t bid then the next price must be shouted not earlier than  $T + T_m$ ; however, if happened that a buyer submitted a bid,  $T_m$  is ignored.
- Maximum time window of inactivity in the auction that, when observed, will terminate the auction:  $T_w > 0$ ; obviously, the following must hold:  $T_m < T_w$ .

Additionally, number of units  $N$  of the product to be sold is also placed in the negotiation template. This value is decremented with the number items “sold” (actually reserved, according to our model) whenever a successful bid is received from a *Buyer*.

While parameters of the negotiation mechanism together with negotiation rules are public, i.e. known to all negotiation participants, each negotiation participant may also use a private strategy that dictates how it should actually act during the negotiation. In a Dutch Auction *Buyer* strategy dictates when exactly the *Buyer* should accept price shouted by the *SeA*. It could be extremely simple and require acceptance of shouted price that falls below a given threshold. It could also be rather complex and involve passage of time, number of still available

items and/or speed with which items are being purchased by other *Buyers*. On the other hand, *Seller* strategy could contain following parameters:

- initial price  $X_0$ , i.e. price that is shouted first,
- timing  $R_i$  of reducing price at each new shout  $i$  (variable at each shout); the following condition must hold:  $T_m \leq R_i \leq T_w$  for all  $i$  to assure that rules are not violated and negotiation does not terminate,
- Reservation price  $X_{res}$ ; *Seller* will stop bidding if the price reaches a value below this limit.

Let us now look into the rule-based representation of a Dutch Auction. We define:  $Pr$  – proposal (or bid);  $X(Pr)$  – price,  $T(Pr)$  – time when the proposal has reached the *Negotiation Host*, and  $M(Pr)$  – number of units “accepted” for purchase. Let us present sample rules that are a part of our representation of the Dutch Auction.

The *Seller* is allowed to shout a new price when one of the following conditions holds: (i) it is the first shout; (ii) one of *Buyers* submitted a bid that was successful; (iii) no successful bids were received and at least  $T_m$  time units elapsed since the last shout. Rule 1 checks the third of these conditions. Note that when the *Seller* offer passes all checks it becomes *posted*.

---

#### Rule 1 POSTING-SELLER

---

**IF**

There is a valid proposal  $Pr$  submitted by the participant with role ‘Seller’ **and**

No participant with role ‘Buyer’ submitted a successful bid since the last shout **and**

There is an active proposal  $Pr_1$  from the participant with role ‘Seller’ **and**

$T(Pr) - T(Pr_1) \geq T_m$

**THEN**

Proposal  $Pr$  is posted

---

A posted offer that is not the first offer must also satisfy the improvement tests in order to become active. This is realized by rule 2 that asks for the shouted price to be at most equal to the last shouted price minus a template-specified decrement. When this condition holds, the seller offer becomes *active*.

---

#### Rule 2 IMPROVEMENT-SELLER

---

**IF**

Participant with role ‘Seller’ has posted proposal  $Pr$  **and**  
Value of last offer posted by ‘Seller’ is  $B$  **and**

Minimum decrement is  $H$  **and**

$X(Pr) \leq B - H$

**THEN**

Proposal  $Pr$  is active

---

Now let us see when a bid posted by a *Buyer* can be accepted, i.e. it becomes *active*. Informally, a *Buyer* is allowed to submit a bid only when there is already an active offer shouted by the *Seller*. Additionally, the *Buyer* bid is accepted (i.e. becomes *active*) only if its price is equal to the price shouted most recently by the *Seller* and the required quantity is at most equal to the quantity available in the *Seller* offer. These

conditions are checked by rules 3 and 4. Note that multiple *Buyer* bids are allowed in-between two consecutive *Seller* bids. The first-come first-served mechanism is used to resolve situation when *Buyer* bids exceed the available inventory.

---

#### Rule 3 POSTING-BUYER

---

##### IF

Proposal  $Pr$  submitted by a participant with role 'Buyer' is valid **and**

There is a seller active offer

##### THEN

Proposal  $Pr$  is posted

---



---

#### Rule 4 ACCEPTANCE-BUYER

---

##### IF

Proposal  $Pr$  was posted by a participant with role 'Buyer' **and**

The seller active offer has value  $B$  **and**

$X(Pr) = B$  **and**

$M(Pr) \leq N$

##### THEN

Proposal  $Pr$  is active

---

When a *Buyer* bid becomes active, it will result in: (i) triggering rules for informing participants (specifically, *Buyers* are notified how many units are still available for sale); (ii) triggering rules for agreement formation and negotiation termination. An agreement formation rule 5 simply looks for an active *Seller* offer and an active *Buyer* bid, in which case it generates a deal by matching those two proposals and updates number of units available for sale.

---

#### Rule 5 AGREEMENT FORMATION

---

##### IF

There is an active bid submitted by a participant  $Par_1$  with role *Buyer* **and**

There is an active offer shouted by a participant  $Par_2$  with role *Seller*

##### THEN

An agreement between  $Par_1$  and  $Par_2$  to transact according to  $X(Par_1)$  is formed **and**

Available quantity  $N$  is updated

---

Since the agreement formation rule updates number of items still available for sale, a negotiation termination rule has to be activated. It checks if there are any items left and if they are none the negotiation is terminated.

Some *effects* of agreement formation and negotiation termination rules have been depicted in Figure 3. It is important to recognize that, operations performed by the *SeA* (e.g. sending message to the *GA*) and their conditions represent a different level of description than discussed above rule-based mechanisms within the *SeA* that trigger them.

#### V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this note we have considered how a Dutch Auction mechanism can be incorporated into our model agent-based

e-commerce system. To this effect we have: (1) defined the specific form of Dutch Auction; (2) discussed, and illustrated in the form of UML diagrams, these parts of our system that are affected by adding a new price negotiation mechanism; (3) shown that the proposed modifications are general enough that they will be able to handle not only Dutch Auction, but also accommodate earlier considered English Auction; (4) specified, and illustrated by selected sample-rules how rule-based mechanisms will be used to represent Dutch Auction.

The next step will be to adapt the complete set of rules for the JESS rule-engine. We also will investigate which rules are common to both English, Dutch and other auctions and which are negotiation-specific. This may allow us to form a set of core (reusable) rules applicable to a wide class of price negotiations. We will report on our progress in subsequent papers.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Work of M. Ganzha, M. Gawinecki, P. Kobzdej and M. Paprzycki has been partially sponsored by the M. Curie IRG grant, project E-CAP.

#### REFERENCES

- [1] C. Badica, A. Badita, M. Ganzha, M. Paprzycki, *Developing a Model Agent-based E-commerce System*, in: Jie Lu et. al. (eds.), *E-Service Intelligence - Methodologies, Technologies and Applications* (to appear)
- [2] C. Badica, M. Ganzha, M. Paprzycki, *Mobile Agents in a Multi-Agent E-Commerce System*, in: D. Zaharie et. al. (ed.), *Proceedings of the SYNASC 2005 Conference*, IEEE Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 2005, 207–214
- [3] C. Badica, M. Ganzha, M. Paprzycki, *UML Models of Agents in a Multi-Agent E-Commerce System*, in: *Proceedings of the ICEBE 2005 Conference*, IEEE Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 2005, 56–61
- [4] C. Badica, A. Badita, M. Ganzha, A. Iordache, M. Paprzycki, *Rule-Based Framework for Automated Negotiation: Initial Implementation*, in: A. Stoutenburg, et. al. (ed.), *Proceedings of the RuleML Conference*, LNCS 3791, Springer Verlag, 2005, 193–198
- [5] C. Badica, M. Ganzha, M. Paprzycki, *Two Approaches to Code Mobility in an Agent-based E-commerce System*, in: C. Ardil (ed.), *Enformatika*, Volume 7, 2005, 101–107
- [6] C. Badica, M. Ganzha, M. Paprzycki, A. Pirvanescu, *Combining Rule-Based and Plug-in Components in Agents for Flexible Dynamic Negotiations*, in: *Proceedings of the CEEMAS'2005*, LNAI 3690, Springer Verlag, 2005, 555–558
- [7] C. Badica, M. Ganzha, M. Gawinecki, P. Kobzdej, M. Paprzycki, *Towards Trust Management in an Agent-based E-commerce System – Initial Considerations*, in: *Proceedings of MISSI'2006* (to appear)
- [8] C. Bartolini, C. Preist, N.R. Jennings, *A Software Framework for Automated Negotiation*, in: *Proceedings of SELMAS'2004*, LNCS 3390, Springer Verlag, 2005, 213–235
- [9] M. Ganzha, M. Paprzycki, A. Pirvanescu, C. Badica, A. Abraham, *JADE-Based Multi-Agent E-Commerce Environment; Initial Implementation*, *Annals of West University, Seria Matematica-Informatica*, Vol.XLII, 2004, 79–100
- [10] M. Gawinecki, M. Ganzha, P. Kobzdej, M. Paprzycki, C. Badica, M. Scafes, G. Popa, *Managing Information and Time Flow in an Agent-based E-commerce System*, in: *Proceedings of the ISPDC'2006* (to appear)
- [11] M. Paprzycki, A. Abraham, A. Pirvanescu, C. Badica, *Implementing Agents Capable of Dynamic Negotiations*, in: D. Petcu, et. al. (ed.), *Proceedings SYNASC04*, Mirton Press, Timisoara, Romania, 369–380
- [12] <http://www.agorics.com/Library/Auctions/auction3.html>
- [13] <http://collectibles.about.com/library/articles/blebaydutch.htm>
- [14] [http://www.ehow.com/how\\_16375\\_bid-dutch-auction.html](http://www.ehow.com/how_16375_bid-dutch-auction.html)
- [15] <http://www.fipa.org/specs/fipa00032/XC00032F.pdf>
- [16] <http://glossary.global-investor.com/terms/Dutch-auction.htm?ginPtrCode=00000&id=12389&PopUpMode=true>