

Injunctions, Disjunctions, Remnants: The Reverse of Unity

Igor Guatelli

I. INTRODUCTION

Abstract—The universe of aesthetic perception entails impasses about sensitive divergences that each text or visual object may be subjected to. If approached through intertextuality that is not based on the misleading notion of kinships or similarities a priori admissible, the possibility of anachronistic, heterogeneous - and non-diachronic - assemblies can enhance the emergence of interval movements, intermediate, and conflicting, conducive to a method of reading, interpreting, and assigning meaning that escapes the rigid antinomies of the mere being and non-being of things. In negative, they operate in a relationship built by the lack of an adjusted meaning set by their positive existences, with no remainders; the generated interval becomes the remnant of each of them; it is the opening that obscures the stable positions of each one. Without the negative of absence, of that which is always missing or must be missing in a text, concept, or image made positive by history, nothing is perceived beyond what has been already given. Pairings or binary oppositions cannot lead only to functional syntheses; on the contrary, methodological disturbances accumulated by the approximation of signs and entities can initiate a process of becoming as an opening to an unforeseen other, transformation until a moment when the difficulties of [re]conciliation become the mainstay of a future of that sign/entity, not envisioned a priori. A counter-history can emerge from these unprecedented, misadjusted approaches, beginnings of unassigned injunctions and disjunctions, in short, difficult alliances that open cracks in a supposedly cohesive history, chained in its apparent linearity with no remains, understood as a categorical historical imperative. Interstices are minority fields that, because of their opening, are capable of causing opacity in that which, apparently, presents itself with irreducible clarity. Resulting from an incomplete and maladjusted [at the least dual] marriage between the signs/entities that originate them, this interval may destabilize and cause disorder in these entities and their own meanings. The interstitials offer a hyphenated relationship: a simultaneous union and separation, a spacing between the entity's identity and its otherness or, alterity. One and the other may no longer be seen without the crack or fissure that now separates them, uniting, by a space-time lapse. Ontological, semantic shifts are caused by this fissure, an absence between one and the other, one with and against the other. Based on an improbable approximation between some conceptual and semantic shifts within the design production of architect Rem Koolhaas and the textual production of the philosopher Jacques Derrida, this article questions the notion of unity, coherence, affinity, and complementarity in the process of construction of thought from these ontological, epistemological, and semiological fissures that rattle the signs/entities and their stable meanings. Fissures in a thought that is considered coherent, cohesive, formatted are the negativity that constitutes the interstices that allow us to move towards what still remains as non-identity, which allows us to begin another story.

Keywords—Clearing, interstice, negative, remnant, spectrum.

Igor Guatelli is with the Architecture College, Mackenzie University, São Paulo, 01302907, Brasil (phone: +55 11 991477441; e-mail: igor.guatelli@mackenzie.br)

PARMENIDES and Heraclitus, original (and original) because they think about the origin of thinking and, according to Heidegger [7]) pre-Socratic thinkers, founded the antipodes of Western thought. Respectively, on the one hand, essential thought, of Truth (doctrinal poem), totalizing and unitary, established through the clarity of oppositions (if there is A, non-A cannot be, nor exist, it only has the right to exist if it is distinguished affirmatively as B), in a yearning for the whole, and, on the other hand, conflicting thought, one of diversity, plurality, which yearns for the truth in what is multiple, based on the recognition of multiplicity, of contradiction, of the inclusion of negativity (A can live with the non-A without this necessarily being B, non-A can also exist as a negation of something), and the coexistence of opposites.

Not one or the other, but both, an interval thought between them, that breaks and causes interstices in what appears or is perceived as cohesive and closed in itself, but without destroying it. It is the clearing needed for a thought that needs to be abyssalized so as not to be engulfed by the visibility of full presence, an apparent paradoxical movement, therefore.

The interstice, a form of *Stimmung*, functions as the passage to the other based on the dilaceration and dilation of the one, of the whole and total unity of the entity, of any entity that presents itself as an integral, fixed, unitary, and ideal entity in its own meaning. Tearing, breaking, and dividing up the one in its apparent inviolable integrity is the condition for constructing, in the negative, an absent presence, a gap in the integrity of the whole, an interstice, an interval through which one can access territories that are still unfathomable, non-existent as recognizable entities. Their presence is not guaranteed because they are veiled by the full presence of what is shown as maximum visibility, as an entity or an assured, cohesive, unbreached discourse.

In the face of monolithic entities, of an undisturbable discursive or significant cohesion, the opening is the possibility of the emergence of that which, according to Derrida, was and remains repressed by the power and dominance of what is incessantly reaffirming itself as *aletheia*, as historical truth.

Openness is the first condition to access what has been repressed, suffocated, and submitted to what has been established as truth. Corresponding to this interval movement would be a desire to profane the apparently unprofaneable, the possibility of promoting dissent through it, where one seeks in an iterated way the construction, constitution, and preservation of consensual thought and the integrity of the entity, of the one

and totalizing entity.

To create intervals, to see interstices is to generate a problematic experience in the clarity of monolithic thinking, it means desiring multiplicity. These are those rare moments of existence - happenings - when it is possible to interpret the world beyond what is already a given and formatted by each person based on known and consecrated foundations. They would be the necessary objection to common sense to go beyond the automatism of customary thought, mindless use of sentences, and of ready-made, consecrated, naturalized expressions. This happens because common sense feels challenged by the interval in its abnormality, unintelligibility and/or immanent [almost] always irresolvable contradictions, but openness to another.

II. INTERSTITIAL THINKING AND THE ANTIDOTE TO THE NATURALIZATION OF THE ENTITY

According to Nietzsche [12], against traditional axiology, it is necessary to rattle the ideal territory that holds philosophical tradition as an unquestionable truth. And, we might say that this applies not only to philosophical tradition, but to aesthetic-architectural and urbanistic traditions as well.

Faced with the unavoidable need of transmutation of fixed and inviolable values, destruction as active destruction of traditional values stabilized in their *aletheia* becomes a fundamental *ethos* for the exercise of transmutation of these values, transmutation as passage to an active becoming, an uncertain becoming, yet to be defined.

The only chance of passage is through the interval, through the interstice; the interval is the condition for affirming the inapparent, the nonexistent, the lesser, the invisible, by denying and destroying everything that covers these elements, through a luminosity that obscures. This prevents them from appearing or presenting themselves as consonant dissonances, a kind of *Unheimlichkeit*, the strangely familiar, a disagreement in what seems familiar, given, an external and disaggregating interiority, despite being a constituting part. It is a supplement in its apparent complementarity.

According to Derrida, the interval is a generative spacing, a gap between what a thing is and may not be, but never a permanent "will always have been". The interval is a supplement that is part of the thing and already a chance to overcome it, even without destroying itself [Fig. 1]. By perceiving, causing ontological breaks, disintegrating or generating interstices in the thing, it can be deprived of its assured foundations. Then it can be restored as another, deferred and accepted in relation to its previous future, to its "will always have been" the same. In the spacing, through disjunction, conjunctions are woven at the same time with a being not yet present, an entity that is already another.

By provoking or recognizing interstices in the one, the unit, the monolithic thing, we create the possibility of non-existent neighborhoods between the presences formed by the absence that formed them, or by the conjunction of impossible presences, given the initial cohesion of what was seen as one, in-and-of-itself.

Disjunctions create other conjunctions precisely because of

the opening created by them and the distances that now separate these "fragments" from other fragments, distances that did not exist, given the totality of that which was one, a truth in-and-of-itself, complete, closed, nothing lack. From Heidegger's ideas and concepts [5], [14] of being-with (*Mitsein*), "opening" (*Offenheit*), "tool-being" (*werkzeug*, where *zeug* can mean both "thing" and "generate", in this case, in the verbal form *zeugen*), and "sense of accomplishment", understanding that a doorknob device is only a doorknob when it is placed in relation to something beyond it - the door device - means perceiving the strength of the connective tissue between things, which, apparently, can exist as entities in themselves, however, without the power they both have when they place themselves in conjunction, without canceling each other out in their singularities.

Concepts are torn apart, dismembered so that they can continue as sources of meaning, a means for other conjunctions of content - formal, spatial, temporal. As shown to us by the post-structuralists, especially Derrida [2], [4] and his polysemic and labyrinthine games around concepts, a concept within an apparently cohesive, coherent discourse can be a *moment* that promotes contradictions, shufflings, and estrangements.

Always in interval with itself, the spacing between the concept's *etymon*, its etymology, and its additional metaphorical layers over time make it potential territory for loss, inquiry and questioning, and not for univocal or bi-univocal certainties or acknowledgments. "Concepts are monsters that are reborn from their pieces" [1, p.183], claimed Deleuze.

Antidote to doxa, to common sense, and to stereotyped reasoning, concepts are prospective devices, not used for recognition or identification.

"[...] In any concept, there are usually bits or components that come from other concepts, which corresponded to other problems and presupposed other planes. This is inevitable because each concept carries out a new cutting-out, takes on new contours, and must be reactivated or recut" [1].

By the conceptual differentiation of the concept itself, a field of conceptual speculations opens up, unprecedented up to then, veiled by the inviolable unity of the concept which is naturalized in its meaning or representation. The concept allows one to think and prospect the world in a phenomenal way, while moving away from the doxa and the risks of highly subjective, absolute, and positive interpretations.

We can ask ourselves about the meanings of the concept of border, for example. In addition to the idea of limit, the idea of un-limitation can only exist through the delimitation of something. It is only in places of loss, of semantic tribulations and overcomings, places where truths are questioned, that essences can come to exist in the moment we recognize their limits, their meanings, and given identities. Borders give us the possibility of going beyond what is given to us as a field of recognition, identity, and property.

Restitutions can only exist when there is recognition of the border between what you want to retribute and preserve. Improbable, improper, inappropriate entanglements and

dialogues can only exist based on the clear delimitation of what is proper, someone's property, or suitable for something or someone. Becomings can only exist based on the recognition of the properties of the entity.



Fig. 1 Seesaw: intervention by the architect Ronald Rael, called "Borderwall as Architecture", built, in 2019 on the fence-grid-border that separates Mexico from the USA

III. SPECTRALITIES AND REMNANTS

By means of and through the interstice it becomes possible to weaken what is shown in its inviolable integrity and absolute presence. The interstice is an absence that becomes present as a spectral supplement. From one, from unity, from the totalized thing itself, through the crack, through the interval, three emerge. Disjunctive, the gap plagues the one, the absolute, by dividing it, while guaranteeing the relationship between the parts, neither autonomous, nor fused, but disjointed.

The interstice, this superfluous absence, disintegrates the whole to make it a multiplicity, one that is made at least three, but juxtaposed, neighboring, tormented by this absence that separates and unites them at the same time, remnants of what they were and what they can come to be as new juxtaposed "ones," in relation to each other. Certainly Koolhaas [9] knew how to create interstices in the formatted discourse of Le Corbusier, in his prescription for new architecture and urbanism. Not only in Corbusier's prescription, but in modern architecture and urbanism.

Koolhaas [9] works with remnants of the Corbusian *architectural promenade* as a means to precipitate another ethos about the architectural space. He causes multiple connections, disruptions, discontinuous continuities, deviations, programmatic-spatial [de] aggregations. There is such generosity in the restitution of the Corbusian lexicon that he ends up overcoming it, transmuting it into another one, without destroying it.

If the interstice is a condition for the labyrinth and is realized in it, the labyrinthine *promenade* of Koolhaas' projects (Casa da Música in Porto and the Seattle Public Library, for example) are an opening to the other in Corbusian discourse [Figs. 4 (a)-(c)]. Koolhaas starts from the Corbusier device, and then abandons it by radicalizing it; he does not, therefore, put it at its entire disposal, but considers it well enough to subvert it. Nothing is implied in the device: it must be reopened and questioned. This radicality cracked the field

erected, formatted and idealized in a precise ideology (intentional redundancy) by Le Corbusier. In a Derridean thought, promise was installed in that fissure, the exteriority of an inviolable interiority. History is a fertilization of its own becoming, and not a place for preservation and reverence. Time is nothing other than this repeated inclusion of the other in what appears to be the original, the matrix, the inviolable reference.




Fig. 2 Labyrinthine *promenade*. Section of Casa da Música in the city of Porto




Fig 3 Labyrinthine and continuous *promenade*. Sketch of the Jussieu Library, Paris (OMA/Koolhaas)

With no devotion, Koolhaas frees the *promenade* from its representations, cleaving it in its identity, making it a differential identity, one and the other. It throws it in an interval between what it was in the Corbusian-modern context and the context it is now inserted, the *fin-de-siècle* metropolis.

In the interstice, we inhabit the presence of absence and the absence of presence. It is through it that the traces of before and after are manifested. Koolhaas deliberately splits-fissures and distorts the representations of the Corbusian discourse of the *architectural promenade* and creates an unsettling interval by bringing it closer to the world of shopping malls, about which he theorizes in his well-known text *Junkspace* [11].

The *promenade* is restored based on a critical and sharp reading of the potential of the escalator device when inserted in the world of malls. It is reinserted in the metropolis as a condition for the interiorization of public exteriorities of the space, becoming a means for the realization of a powerful and

labyrinthine spatial *continuum* - escalators function as deviating synapses, [dis] articulating routes, non-sequential paths - interiorizing, de-hierarchizing activities and blurring the boundaries between public and private; his proposal for the Jussieu Library competition in Paris [9] or the aforementioned project of the Casa da Música in the city of Porto, are expressions of this strategy [Figs. 2, 3]. Spatial congestions are caused by the extreme manipulation of improbable connections, carried out through often times non-sequential, erratic, broken, and deviating flows. Furthermore, through the interval created when the *architectural promenade*, imagined by Le Corbusier, approached the escalator, Koolhaas recreates the idea of a transfigured spatial continuity, altered in its original value and meaning, despite not destroying them. An interval is created between the rationality of the “original” *promenade* and its massification in the world of malls [10]. Something remains between one and the other, the crack through which Koolhaas operates. Derrida in his work, *La Vérité en Peinture* [2] counters this by exposing a debate between Heidegger and Shapiro around one of the paintings in Van Gogh’s series “shoes”. In this series, Van Gogh portrayed, with variations, two worn, shabby shoes, supposedly fairly used.




Fig. 4 (a), (b), (c) The transmutation of the promenade: from Corbusier to the world of shopping malls

In general lines (almost a heresy regarding Derrida) the chapter *Restitutions* is dedicated to *parousia*, the total coincidence, without any remainders, in an image, between an object and the representations we carry about things, prior to any more detailed analysis of any possible gaps in those images.

In *The Origin of the Work of Art* [6], Heidegger - the thinker of the Black Forest, of the chalet, attached to the land, who cultivated walking and skiing as his greatest pleasures, who had insights in his chalet during storms - analyzed this painting by Van Gogh. He affirmed that the painting represents a peasant man or woman’s pair of shoes to then interpret the peasant man or woman’s *da-sein*. As speculated by Derrida in the same chapter Meyer Shapiro, a city man, university professor, communist, in correspondence sent to Heidegger, opposes Heidegger saying that it would not be possible to categorically affirm that that was a peasant woman’s pair of shoes, but perhaps, they belonged to a citizen, a man from the city, possibly a factory worker; or even Van Gogh himself during his years of hardship and deprivation in Paris. Both incorporated dogmatic representations into their arguments.

Derrida questions whether they were not talking about the thing based on representations of the world and values that they each carried, regardless of the object analyzed, of what they were seeing. In Shapiro’s defense, if we can put it in these terms, he highlights the fact that worked with doubt, with the maybe, and did not work with assertions. But, in any case, the shoes, which are untied in the painting, already seemed tied to representations of the world of their interlocutors. They seem to have attached a suitable and ideal *sujet* (theme and subject) to the painted model: Van Gogh himself. And, at the same time, this *sujet* becomes a real predicate of a painted object. The shoes remain attached to specific feet and characters [2].



Fig. 5 The pair of shoes responsible for the controversy between Heidegger, Shapiro, and Derrida

We ask, without affirming or aspiring to a conclusion, whether it was the painting or Van Gogh himself that was being analyzed; the painting had already become Van Gogh himself, a coincidence without remainders between one and the other. Both Heidegger and Shapiro seemed to fully reconstitute, with no interval, the painting to Van Gogh and to themselves, expropriating intrinsic values from the painting, to better appropriate it by assigning values based on their representations of the world and personal values, with the intention of validating their assertions. Interested in the truth of the painting, they project it into imaginary places, consistent with their own references.

If Heidegger speaks of a generic peasant woman, Shapiro criticizes him for allegedly forgetting the author of the painting himself, as opposed to his own self. Fetishized, both restore the painting full of attributes, without interstices between the shoes and their *sujet*; nothing seems to be left unknown. One of Derrida’s central questions, which permeate the text is: What can still be produced from the product, from the produced, or from the produced product? The produced product must lack in order to become a gateway for other productions.

Perhaps both Heidegger and Shapiro retained and attached too much to Van Gogh’s signature, as well as their own,

compromising the restitution of the painting to the public. The painting, in Derrida's provocative analysis, seems to have remained the property of the painter and the two critics. Astute, almost ironic, he wonders if those shoes form a pair, they might not even be one. Looking at each of them in detail, at the space between them and comparing them based on the gap that unites and separate them, their curvature seems to be on the same side, configuring the same foot. Furthermore one seems slightly smaller than the other. He even questions whether they could be part of a set of shoes, not depicted in the painting [Fig. 5]. These remainders between the image and its immediate apprehension are the necessary intervals through which other thoughts act, operate, and through which other hypotheses are constructed. Unlike the others, Derrida seems to remain between what still belongs to the painting and what could be beyond it, present in it as a sign of another possibility, with no guarantees. We are talking about the dismantling of categorical discourses towards a more unstable, dissenting, uncertain territory, therefore more fruitful as an open, public restoration, means of other constructions, and not just adherence to or refutation of what arrives as formatted discourse.

If the interval seems to be missing between Heidegger and the shoes and between Shapiro and Van Gogh, in *Glas*, from 1974, one of Derrida's most obscure and intriguing works, it is through the interval, in the interval, that Derrida establishes a complex, conflicting and delimiting dialogue between Hegel, the monumental thinker of the pure, the absolute, the immaculate, and Jean Genet, the controversial marginal writer of the impure, the obscene, the author of minor works. This impossible contiguity opens up a field of cross-readings, spectral subtexts, and improbable connections, which through assembly, will be able to dismantle what appear to be the fundamentals and that which is proper to each [Fig. 6].

Hegel and Genet occupy the same area of the book, tensioned by an interval that keeps them apart and united. Unusually shaped, *Glas* is a book of 25x25 centimeters square, the pages are organized, for the most part, in 2 vertical columns, one against the other, one [not] without the other, in addition to a third column formed of erratic inscriptions, incisions between the first two columns, without a beginning or an end. The left column is constituted of a "dialogue" with Hegel, the one on the right, of a dialogue with Genet (apparently, the texts were written at different times, the text about Hegel was prepared for a 1971-1972 seminar, and approximated as intertextuality). By suppressing parts of the columns, in the open interstices and openings, Derrida promotes and operates a disjunction of both authors, from unusual and improbable junctions and tangencies between them, with some specific reflective notations, supplements that [do not] supply, emulate questions. [3] It was through a tangential thought that Derrida, in a judicious, ambiguous, and contradictory way, built the argument – through an approach by deferral, by dilation, a spacing between both authors [*Différance*] - that would dismantle and maintain, albeit not unscathed, the alleged existing frontiers between a major work [Hegelian philosophy and philosophy in general] and a work

considered minor [literary tales], if compared to Philosophy.

It is in and through the remnant generated by the impossible "dialogue" between them that Derrida dismantles truths about some dualities that would only be possible and liable to exist simultaneously in antagonism, as antipodes. Proper and natural limits between one and the other are put to the test, challenged, and then dissolved to be restored in a gray zone between both, by both, through them.




Fig. 6 Excerpt from *Glas*. Hegel on the left, Genet on the right, with supplementary notes by Derrida

It is in this textual mosaic of simultaneous cross-readings, in two columns, bringing Hegel's dialectic closer to Genet's multiform, heterodox writing, that Derrida builds an interstitial environment beyond dualisms. It is a place of fruitful indiscernibility, of the dissolution of binary oppositions, or of the irreducible difference between one and the other; oppositions end up contaminating each other, generating displacements of given meanings. About *Glas*, Benoit Peeters states the following in his biographical work on Derrida:

"*Glas* poses real reading difficulties; we literally do not know from where to start the book. It is impossible to follow the two columns in parallel, one page after the other, because in this way, the proposal soon dissolves. On the other hand, it would be even more absurd to read one column after the other in full: this would mean denying the profound unity of the volume and ignoring the incessant echoes between these two strands. The reader is then forced to invent their own rhythm, to skip five, ten, or twenty pages, then to backtrack, all while keeping an eye on the other column. It is up to them [the reader] to build the relationship, implicit in the text, between the family, according to Hegel and the absence of family, in Genet, between the reproductive sexuality theorized in Hegel's "Elements of the Philosophy of Right" and the homosexual expenditure of Genet's "Thief's Journal" or "Miracle of the Rose" [13]".

The book is a long theoretical, philosophical, and theatrical drift through the interstices of the thoughts of the two authors. It is up to the readers to invent their paths, build inexhaustible relationships and come to “undecidable” conclusions. The book becomes “Khôra” [4], in the very Derridean discussion of the concept, a receptacle of endless narratives, capable of receiving all Histories, the construction of the other in History itself. Corroborated by Peeters, we can say that Derrida bet on another type of reader, an impossible reader, a reader in the process of becoming. In the chasm created between the two columns, between the two authors, lies the impossibility of reconciling each author’s own thinking and, therefore, the impossibility of a solution, of closure.

IV. CONSIDERATIONS WITHOUT [ONE] END

It is not possible to know whether Koolhaas became aware of or read *Glas* or any other work by Derrida, but that is not really necessary for traces of it reverberate in his design actions. Koolhaas juxtaposes different worlds and makes them be in friction with each other. His iconic floating pool is part of the essay *Floating pool* - which became part of the first edition of *Delirious New York* [8], but then disappeared in later editions. This pool appears transfigured in some of his projects and - like belief and disillusion - it brings together the East to the West, communism to capitalism. His projects in the US and China in the past decade foster this hypothesis.

In *Floating pool*, an essay-like short story of surrealist content, young Soviet architects in the 1930s, at the height of Stalinism, in the post-revolutionary expansionistic atmosphere, invented a mechanism, a floating mega pool [Fig. 7] capable of crossing the ocean. However, when diving, perhaps in a kind of exhibition test, the swimmers-architects, or the architects-swimmers, report that the device reacts in a supposedly weird manner: when swimming in a certain direction they are, in fact, pushing the pool in the opposite direction. After 40 years in the ocean and after visiting other worlds by moving away from them, and distancing themselves by approaching them, they reach their antagonist by constantly swimming towards their place of origin, i.e. the Soviet Union. This is perhaps a reference to Russian constructivism or to the Soviet social condensers, touched on again by the architect in his book *Delirious New York*. However, there is no escape, in the West, disenchantment also awaits them.

Moving towards something by moving away from it, to achieve - voluntarily or involuntarily? - the opposite result, and then precipitating the transmutation of that very thing seems to have been a recurring procedure carried out by hand in the works of Koolhaas and Derrida.

Heraclitan spectrum, when moving away from the experiences of the ready-made scripts that belong to each of the worlds, Koolhaas and Derrida are most likely betting on the contradiction and negativity of the full meaning of the thing. The scripts of each of the entities/worlds are disassembled and reassembled, amalgamated by syncretic interpolations, now with gaps in their apparently unified, unitary, cohesive and coherent, existences.

Koolhaas and Derrida emulate other scripts for the entities

by pairing them with the couplings that leverage seemingly solid semantic uncouplings, however, without fully destroying or overcoming them. Contrasts do not disappear; on the contrary, they are overcast by the opening that the interval, which is irreducible to each one of them, generates as, by them, created. Through the interval, mutual contamination fades their limits to expand them in their assumptions.




Fig. 7 “Arrival Floating Pool after 40 years of crossing the Atlantic,” de Rem Koolhaas

In his work, Koolhaas repeatedly uses this strategy of bringing together worlds that are apparently or historically divergent [the ramp and the escalator], the rationalist ideology of the modern world and the market ideology of the world of shopping malls and making them interact and intertwine until they dissolve into a disjunctive synthesis; united distances, distant proximities. Neither one nor the other, but both, merged in their unpredictable developments become the condition to create a gray zone between the building and the city, the exteriority and the interiority, erudite and popular, formal and informal, distancing and massification, with no chance of restitution from one or the other, but from an other. This other becomes the fabric of their tracks, differentiated in relation to themselves because they are detached from their original codes and discursive representations, contaminated by the presence of other codes. Both in the disjunctive

interpolations between Hegel and Genet, woven by Derrida, and in the discursive disjunction promoted by Koolhaas when bringing modern-Corbusian ideas closer to the massified world of shopping malls, the resulting spectral feature exceeds the engendered binomials. The entities are “devalued” as “existences in themselves,” while valued in their corrupted semantic developments.

Again, in the interstice, promise is installed, the idea of a generous public restitution, without implying expropriation or appropriation, or an anticipated construction of meanings or possibilities, but a field of unstable and conflicting imbrications, permanent [re] formulations and semantic disseminations. Following key concepts of Derrida's philosophy, the interstice is not only a place of differentiation - division based on unity - but, above all, a place of *différence* [3] and *khôra* [4], a place of spacing and becoming, a place of approximations and distances, of unpredictable inscriptions, of separation, repair and restitution at the same time; finally, as in *Glas* [3], a place of the horizontal de-hierarchized relationship, between heterogeneous elements.

Without specific mentions, we speak of a modest restitution, strong because it is fragile - it maintains traces of the origin and of the destination - in its determinism of ownership and signification, a restitution that comes from the disturbance and non-conformity of the ownership of something - speech, thing, discourse, image - to someone, or of someone to something. Finally, the interstice is a spectral feature, in [de] construction of what was still being and its becomings.

Through the interstice, the truth of the unitarian meaning of the entity loses its univocity, opening itself to the plural sharing of something, of a discourse. Without the retention of property, of the proper, of the supposedly legitimate, of the truth instituted, a priori, by something or someone, or by a desire for semantic and predicative formatting of a project or discourse, the other beckons forwards and will not arrive if not through many voices, through plurivocity.

In “Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future,” Nietzsche shows us how metaphysicians of all times, and that includes Science, cultivate the belief that the knowledge, and what they call “truth” can be reached through “the thing itself”. “The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is the belief in the opposition of values” [12]. Against the stable, permanent structures, taken as truth, because of the lack and absence of meaning of the being of things, processes of disassembly and reassembly are installed, non-substantial synchronic interrelations, but multiple interrelated forces. Common to these thoughts and procedures is Derrida and Koolhaas' recognition of a field of unstable finite, forces, and, therefore, origins of new assemblies. To start over incessantly, is what they both propose to us.

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