

Human Security Providers in Fragile State under Asymmetric War Conditions

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Abstract—Various players are part of the game in an asymmetric war, all making efforts to provide human security to their own adherents. Although a fragile state is not able to provide sufficient and comprehensive services, it still provides special services and security to the elite; the insurgents as well provide services and security to their associates. The humanitarian organisations, on the other hand, provide some fundamental elements of human security, but only in the regions, they are able to access when possible (if possible). The counterinsurgents (security forces of the state and intervention forces) operate within a narrow band defined by the vision of the responsibility to protect and the perspective of the resolution of the conflict through combat; hence, the possibility to provide human security is shaken at this end. This article examines how each player provides human security from the perspective of freedom from want in order to secure basic and strategic needs, freedom from fear through providing protection against all kinds of violence, and the freedom to live in dignity. It identifies a vicious cycle caused by the intervention of the different players causing a centrifugal force that may lead to disintegration of the nation under war.

Keywords—Human security, asymmetric war, counter insurgency, fragile state, insurgency.

I. INTRODUCTION

MANY people all over the world are facing threats in various forms: Economic hardship, violence, and natural disasters. Those threats lead to the feeling of human insecurity and thus to lack of national peace and security. At the turn of the last decade, new, unexpected events and risks made the situation even worse. Civil war, international conflict political violence, and rampant crime due to lack of governance have spread globally. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent events have changed the world drastically. This change and the declaration of the United States of the “Global War on Terror (GWOT)” involved changes of politics, societies, cultures and economies. It has thus affected human security over the globe.

The concept of human security was presented in the UNDP human development report of 1993, focusing on the “freedom from and want” [31]. Since then, the concept has passed through significant development and been the subject of much critique. It has developed to include the freedom from want in order to secure basic and strategic needs; freedom from fear, which means security from all kinds of violence; and freedom

to live in dignity. Moreover, the concept evolved to include seven categories (economic security: main threat poverty; food security: main threat hunger; health security: main threat diseases and injuries; environmental security: main threats pollution and environment degradation; personal security: main threat all forms of violence; community security: main threat discrimination, and political security: main threat political repression). These categories are seen as comprehensive and universal [31]. They respond to all people regardless of the nationality, community, or ethnicity. It is a security concept developed for all. Whether they live in developing or developed communities; people seek human security, ranging from freedom from poverty and hunger to drugs and crime related issues.

Human security is an inter-disciplinary concept that has five characteristics [32]. First, it is a people-centered concept that places the individual at the centre of the analysis. Second, it is multi-sectoral, as it considers simultaneously all the seven threats mentioned above. Third, it is a comprehensive approach, as it is based on the cooperative and multi-sectoral responses including security, development and human rights. Fourth, it is a context-specific concept: it considers the variation of insecurities depending on the situation. Finally, it is preventive oriented; hence, it addresses the root cause of the insecurities. “The human security framework does not advocate a responsibility to intervene to protect but one to engage in order to prevent” [27].

Human security has contributed to the field of security studies with the valuation of the individuals as the object of interest. It has helped in addressing the question “security for whom?” Human security has focused on providing security for the individual rather than the state. Hence, policy making should also address the question of: “for whom”, “by whom”, and “how should it be realised”. “Human security promises a focus on individuals and people, but more widely, on values and goals such as dignity” [26]. The individual’s security is the ultimate goal, hence the individual should be defined in accordance with the vulnerabilities faced and capacities gained [26]. Moreover, the values of the individuals and their specific needs depending on the specific culture should be considered. This article seeks to answer the question of who provides human security during an asymmetric conflict within a fragile state, when a counterinsurgency campaign is in progress. It addresses the interaction between the various players during such circumstances, seeks to discover how each party realises human security for its adherents – a process which results in increased human insecurity for all.

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II. HUMAN SECURITY PROVIDERS

In an asymmetric conflict, many citizens (if not all) lack the freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. However, the various actors in the conflict come to the fore to provide these securities. The services and protection they provide may incidentally meet the citizens' security needs but the motivating factor is usually not providing human security but to realise political goals. There are the insurgents who have their objectives; the state that is trying to regain the control; the humanitarian organisations that are there to ensure humanitarian presence, and often there are international peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions, whose function and capacities depend on the context of their mandate. This section provides a description of the human security aspect of each and an analysis of the intervention with respect to human security aspects.

A. State

The state has the primary responsibility for the well-being of its citizens. It is the duty of the state to respect all human rights, to protect individuals from a third party that might threaten the human rights or the quality of life, and to fulfil needs derived from rights. It is thus the responsibility of the state to respect the human security needs of its citizens; to ensure economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. It is the state responsibility to protect citizens from threats including poverty, hunger, diseases, pollution and environment degradation, all forms of violence, discrimination, and political repression.

The contractarian view of the state suggests that citizens adhere to the government for a guarantee of protection [18]. According to Thomas Hobbes, living without the state is "continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" [13]. Hence, it is the security of the citizens that justifies the state's existence.

From the political systems perspective, according to Easton, the essential variables on which "the life of the political system depends, namely, allocating values for the society and inducing members to accept these allocations as binding" [16]; which considers that the main function of the state is the distribution of values for its citizens. Almond and Coleman list seven functions of all political systems such as political socialisation, interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication. Apparently, the state in this regard provides for the interests and wants of its citizens thus supporting freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity [2]. Charles Tilly, on the other hand, perceives the states as "relatively centralised, differentiated organisations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory" [28]. For him the state is a protection racket; it offers protection from local and external violence. Tilly also suggests that the prices charged from the citizens are in return to the protection provided; which is generally perceived as insufficient by the

states [28]. Accordingly, there are four different activities carried out by the state: War making (eliminating or neutralising rivals outside the territories), state making (eliminating or neutralising rivals inside the territories), protection, and extraction [28].

Apparently, all suggested definitions and views of the state and its justification for existence relies on a basic function which is protection of the individuals. Therefore, according to the above definitions it is the human security that governs the work of the states and governments.

According to international law another responsibility of the states is to provide human security for non-citizens living in its territories. Non-citizens are those with permanent resident status, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, victims of trafficking, foreign students, temporary visitors, and other non-immigrants and stateless people [30]. According to international law, non-citizens should have "freedom from arbitrary killing, inhuman treatment, slavery, arbitrary arrest, unfair trial, invasions of privacy, refolement, forced labour, child labour and violations of humanitarian law" [30]. Hence, international law suggests that it is the responsibility of the state to provide all aspects of human security to non-citizens under its protection. However, despite the fact that non-citizens are guaranteed human security through international [law, the reality on the ground is often very different [30]; as the treatment of asylum seekers in eastern Europe has shown in the summer and fall of 2015.

Based on the above, human security is the basic responsibility of the state. However, sometimes states are not able to protect their people, this is a condition known as "fragile state." The Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity [25] provided an operational definition of fragile state based on three factors. First, authority failures; these include significant organised political violence and a high level of crime. Second, service failures where the state fails to ensure all citizens access to health services, basic education, water and sanitation, basic transport and energy infrastructure, and reduction in income poverty. The third factor is the legitimacy failure that occurs where the state lacks legitimacy with no popular support. The International Monetary Fund IMF, defined fragile states as: "states in which the government is unable to deliver basic services and security to the population" [6].

The OECD has presented a new term for fragile states; namely, "states of fragility". This term helps identifying countries that are most vulnerable to five dimensions of risk and vulnerability linked to fragility: violence; access to justice for all; effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions; economic foundations; and capacity to adapt to social, economic and environmental shocks and disasters [21]. The African Development Bank defines "situations of fragility" as: "A condition of elevated risk of institutional breakdown, societal collapse or violent conflict" [5]. Despite the lack of a consensus on a definition, all definitions presented above entail that fragile states are generally not capable of providing the various elements of human security for all.

Even in a fragile state a certain percentage of the citizens will defend the legitimacy of the state and its capacity to provide human security. This segment usually benefits in some way from the status quo of the state. Its members are among the decision makers, or depend on the state for their economic prosperity and its association with the existing state, or are associated in some other way with the existing government. They feel that the government is their source of human security to live free from fear, free from want and free to live in dignity; they perceive that the attrition of the state is an attrition of their own human security. Others may have an ideological commitment to the state in its current form, and defend it even if it is contrary to their economic or other interests. Hence, they defend the state as a means to defend their existence and their human security, which may be perceived by external observers as irrational and sometimes immoral.

B. Insurgents

By definition "Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organisations" [8]. According to NATO, insurgency is "the actions of an organised, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion." [19]

Reasons for insurgencies differ from case to case; however according to Bard O'Neill [20] there are nine types of insurgents each characterised by a different goal: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, apocalyptic-utopian, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, preservationist, and commercialist. Here we will discuss the most prominent type that poses the highest threat in the twenty-first century. The traditionalist insurgents "articulate primordial and sacred values" [20]; values that are religiously or ancestrally rooted. Traditionalist insurgents perceive that their belief is the only right belief, and they feel contempt towards any who do not share their belief. Most traditionalist insurgents try to restore old systems. This type seeks to establish political structures lead by autocratic leadership. The Islamic State as such falls under the traditionalist insurgency: its adherents fight to turn back the clock to form a government that fits the 9th century, and to retrieve what they claim as their God-given rights. They are revolutionaries aiming to build a world order based on the *Sharia*.

According to David Galula [10], an insurgency is fluid since the insurgents neither have responsibility nor concrete assets; therefore, any service provided for their associates is perceived as value added for the insurgents. They will provide all possible services and use their propaganda value to recruit new adherents and gain more control. All efforts are designed to weaken the government's control and legitimacy while trying to gain more control, legitimacy, and more popular support for the insurgency. The insurgents usually provide human security for a segment of people who are strongly

committed to them. These people usually deny the government's legitimacy and capacity to provide human security. They are the elite of the insurgents; they are the most provided with security; hence, their association with the insurgents provides them a perspective of freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity.

C. Counterinsurgents

Counterinsurgency is the state's (and sometimes international actors') response to an insurgency. As the insurgents apply violence to seize power, the state responds with more violence, and this is how the counterinsurgency starts. According to Galula "Counterinsurgency cannot be defined except by reference to its cause" [20, p. 1]. It is an asymmetric condition that results from the difference between each party's assets and liabilities; asymmetry also lies in the diplomatic power and the legitimacy. Though the Government strives to sustain its services to all during counterinsurgency, sustained operations carry high political and economic burdens. The escalation in insurgent operations results in the government's increase in the expenditure on counterinsurgency as in the case of Malaya and Algeria [20, p. 9]. Hence, insurgency affects the ability of the state to provide human security to all. The state also loses control over some territory and is unable (even if the resources are otherwise available) to provide services to the people in lost or contested areas.

According to NATO, doctrine counterinsurgency is "defined as the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address core grievances" [19]. From the definition it is clear that counterinsurgency employs various methods and tactics; it is not only based on military, it is also based on political, economic social, information, and infrastructure activities. In fact, the military aspect – however important it may be – is only a relatively small, subordinate part of the whole. NATO also emphasises that in a fragile state counterinsurgency is needed as people will lack human security. Although NATO doctrine focuses on the military interventions per se, it describes major indicative activities and tasks in counterinsurgency that reflect non-military intervention; these include (but are not limited to): build human security, stimulate economic and infrastructure development, and foster host government capacity and legitimacy.

As part of its comprehensive approach, NATO relies on civil-military cooperation CIMIC as one of its military facilitators. CIMIC is defined as "the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national, and non-governmental organisations and agencies" [4]. The manual focuses on the humanitarian relief and on training military personnel to provide humanitarian relief. However, the primary purpose of CIMIC is not the provision of human security, but to free the commander from the burden of caring

for the civilian population in the war zone, and allow him to carry out his primary mission, the defeat of the insurgents.

The US doctrine defines counterinsurgency as the “comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes” [33]. It also defines counterinsurgency using the military and non-military measures: “The military role should be coordinated with the other instruments of national power that include diplomatic, informational, and economic parts” [33].

International law recognises the right to military intervention following the principle of “the responsibility to protect”. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. However, “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect” [14]. The responsibility to protect is restricted to the following cases as identified in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document that include atrocity crimes of genocide crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing [11].

Intervention justified with R2P tends to be on the side of the insurgents, against the constituted government, as in the case of Libya. R2P really puts the government in an impossible situation. In order to restore its authority and preserve the territorial integrity of the state it must conduct military operations against the insurgent forces. But it cannot apply the necessary amount of violence, because international intervention based on R2P will follow.

The responsibility to protect includes three responsibilities: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react, and responsibility to rebuild [17]. Amongst the three the responsibility to prevent is the most important since it will include the early warning that could be addressed politically. Despite this the doctrine focuses mostly on the responsibility to react and the use of military intervention. Although all documents admit the importance of early warnings, of the prevention and the concern to human security, they all in fact focus on the reaction and the military aspects.

The Libyan counterinsurgency is an example of official planning that focuses on humanitarian aspects and unofficial aims that utilises military measures only. The aim of the operation mandated by the UN Security Council was “no-fly zone, the protection of civilians, and the enforcement of arms embargo” [29]. The intervention in reality was commenced by NATO without deploying ground forces with the unofficial aim of “regime change in favour of the National Transitional Council” [29]. This model depicts that although all counterinsurgency doctrines and plans focus on human security; however, when counterinsurgency starts the political factors are then the drivers of the situation.

The involvement of external forces in the counterinsurgency does not reinforce the legitimacy of the state. Although the fragile state is in need for support, usually foreign

counterinsurgents are not welcomed, and do not strengthen the position of the state. On the contrary, their intervention may lead to more opposition towards the government and to a more active insurgency – as the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan have shown.

The direct impact of military intervention on the people is visible. It affects the daily life of the people, it affects economic and social structures. The result is the deterioration of all services including education, health, the operation of all economic facilities, etc.... It affects the targeted areas along with areas not directly targeted by the various belligerents.

D. Humanitarian Organisations

The humanitarian organisations play a non-military role through relief and ensuring humanitarian presence. They also focus on denunciation of rights violations [3]. The humanitarian aid usually aims at preventing the disastrous consequences of the conflict or to prevent the growth of dependence on outside assistance [22]. “Humanitarian aid is thus essential to save lives, relieve suffering and restore dignity, but it also has negative effects on the development of the armed conflict” [22]. The Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship defines the objective of humanitarian programming “to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity ... as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations” [24]. Humanitarian organisations and humanitarian aid aims at providing human security to vulnerable people.

Research has found that “the preponderance of the evidence indicates that aid has not been effective” [7]. In some cases, the aid modality leads to negative impact and increase in the level of conflict. One of the main challenges faced is when the assistance falls into the hand of the belligerents. For example, “in Bosnia, militias commandeered UNHCR relief” [1] and in Afghanistan border areas humanitarian aid was diverted to some terrorists based in refugee camps [1]. Moreover, gathering people in refugee camps can give some belligerents the opportunity to recruit fighters, regain their power and intensify their attacks.

One of the main challenges facing humanitarian organisations during conflict is their access to the different areas of conflict. In some cases, humanitarian organisations are not able to monitor the work and are working through subcontracts with local NGOs. The UN monitor group to Somalia has revealed “corruption within the delivery of WFP food assistance” [12]. On the other hand, during the intensive level of conflict humanitarian organisations face extreme restrictions on their work due to security reasons. In certain conditions, they cannot access areas of conflict, and they are able to provide only limited aid in comparison to the humanitarian needs.

In some cases, the humanitarian organisations face accusation of being on one side of the conflicting parties. This is usually a result of the difficulty to secure aid delivery as it was the case in supporting Rwanda refugees [1].

III. DYNAMICS OF THE VARIOUS PLAYERS

The various players on the ground strive to accomplish their desired objectives; the officially announced ones and the hidden agendas. Some agendas complement each other while others contradict and conflict with the others. The insurgents and counterinsurgents specifically have the most conflicting agendas. The actions of insurgents and the counterinsurgents are shaped by two factors, which are the **willingness to control** and the necessity to gain more **popular support**. The people also might have conflicting agendas. Those benefiting from the existing state are keen to maintain the status quo, and those benefiting from the insurgents maintain their support either because they are benefiting directly, or because their ideology matches those of the insurgents.

The competition between the insurgents and the government is played out to attract those who are neutral; it is high-stakes competition, made even more so with international intervention. Those neutral (generally the majority of the population) are eager to return to the normal situation, but they favour a nationalistic approach. Mostly, they do not perceive the insurgents as providers of human security, neither do they perceive the intervention forces as the saviour especially with the collateral damage they cause during military operations. They believe that their source of human security is national, and mostly they see it through a different national party. It is not the government because it proved to be more fragile than ever - on the contrary they see it a source of insecurity. It is not the insurgents because they have experienced the conflict through this group. It is not the intervention forces, either since these are perceived as another source of violence and damage. This competition leads to more disintegration; new parties or new insurgents arise at this point. As a result, the conflict becomes a vicious cycle, in which an insurgency is leading to more conflict and more disintegration. External military intervention in this case intensifies and aggravates the situation, leading to an inexorable decline in human security.

Though the humanitarian organisations have a critical role in this framework, their intervention is usually insufficient due to the restrictions they face and the escalating crisis conditions that requires ongoing assistance. In such a framework, the humanitarian organisations are not able to reach all the targets, they are usually working in cooperation with the counterinsurgents, and sometimes they are perceived as partial. With more conflict, more disintegration is engendered, this leads to insecurity; hence, humanitarian organisations are not able to provide sufficient assistance due to more restricted areas, more conflict, more players on the ground, and insecurity to access different conflicting areas.

Richard Hartshorne (1954) analysed the centripetal forces that bind the states together (e.g. national unity, religion, language, etc.) and centrifugal forces that pull them apart (e.g. several ethnic groups within a state) [9]. Hartshorne saw nations as either centripetal or centrifugal; however, this article assumes that the dynamics of the various players adumbrated above helps create a centrifugal force. The author suggests that the centrifugal metaphor could be analysed by using the underlying dynamics. State fragility,

counterinsurgency, foreign interventions, and insurgents are the core factors to form the centrifugal force that is based here on human security aspects.




Fig. 1 Vicious cycle caused by external interventions leading to more conflict

It is the personal interest of the individuals and seeking their own human security is the main factor that drives their behaviour in such conditions of conflict. Insurgents try to attract and recruit fighters and associates through human security attraction. The State is also able to maintain loyal associates through human security attraction. Many of the citizens remain neutral, which is the market opportunity for both competitors. The use of foreign interventions on the side of the insurgents or the state (or both) leads to human insecurity that leads to more use of force and more external intervention. It is a vicious cycle: conflict and violence, leading to human insecurity and again to more violence. Fig. 1 shows the various players in the field and how each party is working against the other causing this vicious cycle. The more fragile the state, the more intensive the counterinsurgency effort, and the more extensive the military intervention, the more people feel that there is an inexorable driving force leading to increasing instability.

It is a vicious cycle, and it never stops. Meanwhile the elements of society (individuals, groups, classes) behave as objects traveling in a circular path – as a stone being whirled round on a string – that would react as if there were an outward force – the centrifugal force – affecting it.

The centrifugal force metaphor explains the effect of the various factors leading to change in human security of the people and their perception of instability, and hence on the unity of the nation. The feel of the outward force (the centrifugal force) disturbs the feel of stability, human security, and of national security. The imbalance impacts all elements of human security. It leads to diminishing freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. Equation (1) illustrates the centrifugal force.

$$F_c = \frac{mv^2}{r} \quad (1)$$

where; F_c is centrifugal force (it is the force that people feel disturbs all stability and their human security, m is mass of the

object (military attacks used), v is velocity (weakness of the government), r is length of the string or the radius of the circular movement; it is equal to 1 - total number of those engaged in the conflict/total population as in (2):

$$r = 1 - \frac{\text{\# of those engaged in conflict}}{\text{total \# of population}} \quad (2)$$

When the intensity of military operations increases and the government is weakened then the centrifugal force F_c increases and hence the feel of insecurity increases. The radius ranges from zero to one; when $r = 1$ this means no one is engaged in the violent conflict, and when $r = 0$ all the population are part of the conflict. Therefore, when all the population are part of the conflict the state reached the state of chaos and the centrifugal force is infinite.

Despite the fact that the counterinsurgency effort is trying to stabilise the movement of the stone, the use of military force and the traditional means of warfare strategies is increasing the centrifugal force. Many actors are playing a role; however, all the efforts are not contributing to enhance the security perception amongst the locals. The neutral segment of society is not likely to engage with the insurgents or the counterinsurgents as they perceive that things should be resolved differently.

As the conflict reaches the various segments of the community, the state becomes an ultracentrifugal system; it separates the various elements. The effect of the outward force leads to some being separated easily by leaving the whole system; those who are not willing to remain part of the system emigrate. They are similar to the particles with low density that are easily separated from the system in the ultracentrifuge. Others remain within the system; their willingness to look for alternative solutions makes it harder to break them and lose from the system. Their alternatives might be participation in the conflict, or use of economic opportunities that might arise, or simply starting a new group of insurgents or a new political faction. These alternatives might be sufficient to keep them within the system, or they might end up with very little capacity and energy to maintain, and then they are also jolted away out of the system. The result in all cases is a separation of the constituent elements of the community, destroying all forms of unity, and leading to human insecurity. It leads to the formation of various parties, each trying to conserve its new characteristics, and each trying to ensure human security aspects – if any – for its own adherents. It is conflict that leads to more disintegration and to even more conflict. The balance between fighting and restoring human security to adherents drives the behaviour of the competitors. However, this balance is not possible since it is a provision of human security to adherents only while dismantling human security of the rest; an equation that is never balanced and never possible to maintain.

IV. CONCLUSION

Various insurgents, counterinsurgents, humanitarian organisations, and the state all are part of an asymmetric

conflict in a fragile state. The number of players increases and the violence is striking. As a consequence, the violence is increased to a rate that is then not possible to control. Military intervention is not able to strengthen the state; on the contrary, it is leading to more disintegration of the society.

In an asymmetric conflict in a fragile state the insurgents are able to gain control due to the weakness of the state. Some of the citizens are seeing the insurgents as the saviours since they are in agreement with their ideology or because they receive direct services from the insurgents. Other citizens are benefiting from the status quo of the state weakness, and these are seeing the state as the only source of benefit; they are the elite in the government or those who receive special services from the government. Counterinsurgency and foreign intervention with the use of traditional means of warfare do not help enhance situation, as the use of more military force leads to a faster disintegration of the society, and hence to more conflict. The neutral segments of the society will support either the insurgents or the counterinsurgents in this case. They will seek other alternatives either by leaving the country (more emigration) or by forming new insurgent groups. As it was shown, the vicious cycle thus generated has the effect of a centrifugal force acting on society. This force disturbs the feel of stability, national security, and human security of all, and leads to disintegration just as it breaks down the elements of a fluid with less density in the physical world. Those with less density (less willingness to participate) tend to leave the system easily.

Despite the fact that counterinsurgency effort conducted by the government and intervention forces is trying to stabilise the situation, the use of traditional means of warfare speeds up the vicious cycle until a point of no return is reached and stability cannot be restored anymore. Many active players on the ground, with no feeling of security amongst the local population, it is a state of human insecurity. It leads to more immigration, more disintegration and more conflict.

The work of humanitarian organisations in this case is crippled. They cannot provide sufficient services; they are barely able to provide food and shelter for a limited segment of the society. They are not able to reach the most affected locations. It is only with certain negotiations with the insurgents that they are able to provide limited amount of support, which is usually insufficient and not capable to meet the needs of the vulnerable groups.

And the question is, who provides human security? And, for whom? It is evident from the above discussion that human security is being provided as part of the recruitment strategies of all actors; each party provides human security for its adherents. However, the pursuit of human security for adherents is a zero-sum game, because it involves depriving the adherents of the rivals of human security. Additionally, even when each rival is providing human security to its adherents, they are not applying the comprehensive approach, rather specific ones that fits their agenda. They provide for the least possible needs, prevent the least acknowledged fears, and aim to recruit new adherents. The provision of human security for adherents is not only driven by political agenda; however,

with the limited capacities of the rivals they cannot afford to engage in developing effective sustainable solutions. Hence, the conclusion is that no participant is able to provide real human security under military interventions in asymmetric conflict within a fragile state.

The solution in such a complex condition is not military intervention as such, which complies with the policies of the NATO as well as the doctrines of the national forces. When considering the four principles of human security including people-centred approaches, comprehensive, context specific, and prevention oriented, then the solution is conflict prevention and humanitarian action. It is a solution that was considered by the Canadian foreign ministry that developed a human security agenda with the narrow definition of human security and Japan using the broad definition of human security including the following themes: protection of civilians, peace support operations, governance and accountability, public safety, and conflict prevention [15]. Ramsbotham indicated that the use of soft power is the way to accomplish a balanced solution [23]. David Galula also assured that the solution should be mostly political "is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political... isolation (of insurgents) must not be enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population" [10]. Though armed force should be part of the equation; however, the solution should be based on eliminating the capacity of the insurgents while focusing on nation-building and efforts to gain popular support; the solution is political much more than it is military.

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