

Improved of Elliptic Curves Cryptography over a Ring

A. Chillali, A. Tadmori, M. Ziane

Abstract—In this article we will study the elliptic curve defined over the ring A_n and we define the mathematical operations of ECC, which provides a high security and advantage for wireless applications compared to other asymmetric key cryptosystem.

Keywords—Elliptic Curves, Finite Ring, Cryptography.

I. INTRODUCTION

THE ECC use curves whose variables coefficients are finite, there are two family commonly used on this cryptography. The first uses elliptic curves $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ over prime finite field \mathbb{F}_p where p is large prime; this family is the best for software implementation of ECC. The second family use elliptic curves $E(\mathbb{F}_{2^d})$ over binary field \mathbb{F}_{2^d} where d is large integer number, this family is more suitable for hardware implementation of ECC. In this work, we define the other family which seems to be beneficial and interesting in ECC implementations. Its the family use elliptic curves $E_{a,b}(A_n)$ over the ring $A_n = \mathbb{F}_{2^d}[\varepsilon]$ where $\varepsilon^n = 0$, d and n are large integers numbers [1], [2], [7].

Let d be a positive integer, we consider the quotient ring $A_n = \frac{\mathbb{F}_{2^d}[X]}{(X^n)}$ where \mathbb{F}_{2^d} is the finite field of order 2^d . The ring A_n is identified to the ring $\mathbb{F}_{2^d}[\varepsilon]; \varepsilon^n = 0$. So, we have: $A_n = \{\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} x_i \varepsilon^i | (x_i)_{0 \leq i \leq n-1} \in \mathbb{F}_{2^d}\}$. Similar as in [3] and in [5], we have the following lemmas:

Lemma 1. The elements non invertible in the ring A_n are the elements of ideal εA_n .

Proof: A_n is a local ring, its maximal ideal is $M = \varepsilon A_n$.

Lemma 2. A_n is a vector space over \mathbb{F}_{2^d} of dimension n and $(1, \varepsilon, \varepsilon^2, \varepsilon^3, \dots, \varepsilon^{n-1})$ is a basis of A_n .

Lemma 3. Let $Y = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} y_i \varepsilon^i$ be the inverse of the element $X = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} x_i \varepsilon^i$ then:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} y_0 = x_0^{-1} \\ y_j = x_0^{-1} \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{j-1} y_i x_{j-i}. \text{ For } j = 1, 2, 3, \dots, n-1. \end{array} \right.$$

II. NOTATION

Definition 1. We define an elliptic curve over the ring A_n noted $E_{a,b}(A_n)$ as a curve given by such Weierstrass equation:

$$Y^2Z + XYZ = X^3 + aX^2Z + bZ^3 \quad (1)$$

where $a, b \in A_n$ that b is invertible.

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The discriminant $\Delta = b$ and the J-invariant $J = \frac{1}{b}$, we write:

$$E_{a,b}(A_n) = \{[X:Y:Z] \in \mathbb{P}_2(A_n) | Y^2Z + XYZ = X^3 + aX^2Z + bZ^3\}$$

Definition 2. We define a reduction of $E_{a,b}(A_n)$ over \mathbb{F}_{2^d} as a curve given by such Weierstrass equation:

$$Y^2Z + XYZ = X^3 + a_0X^2Z + b_0Z^3 \quad (2)$$

where $a_0, b_0 \in \mathbb{F}_{2^d}$ that $b_0 \neq 0$.

The discriminant $\Delta_0 = b_0$ and the j-invariant $j = \frac{1}{b_0}$, we write:

$$E_{a_0,b_0}(\mathbb{F}_{2^d}) = \{[X:Y:Z] \in \mathbb{P}_2(\mathbb{F}_{2^d}) | Y^2Z + XYZ = X^3 + a_0X^2Z + b_0Z^3\}$$

Notation 1. We denote π the canonical projection by:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi: A_n &\rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^d} \\ \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} x_i \varepsilon^i &\mapsto x_0 \end{aligned}$$

III. CLASSIFICATION OF ELEMENTS OF $E_{a,b}(A_2)$

Let $[X:Y:Z] \in E_{a,b}(A_2)$, where X, Y and Z are in A . We have two cases for Z :

- Z invertible: then $[X:Y:Z] = [XZ^{-1}:YZ^{-1}:1]$; hence we take just $[X:Y:1]$.
- Z non invertible: So $Z = z_1 \varepsilon$, see [4], in this cases we have tow cases for Y .

- Y Invertible:

Then $[X:Y:Z] = [XY^{-1}:1:ZY^{-1}]$; so we just take $[X:1:z_1 \varepsilon]$; then is verified the equation of

$$E_{a,b}(A): Y^2Z + XYZ = X^3 + aX^2Z + bZ^3,$$

so we can write:

$$\begin{aligned} a &= a_0 + a_1 \varepsilon \\ b &= b_0 + b_1 \varepsilon \\ X &= x_0 + x_1 \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

We have:

$$z_1 \varepsilon + (x_0 + x_1 \varepsilon) \cdot z_1 = (x_0 + x_1 \varepsilon)^3 + (a_0 + a_1 \varepsilon) \cdot (x_0 + x_1 \varepsilon)^2 \cdot z_1 \varepsilon + (b_0 + b_1 \varepsilon) \cdot z_1^3 \varepsilon^3$$

which implies that

$$z_1 \varepsilon + x_0 z_1 \varepsilon = x_0^3 + (x_0^2 x_1 + a_0 x_0^2 z_1) \varepsilon$$

Then

$$(z_1 + x_0 z_1) \varepsilon = x_0^3 + (x_0^2 x_1 + a_0 x_0^2 z_1) \varepsilon$$

Since $(1, \varepsilon)$ is a base of the vector space A over \mathbb{F}_{2^d} , then $x_0 = 0$, so $X = x_1\varepsilon$ and $z_1\varepsilon = 0$ (ie $z_1 = 0$) hence $[X: 1: z_1] = [x_1\varepsilon : 1 : 0]$.

- Y Non Invertible:

Then we have $Y = y_1\varepsilon$, so $X = x_0 + x_1\varepsilon$ is invertible so we take $[X: Y: Z] \sim [1: y_1\varepsilon: z_1\varepsilon]$ thus $1 + a_1 z_1\varepsilon = 0$, ie $1 + a_0 z_1\varepsilon = 0$ which is absurd.

Proposition 1. Every element of $E_{a,b}(A)$, is of the form $[X: Y: 1]$ or $[x\varepsilon: 1: 0]$, where $x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^d}$ and we write:

$$E_{a,b}(A) = \{[X: Y: 1] \in P_2(A) | Y^2 + XY = X^3 + aX^2 + b\} \cup \{[x\varepsilon: 1: 0] | x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^d}\}. [1, 4].$$

Theorem 1. Let $P = [X_1: Y_1: Z_1]$, $Q = [X_2: Y_2: Z_2]$ in $E_{a,b}(A)$ then $P + Q = [X_3: Y_3: Z_3]$:

- If $\pi_2(P) = \pi_2(Q)$ then:

$$\begin{aligned} X_3 &= X_1 Y_1 Y_2 + X_2 Y_1^2 Y_2 + X_2^2 Y_1^2 + X_1 X_2^2 Y_1 + a X_1^2 X_2 Y_2 \\ &\quad + a X_1 X_2^2 Y_1 + a X_1^2 X_2^2 + b X_1 Y_1 Z_2^2 \\ &\quad + b X_2 Y_2 Z_1^2 + b X_1^2 Z_2^2 + b Y_1 Z_2^2 Z_1 \\ &\quad + b Y_2 Z_1^2 Z_2 + b X_1 Z_2^2 Z_1 \\ Y_3 &= Y_1^2 Y_2^2 + X_2 Y_1^2 Y_2 + a X_1 X_2^2 Y_1 + a^2 X_1^2 X_2^2 + b X_1^2 X_2 Z_2 \\ &\quad + b X_1 X_2^2 Z_1 + b X_1 Y_1 Z_2^2 + b X_1^2 Z_2^2 \\ &\quad + ab X_2^2 Z_1^2 + b Y_1 Z_2^2 Z_1 + b X_1 Z_2^2 Z_1 \\ &\quad + ab X_1 Z_2^2 Z_1 + ab X_2 Z_1^2 Z_2 + b^2 Z_1^2 Z_2^2 \\ Z_3 &= X_1^2 X_2 Y_2 + X_1 X_2^2 Y_1 + Y_1^2 Y_2 Z_2 + Y_1 Y_2^2 Z_1 + X_1^2 X_2^2 \\ &\quad + X_2 Y_1^2 Z_2 + X_1^2 Y_2 Z_2 + a X_1^2 Y_2 Z_2 + a X_2^2 Y_1 Z_1 \\ &\quad + X_1^2 X_2 Z_2 + a X_1 X_2^2 Z_1 + b Y_1 Z_2^2 Z_1 \\ &\quad + b Y_2 Z_1^2 Z_2 + b X_1 Z_2^2 Z_1 \end{aligned}$$

- If $\pi_2(P) \neq \pi_2(Q)$ then:

$$\begin{aligned} X_3 &= X_1 Y_2^2 Z_1 + X_2 Y_1^2 Z_2 + X_1^2 Y_2 Z_2 + X_2^2 Y_1 Z_1 + a X_1^2 X_2 Z_2 \\ &\quad + a X_1 X_2^2 Z_1 + b X_1 Z_2^2 Z_1 + b X_2 Z_1^2 Z_2 \\ Y_3 &= X_1^2 X_2 Y_2 + X_1 X_2^2 Y_1 + Y_1^2 Y_2 Z_2 + Y_1 Y_2^2 Z_1 + X_1^2 Y_2 Z_2 \\ &\quad + X_2^2 Y_1 Z_1 + a X_1^2 Y_2 Z_2 + a X_2^2 Y_1 Z_1 \\ &\quad + a X_1^2 X_2 Z_2 + a X_1 X_2^2 Z_1 + b Y_1 Z_2^2 Z_1 \\ &\quad + b Y_2 Z_1^2 Z_2 + b X_1 Z_2^2 Z_1 + b X_2 Z_1^2 Z_2 \\ Z_3 &= X_1^2 X_2 Z_2 + X_1 X_2^2 Z_1 + Y_1^2 Z_2^2 + Y_2^2 Z_1^2 + X_1 Y_1 Z_2^2 \\ &\quad + X_2 Y_2 Z_1^2 + a X_1^2 Z_2^2 + a X_2^2 Z_1^2 \end{aligned}$$

Proof: Using the explicit formulas in [8] we prove the theorem.

IV. CRYPTOGRAPHY APPLICATION

Let $P \in E_{a,b}(A_n)$ of order p , we will use the subgroup $\langle P \rangle$ of $E_{a,b}(A_n)$ to encrypt message, and we denote $G = \langle P \rangle$.

- Coding of Elements of G .

We will give a code to each element $Q = m \cdot P \in G$, where $m \in \{1, 2, \dots, p\}$.

Let $Q = [\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} x_i \varepsilon^i : \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} y_i \varepsilon^i : Z]$ where, $x_i, y_i \in \mathbb{F}_{2^d}$, for $i = 0, 1, \dots, n-1$ and $Z = \sum_{i=3}^{n-1} z_i \varepsilon^i$, or $Z = 1$.

We set:

$$x_i = c_{0,i} + c_{1,i}\alpha + \dots + c_{(d-1),i}\alpha^{d-1} = c_{0,i}c_{1,i} \dots c_{(d-1),i}$$

where α is a primitive root of an irreducible polynomial of degree d over \mathbb{F}_2 then, we code Q as it follows:[6]

- If $Q = [\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} x_i \varepsilon^i : \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} y_i \varepsilon^i : 1]$, then:

$$Q = \underbrace{x_0 x_1 \dots x_{n-1} y_0 y_1 \dots y_{n-1}}_{3.d.n} 1 0 \dots 0$$

- If $Q = [\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} x_i \varepsilon^i : 1 : \sum_{i=3}^{n-1} z_i \varepsilon^i]$, then:

$$Q = \underbrace{0 \dots 0 x_1 \dots x_{n-1}}_{3.d.n} 1 0 \dots 0 z_3 \dots z_{n-1}$$

• Exchange of Secret Key

Alice and Bob wants exchange the secret key, for this he start publicly with integer d , a curve elliptic $E_{a,b}(A_n)$, a point $P \in E_{a,b}(A_n)$ of order p and the coding methode over $G = \langle P \rangle$.

Alice chooses a random number $0 \leq t \leq p-1$ and computes $K = tP$.

Alice sends K to Bob, but keep t

Bob chooses a random number $0 \leq l \leq p-1$, computes $K' = lP$.

Bob sends K' to Alice, but keep l .

Alice computes $t \cdot K' = t.lP$.

Bob computes $l \cdot K = l.tP$.

Finally, Alice and Bob are agree with a point $S = t.lP$, choose the binary code of point S as a private key, which transformed on the decimal code « S' ».

Remark 1. With the secret key S' such as the decimal code of point S Alice and Bob can encrypt and decrypt the message (m) .

• ECC Key Generation Block Diagram




Fig. 1 Depict the key generation phase

To encrypt P_m , a user picks an integer « r » at random and sends the point $(r.Q, P_m + r.Pbkey)$. This operation is showed in Fig. 2.

• ECC Encryption Process Block Diagram

Decryption this message is done by multiplying the first component of the received point by the secret key « S' » and subtract it from the second component:

$$(P_m + r.Pbkey) - S'.(r.Q) = P_m + r.S'.Q - S'.r.Q = P_m$$

This operation is shown in Fig. 3.




Fig. 2 The encryption operation




Fig. 3 Decrypting the message

- Example.

For the example we take the case $n = 3$ (i.e.: $E_{a,b}(A_3)$) and let α is a primitive root of an irreducible polynomial $R(X) = X^3 + X + 1$ over \mathbb{F}_2 .

We consider the field $\mathbb{F}_2(\alpha) = \frac{\mathbb{F}_2[X]}{(R(X))} \cong \mathbb{F}_8$, \mathbb{F}_8 is the finite field of order 2^3 and of basis $(1, \alpha, \alpha^2)$.

Let $a = 1 + \alpha + \alpha\epsilon + \epsilon^2$, $b = 1 + \alpha^2\epsilon + \epsilon^2$ two elements of A_3 .

The elliptic curve $E_{a,b}(A_3)$ has 896 elements but the elliptic curve $E_{a_0,b_0}(\mathbb{F}_8)$, where $a_0 = \pi(a)$, and $b_0 = \pi(b)$ has 14 elements.

So, we have well: $\#E_{a,b}(A_3) = \#E_{a_0,b_0}(\mathbb{F}_8) \times \# \mathbb{F}_8^2$.

We consider the point $P = [\alpha^2 + \alpha^2\epsilon + \alpha\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha^2 + \epsilon : 1]$, we have $G = \langle P \rangle$ is the subgroup of order 56 so, for $Q \in G, \exists m \in \{1, 2, \dots, 56\}$: $Q = mP$.

The points of G are:

$$\begin{aligned}
 P &= [\alpha^2 + \alpha^2\epsilon + \alpha\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha^2 + \epsilon : 1] \\
 2P &= [1 + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha + (\alpha^2 + 1)\epsilon + \epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 3P &= [\alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (\alpha + 1) + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 4P &= [1 + \alpha + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon \\
 &\quad + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 5P &= [\alpha + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon : 1] \\
 6P &= [1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon : 1] \\
 7P &= [\alpha^2\epsilon + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 8P &= [1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon^2 : 1 + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \alpha\epsilon^2 : 1]
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 9P &= [\alpha + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon^2 : \alpha^2 + (\alpha^2 + \alpha)\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 10P &= [1 + \alpha + \epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 11P &= [\alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 12P &= [1 + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 13P &= [\alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon + \epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha^2\epsilon + \epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 14P &= [\alpha^2\epsilon + \epsilon^2 : 1 : 0] \\
 15P &= [\alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha^2 + (\alpha^2 + \alpha)\epsilon + \epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 16P &= [1 + \alpha + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \alpha\epsilon^2 : \alpha + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2) + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 17P &= [\alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 18P &= [1 + \alpha + \epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha^2\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 19P &= [\alpha + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon : 1] \\
 20P &= [1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon \\
 &\quad + \alpha\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 21P &= [\alpha^2\epsilon + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + \epsilon + \alpha\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 22P &= [1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon : 1 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 23P &= [\alpha + \epsilon^2 : \alpha^2 + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 24P &= [1 + \alpha + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha^2 + \epsilon + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 25P &= [\alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : \alpha^2\epsilon + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 26P &= [1 + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon \\
 &\quad + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 27P &= [\alpha^2 + \alpha^2\epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 28P &= [(\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 : 0] \\
 29P &= [\alpha^2 + \alpha^2\epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha^2 + \epsilon + \epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 30P &= [1 + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \alpha\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 31P &= [\alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon + \epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 32P &= [1 + \alpha + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon \\
 &\quad + \alpha\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 33P &= [\alpha + \epsilon^2 : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 34P &= [1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 35P &= [\alpha^2\epsilon + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 36P &= [1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon \\
 &\quad + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 37P &= [\alpha + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : \alpha^2 + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 38P &= [1 + \alpha + \epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 39P &= [\alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon : 1] \\
 40P &= [1 + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \alpha\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 41P &= [\alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha^2\epsilon + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 42P &= [\alpha^2\epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 : 0] \\
 43P &= [\alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha^2 + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon : 1] \\
 44P &= [1 + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \epsilon^2 : \alpha + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 45P &= [\alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 46P &= [1 + \alpha + \epsilon + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha^2\epsilon + \epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 47P &= [\alpha + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon^2 : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha^2) + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 48P &= [1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon^2 : \alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 49P &= [\alpha^2\epsilon + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + \epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 50P &= [1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : 1 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \alpha^2\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 51P &= [\alpha + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha^2 + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 52P &= [1 + \alpha + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha^2 + \epsilon + (1 + \alpha)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 53P &= [\alpha + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : \alpha^2\epsilon + \alpha\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 54P &= [1 + \alpha^2 + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon + (\alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1 + \alpha + \alpha^2 + \alpha\epsilon \\
 &\quad + (1 + \alpha + \alpha^2)\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 55P &= [\alpha^2 + \alpha^2\epsilon + \alpha\epsilon^2 : 1 + (1 + \alpha^2)\epsilon + \alpha\epsilon^2 : 1] \\
 56P &= [0 : 1 : 0]
 \end{aligned}$$

- Table of Coding the Elements of G

We use English letters for this application. The coding are as follows:

TABLE I
TABLE OF LETTERS

- Encryption and Decryption Messages

Let the following message: "nlmad tamazivt"

Transmutation this message effected letter by letter, its points codes are:

TABLE II
TABLE OF ENCRYPT

<i>Code of letters</i>	<i>Symbol</i>
001001010101100000100000000	<i>a</i>
1100110111111101100000000	<i>d</i>
001010100100001100100000000	<i>m</i>
000001100100000000000000000	<i>n</i>
1111011101110101010000000	<i>t</i>
00000110110010001010000000	<i>u</i>
111010000100101110100000000	<i>v</i>
10111101111010111100000000	<i>z</i>
101101100111010101010000000	<i>l</i>
010110110001011001100000000	<i>i</i>

The encryption and decryption of these points are effected by the process cited before see, Figs. 1 and 2.

Exchange of Secret Key.

Alice chooses a random number $t = 5$ and computes $K = t \cdot P$.

Alice sends **K** to Bob, but keep **t**

Bob chooses a random number = 7, computes $K' = l.P.$

Bob sends K' to Alice, but keep \mathbf{I} .

Alice computes $tK' \equiv 35P$.

Bob computes $IK = 35P$.

Alice and Bob are agree with a point $S = 35P$, choose the code of point S as a private key, which transformed on the decimal code $S' = 3563264$

To encrypt every point P_m , a user picks an integer « r » at random and sends the point $(r.Q, P_m + r.Pbkey)$.

We have the following text:

(1011110110101100100000000,011110110111100011000
 00000)(110011011111110110000000,010000110110110
 00100000000)(1110100010111100010000000,0000011011
 0010110010000000)(1111011010001101010000000,0101
 1011000101100110000000)(1101001110011010111000000
 0,0110100010001111110000000)(10110110011101010110
 0000000,00101010010000110010000000)(00000110010000
 00000000000000,00101000110101110010000000)
 (1011110110101100100000000,011110110111100011000
 00000)(110011011111110110000000,010000110110110
 00100000000)(1110100010111100010000000,0000011011
 0010110010000000)(1111011010001101010000000,0101
 1011000101100110000000)(1101001110011010111000000
 0,0110100010001111110000000)(10110110011101010110
 0000000,00101010010000110010000000)(00000110010000
 00000000000000,00101000110101110010000000)

Remark 2. With this application, we can encrypt and decrypt any message. The security of this encryption is based on the discrete logarithm problem.

V. CONCLUSION

In this work, we have studied the elliptic curves cryptography over the ring $A_n = \mathbb{F}_{2^d}[\varepsilon]$; $\varepsilon^n = 0$, and we have established the coding over the elliptic curves $E_{a,b}(A_n)$.

Further, the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) on this elliptic curve is equivalent to the one on $E_{a_0, b_0}(\mathbb{F}_{2^d})$ but the cardinal of this elliptic curve is bigger than that of $E_{a_0, b_0}(\mathbb{F}_{2^d})$, which seems to be beneficial and interesting in cryptography.

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