FPGA Implementation of the "PYRAMIDS" Block Cipher

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Abstract---The "PYRAMIDS" Block Cipher is a symmetric encryption algorithm of a 64, 128, 256-bit length, that accepts a variable key length of 128, 192, 256 bits. The algorithm is an iterated cipher consisting of repeated applications of a simple round transformation with different operations and different sequence in each round. The algorithm was previously software implemented in C⁺⁺ code. In this paper, a hardware implementation of the algorithm, using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA), is presented. In this work, we discuss the algorithm, the implemented micro-architecture, and the simulation and implementation results. Moreover, we present a detailed comparison with other implemented standard algorithms. In addition, we include the floor plan as well as the circuit diagrams of the various micro-architecture modules.

Keywords---FPGA, VHDL, micro-architecture, encryption, cryptography, algorithm, data communication security.

I. INTRODUCTION

 $R_{
m attention}$ of a number of researchers. However, classical encryption algorithms have to be adapted to hardware implementation where area and time constraints are of vital importance. In this work, we present a modified version of the "PYRAMIDS" block cipher to suit hardware implementation using FPGA. The original algorithm was modified for packet-level data security applications [1]. The implemented micro-architecture consists of two main functional blocks. These are the address control module and the encryption module. In the next few sections we discuss the algorithm, the building blocks of the micro-architecture along with details of its operation. We also provide the details of the simulation and implementation results. The particulars of the performed simulations, timing, and routing reports and the floor plan are provided in the given appendix. Moreover, provide a comparison with other FPGA implementations of standard encryption algorithms [2], [3], [4], [5], [6].

II. THE ALGORITHM


In the following few lines, we provide a summary of the PYRAMIDS block cipher algorithm [1]. The aim of the algorithm is to take a plain text message of 256 bits and divide it to four parts x0, x1, x2 and x3, then apply some operations for 8 rounds using 4 sub-keys for each round. The key generation unit in the Encryption module accepts a 128-bit user key, and schedules the sub-keys for all

rounds of encryption. These sub-keys are derived from the user's input key using the key scheduling algorithm which is the PYRAMIDS algorithm itself. The round transformation is composed of different transformations. These transformations are addition +, xor \oplus , right rotation >>>, and ordered operation \otimes . The ordered operation \otimes differs depending on the round and it consists of AND, OR and NOT operations. Because of this, the round function is changed dynamically by considering the plaintext word W as consisting of four parts w0,w1,w2, and w3. There are k sub-keys. The algorithm can be formally described as follows:

```
Algorithm PYRAMIDS BLOCK CIPHER
Given a plain text message block W and user key K]
Input: W[plain text], user key K
Round (W, k)
     Begin round
      w_1 = w_1 + k_i^1;
      w_2 = w_2 + k_i^2;
      w_0 = w_0 \oplus ((w_2 \otimes_i^1 k_i^0) >>> Rot_i^1); // f_i^1
      w_3 = w_3 \oplus ((w_1 \otimes_i^2 k_i^3) >>> Rot_i^2); // f_i^2
      w_1 = w_1 \oplus w_0;
      w_2 = w_2 \oplus w_3;
      w_0 = w_0 >>> Rot_i^2;
      w_2 = w_2 >>> Rot_i^1;
      (w_0, w_1, w_2, w_3) = (w_2, w_0, w_3, w_1);
    End round;
Encryption (Plaintext, Ciphertext, k,⊗, Rot)
    begin
          for i = 0 to R-1
              Round(Plaintext, Ciphertext, k, \otimes, Rot);
          for i=0 to 4
            Ciphertext[j]=Ciphertext[j] \oplus k_{4R+1}^{j}
    End.
Output: encrypted file
```

We have proved through experimentation that the implementation of the algorithm, in its original form, will not be feasible regarding the implementation area and the number of input/output pins available on the target FPGA device. We have modified the PYRAMIDS to suit the hardware implementation on this target device by reducing the number of input and output bits. This is accomplished by taking a 16-bit text message and dividing it into

four parts. The round's graph, shown below in Figure 1, displays the modifications to the algorithm.



III. THE MICRO-ARCHITECTURE

In this section, we provide a detailed description of our proposed micro-architecture for the PYRAMIDS block cipher. The micro-architecture contains two modules as shown in Figure 2. The first module is the address_control module which is used to generate and synchronize the memory address for reading the plaintext and writing the ciphertext operations. It contains two counters; one for "read-address" generation and the other for "write-address" generation. It also contains a multiplexer for synchronization between these two counters. The second module is the encryption module that performs this operation. In this design, as mentioned before, we have used a plaintext of 16 bits and a user key of 128 bits. The output ciphertext is 16-bit long. The circuit diagram of all modules is shown in Figure B.2 in Appendix B.




Fig. 2 The micro-architecture

A. Address Control module

The function of the address control module is to generate and control addresses of the plaintext and ciphertext words to be read and stored in the memory unit respectively. This module sends the plaintext word address (read address) generated by read counter during read clock cycle. Afterwards, it sends the ciphertext

address (write address) generated by write counter during the write clock cycle. The output of this module is 18-bit long because we have used in this design memory of 256 KB. The read counter generates addresses starting from Hx"00000". The write counter generates addresses starting from Hx"3FFF9". The difference between the read address and the write address is 8 positions so that the ciphertext word will be stored in the same position of its plaintext. The conceptual block diagram is shown in Figure 3. The circuit diagram is shown in Figure B.3.




Fig. 3 The Address Control module

B. The Encryption module

This module performs the encryption operation and it also generates the sub-keys from the original user key. The Encryption module consists of nine components; eight round units (round0 - round7), and the key generation unit. This module accepts plaintext word and user key of 128 bits and generates the cipher word after eight rounds. Each round is completed in one clock cycle. During this round some operations on the input with four sub-keys are carried out. These operations are addition +, xor \oplus , right rotation >>>, and ordered operation \otimes . Each round from 0 to 6 uses four sub-keys. The last round uses eight sub-keys. The conceptual block diagram is shown in Figure 4. The circuit diagram is shown in Figure B.4.




Fig. 4 The Encryption Module

B.1 The Round unit

The round unit contains eight rounds (roun0 – round7). The round0 accepts the plaintext word and divide it to four parts (x0, x1, x2 and x3). Subsequently, it applies some operations with four sub-keys as described above. The block diagram of this unit is shown in Figure 5.




Fig. 5 The Round0 unit

The four output buses of the enc-round0 are connected to the inputs of the enc-round1. The same connections apply to other

units from round1 to round 6. This is achieved by taking four inputs from the next round and connecting them to the four outputs of the previous round as shown in Figure 6.




Fig. 6 The Round1-round6 units

The round7 is the last round. It takes the four outputs of round6 as inputs and applies some operations with eight sub-keys. Finally, the four parts of the ciphertext are collected together to produce one cipher word as shown in Figure 7. All rounds have the same architecture; however their functionalities are different depending on the order of the round.




Fig. 7 The Round7 unit

B.2 The key generation unit

The input to this unit, as shown in Figure 8, is a user key of 128-bit long. When the reset signal takes place, the unit accepts the input user key and generates the sub-keys. These sub-keys are used as inputs to the eight-round units as mentioned above. The circuit diagram is shown in Figure B.5.



Fig. 8 The key generation unit

IV. SIMULATION

At the start when the reset signal is active, the key generation unit in the encryption module accepts the user key and generates the sub-keys. Then at each clock, the address control module generates an address to the memory unit. The read operation is performed in one clock cycle and the next clock is used for the write operation. During the read operation, one plaintext word

arrives to the encryption module from the memory unit through the signal *plaintext*. The address control unit also produces an address position to store a cipher word at the rising edge of the write clock. Therefore, at every two clock cycles there will be one read operation and one write operation. Figure 9 shows the results of the simulation of the address control module.




Fig. 9 Simulation of the address control module

When the plaintext word arrives at the encryption module, it is divided into four parts in the round0 unit. The round0 applies some operations on the four parts using four sub-keys. The four outputs of round0 are accepted as inputs by the round1 unit. This unit applies also some operations using another four sub-keys. The round2 to round6 units accomplish the same function similar to round1. Finally, round7 performs the same operations on the four inputs using eight sub-keys. Then it produces the cipher word. The simulation results are shown in Figure 10. The output of the encryption unit is then transmitted to the memory unit.




Fig. 10 Simulation of the encryption module

V. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS

We have used the XC4000XLA Xilinx family to implement our design. We have used this device because the number of

Input/Outputs in our design is 180 ports and this family is suitable for this design. Although we understand that there are now Xilinx families with more advanced features, however most of the standard literature on FPGA implementation of encryption algorithms was performed family. A comparison with using this implementations, using the XC4000 FPGA family, is shown in Appendix A. With the exception of the YAEA implementation, the comparison demonstrates the preeminence of the discussed algorithm and our proposed micro-architecture. This is based on the data throughput, the consumed area, and the proposed functional density figure-of-merit. In appendix B we provide a summary of the details of the timing reports. These reports were taken for a 16-bit block plain text, 128 bits key and a cipher text of 16 bits. The details of these reports are as shown in the above-mentioned appendix. Moreover, the design floor plan and the circuit diagrams of all modules are also provided.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The PYRAMIDS is an iterated cipher consisting of a repeated application of a simple round transformation with different operations and different sequences in each round. The special features of the proposed microarchitecture are summarized as follows:

- A hardware-adapted version of the encryption algorithm "PYRAMIDS" is presented in this work. This adapted version is suitable for FPGA or ASIC-type implementations due to appreciable saving in implementation area, as counted by the number of gates.
- When the round function is changed dynamically, then one can establish that the algorithm output varies for every input user's key.
- The encryptor part of the micro-architecture can easily be integrated before the router at the sender side. The decryptor, essentially of the same design as the encryptor, is integrated after the router at the receiver side. Thus, one can realize a virtual private network VPN for security-demanding applications. On the other hand, this micro-architecture can be part of a more comprehensive security processor structure.
- As shown in Table A.1 and Figure A.1, the algorithm provides a performance that surpasses the implementations of the RC-6, TWOFISH and SERPENT. The performance metric is based on the functional density figure-of- merit. This performance edge is quite encouraging since the algorithm belongs to the same family of RC algorithms.

Based on the discussed comparison, one can conclude that the micro-architecture performance is satisfactory for packet-level high-security applications of today's networks.

APPENDIX A

Comparison with other implementations of well-known algorithms

The following table [2], [3], [4], [5], [6] and the accompanying chart provide a comparison of various algorithm FPGA implementations. We have used a figure-of-merit that is equal to the obtained throughput divided by the area consumed in realizing this architecture. A chart is given below that demonstrates this functional density figure-of-merit for some of the standard algorithms.

TABLE A.I
A comparison between FPGA implementations of various algorithms

Algorithm	Throughpu t Speed in Mbps	Area in (CLBs)	Functional Density Figure-of-merit = (Throughput ÷ Area) in Mbps/ CLB
RC-6	61	1325	0.04603
SERPENT	139.3	3136	0.0444
TwoFish	88	958	0.0919
YAEA (XC4005xL)	129.1	149	0.8661
PYRAMIDS (XC4085XLA)	54.461	240	0.22692




Fig. A.1 The Functional Density for our design and some algorithms' FPGA implementations

APPENDIX B

<u>Implementation reports</u>

In this appendix, we provide the details of the implementation reports as they were made available by FPGA advantage and Xilinx software for HDL design.

Design Information

Target Device XC4000XLA

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Target Package: 4085xlaHQ240

Target Speed : -9

The Whole Design

Device utilization summary:

Number of External IOBs 180 out of 448 93%

Flops: 0 Latches: 0

Number of IOBs driving Global Buffers 1 out of 8

12%

Number of CLBs 240 out of 3136 7% 144 out of 6272 2% Total Latches: Total CLB Flops: 168 out of 6272 2% 414 out of 6272 6% 4 input LUTs: 3 input LUTs: 150 out of 3136 4% Number of BUFGLSs 1 out of 8 12% Number of STARTUPs 1 out of 1 100%

The Average Connection Delay for this design is:

4.948 ns

The Maximum Pin Delay is: 29.379 ns

The Average Connection Delay on the 10 Worst Nets is: 22.689 ns

Timing summary:

Timing errors: 0 Score: 0

Constraints cover 159986 paths, 731 nets, and 1690

connections (100.0% coverage)

Design statistics:

Minimum period: 65.354ns (Maximum frequency:

15.301MHz)

Maximum net delay: 29.379ns

Address Control module:

Device utilization summary:

Number of External IOBs 20 out of 448 10%

Flops: 0 Latches: 0

Number of IOBs driving Global Buffers 1 out of 8

12%

 Number of CLBs
 27 out of 3136
 1%

 Total Latches:
 0 out of 6272
 0%

 Total CLB Flops:
 36 out of 6272
 1%

 4 input LUTs:
 54 out of 6272
 1%

 3 input LUTs:
 0 out of 3136
 0%

Number of BUFGLSs 1 out of 8 12% Number of STARTUPs 1 out of 1 100%

The Average Connection Delay for this design is:

2 389 ns

The Maximum Pin Delay is: 4.975 ns

The Average Connection Delay on the 10 Worst Nets is:

3.783 ns

Timing summary:

Timing errors: 0 Score: 0

Constraints cover 432 paths, 73 nets, and 146 connections

(100.0% coverage) Design statistics:

Minimum period: 7.829ns (Maximum frequency: 127.730MHz)

Maximum combinational path delay: 14.409ns

Maximum net delay: 4.975ns

The Encryption module:

Device utilization summary:

Number of External IOBs 162 out of 448 83%

Flops: 0 Latches: 0

Number of IOBs driving Global Buffers 2 out of 8 25%

Number of CLBs 214 out of 3136 6% 144 out of 6272 2% Total Latches: Total CLB Flops: 128 out of 6272 2% 4 input LUTs: 349 out of 6272 5% 3 input LUTs: 143 out of 3136 4% Number of BUFGLSs 2 out of 8 25% Number of STARTUPs 1 out of 1 100%

The Average Connection Delay for this design is: 4.243 ns

The Maximum Pin Delay is: 24.472 ns
The Average Connection Delay on the 10 Worst Nets is: 18.583
ns

Timing summary:

Timing errors: 0 Score: 0

Constraints cover 159546 paths, 671 nets, and 1486 connections

(100.0% coverage)

Design statistics:

Minimum period: 71.637ns (Maximum frequency: 13.959MHz)

Maximum net delay: 24.472ns

The floor plan:




Fig. B.1 The Floor Plan

The circuit diagrams of the various modules: THE WHOLE DESIGN:




Fig. B.2 The schematic diagram of the whole design

ADDRESS CONTROL MODULE:




FIG. B.3 The schematic diagram of the address control module

ENCRYPTION MODULE:




Fig. B.4 The schematic diagram of the encryption module

KEY GENERATION MODULE:




Fig. B.5 The schematic diagram of the key generation module

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